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ABSTRACT OF DISSERTATION 
 
 
 
 
THE LABOR MARKET, POLITICAL CAPITAL, AND OWNERSHIP SECTOR IN 
URBAN CHINA 
 
Over the past three decades, economic reforms have brought about dramatic changes 
in China. The wave of structural and economic reforms regarding the State-owned Sector 
(SOS), and the surge of the Non-State-owned Sector (NSOS), have influenced returns in 
the labor market, such as the returns concerning human capital and political capital in 
urban China. Presumably, the NSOS would be more marketed-oriented compared to the 
SOS, and it would have different returns concerning political capital, as represented by 
Chinese Communist Party (CCP) membership. This is likely because the NSOS would 
not value Party membership as much as the SOS does. The question of how Party 
membership is rewarded in the two sectors might also change with the development of 
the two ownership sectors, as more time passes since the establishment of the economic 
reforms. 
   
I examine whether CCP members display any earnings advantage in these two 
sectors, and I also explore how such an advantage might have changed over time. Unlike 
most of the previous studies that have focused on earnings in urban China, I treat Party 
membership affiliation and ownership sector selection as being endogeneous. I apply the 
Mlogit -OLS two-stage selection correction estimation proposed by Lee (1983) and 
discover evidence which suggests that Party membership serves as a proxy for both 
political and productive skills. A flat Party premium in the SOS and a decreasing Party 
premium in the NSOS suggest that the Party card served a similar function in the 
payment scheme present in the SOS during this three year span, whereas the NSOS 
valued political capital by a decreasing amount over time.  
 
The evidence presented in my dissertation indicates that economic reforms tend to 
mitigate the earning advantage of Party members that occurs as a result of unequal 
treatment based on Party membership. This evidence suggests that CCP membership is 
losing its earning power, at least in the NSOS.  In addition, the CCP members sacrifice 
the benefits previously possessed in the adaptation to the transformed economic 
environment in urban China. However, the rewards to other forms of human capital have 
increased over time.  
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Chapter 1  
Introduction  
Decades of economic reforms have brought about dramatic changes in China. 
Reforms leading towards a market economy have gradually weakened the dominant role 
of ‘Central Planning’ in China. Private ownership is allowed to coexist with public 
ownership, which moves the economy away from central price-setting toward a market-
oriented system. One would expect these reforms have influenced returns in the labor 
market, such as the returns to the human capital and political capital. It is expected that 
the Non-State owned sector (NSOS) would be more market-oriented compared to the 
State-owned sector (SOS)1
The labor market in China has gradually moved toward a market-based system.  From 
1978 to 1999, the employment rate of State-owned units fell from 78% to 41% of the 
workforce in urban China (See Figure 1.1). The Collective-owned units fell from 22% of 
the workforce to only 8%. But other Non-State-owned units grew to 51% of the 
workforce over the same time period (NBS Year Book 2000).   
 and the returns in NSOS would mainly depend on labor 
productivity. However, it is not clear what role political capital, as represented by 
Chinese Communist Party Membership (CCP) would play in either sector. If CCP 
membership is associated with higher productivity because of screening or Party benefits, 
then they would earn more in both sectors. However, if they have political skills only but 
no differential in productivity, then they may only be better off in the SOS and not to be 
rewarded (or even worse) in the NSOS. In this dissertation, I focus on the annual earnings 
of CCP members and other workers in urban China’s labor market from 1988 to 1999, 
which covers two important phases of economic reforms: a moderate reform phase 
(1988-1995) and a radical reform phase (1995-1999). I look into the personal choices 
concerning political investment and ownership forms of the work sector in urban China. I 
examine whether CCP members in the SOS have been as successful as those in the NSOS 
at obtaining economic advantages, compared to other workers in urban China. 
                                                 
1 Generally in urban China, SOS includes government agencies and State-owned enterprises, while the 
NSOS in urban China includes urban collective enterprises and other private sector. We are not able to 
separate government agencies from state-owned enterprises in the 1988 CHIP sample. 
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The Chinese government went through a series of structural and economic reform 
efforts for State-owned enterprises (SOEs). The reforms were aimed to decentralize the 
decision-making authority out of the central ministries, to reduce the role of the CCP in 
the economy and to allow SOEs to enter the market by being responsible for price setting, 
selling outputs, and purchasing inputs. A multiple-stage management contract system was 
launched for SOEs, and this development took place over a gradual period: the tax-for-
profits2 and contracted management system (CMS)3 was put in place between 1983 and 
1985, followed by the management responsibility system (MRS)4 and internal contract 
system (ICS)5 that began in 1985.  Finally, the shareholding system6
                                                 
2 Under ‘tax-for-profits’ system, large- and medium-sized SOEs paid 55% of profit as enterprise income 
taxes and small ones a progressive income tax, while government levied an excess profits tax. Tax payment 
is part of contract responsibility system (Lee and Warner 2007). 
 was inaugurated in 
the 1990s. All these reforms contribute to the development of the labor market in urban 
China, because SOEs have increasing autonomy to recruit employees while government 
has ceded administrative allocation of labors. By 1989, the new managerial system was 
established in most of the large and medium SOEs employing more than 1000 workers 
3 In the CMS, SOEs signed a contract with the state about mutual responsibilities and are responsible for 
the profits and losses. It emphasized retained profits to make compensations. It required SOEs to keep 
separate accounts of state-owned funds and enterprise-owned funds. Accumulated enterprise-owned funds 
served as a risk reverse which was used to remit to the state when SOEs failed to achieve profit target. It 
was intended to separate ownership from management (Lee 1993). 
4 MRS was aimed to separate management from the Party. Under the MRS, the Party no longer held 
supreme power in the enterprise. Party committee’s roles were reduced to the area of ‘party organization’ 
and ‘ideological work’. The manager was supposed to have autonomy on production, marketing, 
investment, wages and bonus policies, worker training and use of enterprise funds (Lee 1993). 
5 The ICS was a practice of contract in SOEs internally at each level. For example, the bottom level was the 
division of contracted work by team leader into individual workers. Under the ICS, middle-level managers 
and division directors were regarded as individual contractors, while divisions were group contractors. The 
bonuses of middle-level managers and of division directors depended on the fulfillment of main contracts 
with the state, not division targets. As for group contractors, upon fulfillment of division targets, bonus 
funds were released to the divisions by the manager. Over-fulfillment of quotas were rewarded accordingly 
(Lee 1993). 
6 Shareholding system was in the phase of experiments in the late 1980s and introduced to resolve the 
problem of ambiguous property rights relations between the state and SOEs. The stocks of the shareholding 
company could consist of state shares, enterprise shares, and individual shares. Under this system, the 
enterprise first paid income taxes, then remaining profits were divided into accumulative funds, collective 
welfare funds, and risk funds, and the final residual was distributed as dividends. Since 1993, some SOEs 
were reformed as ‘Shareholder Corporations’ and ‘Shareholder Partner Companies’. ‘Shareholder 
Corporations’ are owned by internal shareholders (such as managers and employees) and external 
shareholders (other companies or individuals). These firms have been subject to a variety of regulations and 
forms of governance, and to overall supervision by the State Assets Administration Bureau. Smaller SOEs 
are allowed to be purchased and managed by individuals and so called ‘Shareholder Partner Companies’. 
The state plays little role in these firms (Lee and Warner 2007).  
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(Sullivan 2007). The coverage expanded quickly from 0.16 million workers in 1984 to 
7.26 million workers (approximately 8% in SOEs) by the end of 1986.  It has further 
increased to 39 percent of the total employed population in 1995 (Meng 2000). With the 
implementation of this new system, the lifetime employment in the SOEs, called the 
“Iron Rice Bowl”, no longer existed. Lifetime employment used to provide workers 
permanent protection from unemployment, as well as supply them with stable wages and 
potential opportunity for advancement. After the economic reforms, the “Iron Rice Bowl” 
no longer ensured this type of lifetime opportunity, and the loss of this practice further 
weakened state and local labor authorities’ power. State and local labor authorities 
abolished recruitment quotas by the 1990s and SOEs were granted greater autonomy to 
recruit new employees based on the needs of business and the quality of applicants. 
Another large scale reform that occurred for SOEs was the decision to shut down nearly 
one-half of all companies with long-term prospects of losses and involvement in so-called 
‘debt chains’. As a result, 27 million redundant workers were laid off and encouraged to 
find new jobs in the expanding private sector (Sullivan 2007). 
On the one hand, unlike post-Communist Hungary, Poland, and Russia, socialist-state 
institutions in China have not been completely abandoned. Gradual reform in the 
economic realm and the persistence of socialist-state institutions have led to a particular 
coexistence of multiple ownership forms: government agencies, SOEs, collective 
enterprises, and other private-sector enterprises. In this particular social stratum, the CCP 
has not lost its control over the allocation of resources through its control of the SOS. The 
lack of complete market-supporting institutions makes the government intervene even in 
private businesses by imposing unnecessary regulations or high tax rates, to some extent. 
On the other hand, the CCP has expanded the role of the market forces in SOEs, and it 
has also increased the scope of privatization in the NSOS to achieve its primary economic 
goal. The private enterprises in the NSOS grew from zero to over 38 million firms from 
1978 to 2001, producing more than one-third of China’s industrial output (Li, Meng and 
Zhang, 2006). The booming NSOS created more job opportunities, which not only 
absorbed part of the population of laid off workers from SOEs, but also allowed for 
workers to obtain greater autonomy in choosing their jobs, because some of the new 
opportunities available in the NSOS better met their needs; this group included some 
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CCP members who used to work in the SOS7
In this type of particular economic stratum in China, people have not only sought to 
improve their lives through the economic opportunities created by the market economy, 
but they have also experienced an ideological transformation in order to meet the 
markets’ need. On the one hand, Party members face difficulties in maintaining Party 
principles in this type of market. More and more, CCP members have abandoned their 
Party responsibilities to pursue economic opportunities. They have left their jobs in the 
SOS to go into the NSOS with other workers
.  The speed with which the NSOS has 
developed, has far outpaced that of the SOEs. However, private firms were considered an 
inferior ownership form for ideological reasons and subject to various restrictions in the 
1980s, despite the existence of formal legislation permitting their existence. Since the 
early 1990s, the government has attempted to discard ownership discrimination and 
acknowledge the important contribution that private enterprise has made to China’s 
economic development. But the market environment is far from being truly fair for 
private enterprises, given ideological obstacles and imperfect market mechanisms. 
8
                                                 
7 CCP imposed a ban to forbid the recruitment of the private entrepreneurs in August 1989, but relieved it 
in July 2001 (Dickson 2003). 
. Dickson (2003) labels these people as 
‘xiahai entrepreneurs’ in the NSOS. The studies on private entrepreneurs have found that 
many of the wealthiest entrepreneurs formerly held high-level Party and government 
posts. A far larger number of private entrepreneurs were former mid-level officials, or 
simply rank-and-file Party members who did not hold formal posts but left their previous 
jobs to go into business. Some of these Party members were laid off in the course of the 
SOEs reform and then became reemployed in the NSOS. On the other hand, private 
entrepreneurs in the NSOS became willing to join the CCP after demonstrating their 
entrepreneurial skills and business success. In the early stages of economic reform, the 
NSOS expanded so fast that most enterprises did not have Party organizations embedded 
within them, and few new members were recruited from their work units. While all the 
local Party organizations or other local organizations such as Federation of Industry and 
Commerce can process the applications from the NSOS. The only ban was imposed on 
the entrepreneurs in private firms between 1989 and July 2001, which does not formally 
8 This phenomenon is called as xiahai, literally meaning a plunge into the sea. 
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allowed them to join the CCP. However, the ban was not so effective because recruiting 
entrepreneurs into the Party is advantageous for both local officials and entrepreneurs. 
Even before the ban was lifted, it is widely recognized that private entrepreneurs made 
significant contribution to the development of economy and their innovativeness, 
administrative skills could be modeled as advanced productivity. Some local Party 
committees found ways to circumvent it. ‘Some local Party committees classified private 
enterprises as collective or joint-stock enterprises, thereby allowing them to recruit their 
leaders while remaining in technical compliance with the central ban.’ (Dickson 2003)9
However, unlike in the pre-reform era, the willingness of individuals to join the CCP 
was seldom driven by their political beliefs and ideological loyalty. As the economy 
moves away from central planning to market-oriented, people compete for economic 
opportunities to earn more. At the same time, since the CCP has a monopoly power in the 
political and economic system, people also believe that Party membership helps them to 
establish broader social networks and gain easier access to valuable information, which, 
in turn, could provide them, either directly or indirectly, with economic benefits that they 
would not otherwise have access to. For example, comparing to the 1980s, workers in 
1990s are more likely to regard membership as reward-related capital and have such 
incentives to join the CCP either in the school or in the work place, rather than pure 
communist ideology. Entrepreneurs in 1990s (especially in NSOS) are more willing to 
convert economic influence into political power as well, such as accumulating political 
 
To adjust its policy to correspond with this rapidly changing economic and social 
environment, the CCP lifted the ban on July 1, 2001. There are two reasons to believe 
that the ban would not make harder for a worker in the NSOS to be recruited into CCP. 
First, the ban was not imposed on either the employees in the NSOS or entrepreneurs in 
other ownership forms in the NSOS, and the major component of the NSOS is Urban 
Collective Enterprises (UCEs) in this dissertation. Second, all the applicants are fairly 
treated regardless the ownership. To adapt to the new economic environment, CCP 
reinforces its connection to the NSOS and makes more convenient for their employees to 
apply for the membership. 
                                                 
9 Shenzhen even created special party branches for them who join the party. 
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skill, which, in turn, could bring them more benefits. Those who possess the ambition to 
pursue political successes are more likely to self-select into the CCP and work for the 
SOS, which is under the direct control of the CCP. Those who prefer a relative stable job 
but have no political ambitions are more likely to self-select into NonCCP/SOS category, 
while innovators would be more likely to be in the NSOS. Their personal choices about 
career and political investment become more market-oriented and depend on individuals’ 
preference rather than a central assignment, which was the previous practice and did not 
allow workers to choose jobs which corresponded with their own desires. Most literature 
does find economic advantages for CCP members as the market reform grows in 
importance, and these studies tend to explore potential explanations for this outcome 
(Morduch and Sicular 2000; Lam 2003; Liu 2003). Party membership per se, in theory, is 
not supposed to have an influence on one’s career or economic circumstances. When 
markets intrinsically reward productivity and entrepreneurial initiative rather than 
political power, the findings of the economic advantages associated with Party 
membership might indicate that Party card acts as a screen for high productivity, which 
makes membership an economic factor in the labor market in China. Li, Liu, Zhang and 
Ma (2007) use data obtained from twins to reexamine returns to CCP membership by 
controlling for the omitted ability and family background. They find zero within-twin-
pair estimates which indicate a contribution of the CCP members’ instinctive high 
abilities in relation (or more advantageous family background) to their capacity to 
achieve higher earnings10
One of the important features of this dissertation is that we treat both CCP 
membership affiliation and ownership sector choice of a worker as endogenous variables 
in the earning equation. Many studies completely ignore this issue of endogeneity. 
Instead, they control for CCP membership affiliation and ownership sector choice using a 
set of dummy variables in a single earning equation (Liu 2003; Bishop and Liu 2008). 
Other studies, such as Lam (2003), Appleton, Knight, Song and Xia (2003) and Li, Liu, 
Zhang and Ma (2007), have allowed for the endogeneity of the CCP membership 
affiliation but continue to treat the sector choice as exogenous; Zhang (2004) considers 
. 
                                                 
10 They did sensitivity analysis on omitted variable biases, measure error and within-family externality. 
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the endogeneity of workers’ sector choice but treats CCP membership affiliation as being 
exogenous. According to the Party constitution, CCP members are supposed to differ 
from other workers in observable characteristics. For example, during the lengthy 
selection procedure, the candidates usually need to outperform their co-workers (or their 
classmates if in the school). They also differ in unobservable characteristics such as 
ambition and opportunism, as well as possessing a knack for organizational activities. All 
these characteristics make CCP members more successful in their choices of the 
ownership forms associated with their jobs; it also makes them more successful in the 
way they are selected into the CCP and how they obtain material advantages. Not treating 
each variable as endogenous may lead to selection bias in the estimated earning equation. 
To address this problem, we apply the Mlogit -OLS two-stage selection correction 
estimation proposed by Lee (1983). Given that individuals exercise some choice over 
both their political decisions and also, the ownership forms of their jobs, I classify current 
workers in urban China into four categories: CCP members in the SOS; NonCCP workers 
in the SOS; CCP members in the NSOS; and other workers in the NSOS. To my best 
knowledge, this is the first application of Lee’s selection model for this specific problem. 
This dissertation examines how the characteristics of workers are different in four 
categories, as well as how they are different in affecting the probability of workers being 
in each group. Another important feature of this study is that I predict how earnings can 
change if workers join the Party in each sector, by decomposing the CCP-NonCCP 
earning differential in each ownership sector. 
Four major questions addressed in this paper are: (1) How did total earning gap 
between CCP members and other workers, in the SOS and NSOS, change from 1988 to 
1999? (2) How did the contribution of human capital to earnings vary by political status 
of workers in each sector? (3) What did the decomposition of earnings differential 
between CCP members and other workers show in each sector? (4) How did Party 
premiums change in the SOS and the NSOS during the early reform period that lasted 
from1988 to 1995, and in the radical reform period from 1995 to 1999? I find evidence 
that the contribution of higher education to CCP workers’ earnings is not as much as it is 
for other workers’ in the SOS; the investments on human capital did play an increasingly 
important role in the earning structure of NonCCP workers in the SOS throughout three 
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stages of the economic reforms, and it did so more quickly and strongly than it did for 
CCP workers in the SOS. The results from the NSOS indicate that different returns 
brought about because of different educational levels became more significant to 
NonCCP workers in the NSOS over time; the human capital and political capital were 
complements in 1988, while they became neither complements nor substitutes in the late 
1990s. There is evidence that the total earning differential in favor of CCP workers in the 
SOS increased dramatically during the early reform period from 1988 to 1995, and then it 
leveled out in 1999; at the same time, it was decreasing in the NSOS between 1988 and 
1999.  In addition, the CCP-NonCCP earning decomposition in either sector shows that 
the proportion of endowment differences increased over time, while the unexplained 
proportion decreased in three years. The coefficient differentials in favor of CCP workers 
decreased dramatically in the early reform period from 1988 to 1995, until it faded away 
in 1999. The predicted Party premium for an average worker slightly increased in the 
SOS but declined in the NSOS during three years being studied. The predicted Party 
premium in 1999 indicates that the political capital became less important in the payment 
scheme in the NSOS. My findings suggest that CCP membership is losing its earning 
power at least in the NSOS.  
The rest of the dissertation proceeds as follows. In Chapter 2, I review the current 
literature regarding the economic impact of political capital. Chapter 3 introduces the 
selection process for membership in the CCP. In Chapter 4, I provide a theoretical 
discussion on the determinants of investments in political capital and the econometric 
model. In Chapter 5, I introduce data sources and describe variables. The analysis on 
two-stage estimates of the earning equation is offered in Chapter 6, including earning 
decomposition results and discussions about how membership choice and choices of 
ownership of work unit affect workers’ economic outcomes. Chapter 7 concludes and 
provides some policy implications.  
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Figure 1.1 Percentage of Employed Persons by Ownership in Urban China 
 
Note: The data is from Table '5-4 Number of Employed Persons at the Year-end by Residence in Urban and 
Rural Areas', China Statistical Year Book 2000. 
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Chapter 2  
Literature Review 
 
2.1 Introduction 
There are a tremendous number of papers and books which study economic reform in 
China. The economic reform is leading China away from a planned economy to a market 
economy. The most important change in the period has been the entrance of the NSOS, 
including collective, private, and foreign firms into the economy. In 2002, the NSOS 
employed 70% of workers in China and produced two-thirds of the GDP. Implementation 
of a wage system reform in the SOS made wage determination more productivity-related. 
The Ministry of Labor (MOL) in 1985 announced that the budget to be allocated for 
wages of SOEs will depend on the economic performance of SOEs, which was measured 
by SOEs profitability or a combined indicator of economic returns. In 1992, the State 
Council allowed SOEs to set their internal structure within the confine of the overall 
wage budget determined by government. Starting from1994 to 1995, more and more 
SOEs were permitted to set their own wages based on productivity and skills11
The economic implications of political status and political connections in the 
transition or developed countries have attracted numerous researchers in both the 
economic and sociological literature (Gerber, 2000; Fisman, 2001; Agrawal and Knoeber, 
2001; Johnson and Mitton, 2003; Khwaja and Mian, 2005; Faccio, 2006). In China, there 
is a growing interest among economists and sociologists in studying this association at 
different stages of the economic reform since 1978. Many studies have found that CCP 
. It 
suggests that the wage in the SOS becomes less determined by CCP but more influenced 
by the market. By doing so, the wage differential between the CCP and other workers in 
SOS is expected to become closer to that of the NSOS over time. If the NSOS values 
CCP membership less than does the SOS, with the weakening of Communist Ideology, it 
is expected to find declining returns to CCP membership at an overall level, and less 
demand for CCP membership by the younger generation over time. 
                                                 
11 But wage-setting in the SOS needs to meet two standards. The first is that the growth rate of total wages 
must be lower than that of after-tax profitability and the second is that per capita wage growth is lower than 
the rate of growth of labor productivity. 
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membership has had a positive value on personal income during China’ economic 
transaction (Morduch and Sicular(2000); Lam(2003); Liu(2003); Li et al., 2006; 
Appleton, Knight, Song and Xia (2006)).  Within the first decade, the market reform in 
urban China was still at an early stage, while China’s rural area economy had undergone 
a dramatic transition from a collective economy to a market-like economy in terms of 
multiple ownerships, a shift in market power, and diversities of income sources.  The 
earlier research on the effects of the market transition on social stratification mainly used 
small survey data in rural China in the 1980s. These studies are preoccupied with the 
question of cadre advantages, including the economic returns to political position in the 
rural area (Nee, 1989, 1991, 1996; Cook, 1998; Morduch and Sicular, 2000). The term 
cadre stands for the official, and cadre status represents a person’s political position in the 
administrative hierarchy of state socialism. Nee (1989) combines economic and 
sociological perspectives and argues that the short-run cadre advantages in rural China 
will shrink over time, relative to ability, as market institutions become more firmly 
rooted, and a market economy rewards private entrepreneurship and human capital. The 
empirical findings are based on the Fujian Rural survey project in 1985. In this project, 
725 households were randomly selected from 30 villages in two counties in Fujian. The 
author found no evidence that cadre status and social network ties (guan xi) built up 
during the tenure, as cadres confer economic advantage during the market transition. 
Most literature reaches a broad consensus that cadres in rural China continue to enjoy 
advantages in the short-run. However, there is a debate on how cadre advantages change 
over the long-term, given the empirical evidence of large economic opportunities for 
rural cadres and their families in the market reform (Cook, 1998; Morduch and Sicular, 
2000). Morduch and Sicular (2000) use 4-year longitudinal household data sets (1990 -
1993) from 16 villages in the county ‘Zouping’ located in central Shangdong province. 
The significant and increasing cadre advantages over time indicate that an accelerated 
market liberalization enhanced village-level cadre’s economic advantages after Deng 
Xiaoping’s southern tour in 1992.  They find that the households with a village-level 
cadre have a continued significant income benefit. Other studies find that these cadres 
have more opportunities to accumulate market entrepreneurship than the public when the 
market reform allows them to invest and manage public assets in collective enterprises. 
12 
 
Social network ties (guan xi) also built up during the tenure, as cadres make it easier to 
acquire strong positions for their family members in the local industry; this possibility 
helps family members gain access to credit, as well as facilities used in building or 
operating their own private enterprises. The benefits accrued through privatization ensure 
that the advantage from the cadre persists over time. Walder (2002) argues that, “Just as 
the evidence of surviving cadre advantages in the short run does not refute the notion that 
market reform eventually erodes cadre privileges, evidence of a downward trend does not 
refute the notion that market reform provides opportunities for cadre enrichment… The 
latter view does not imply that current cadre advantages will prove eternal.” He uses a 
national random sample of households drawn from all regions of China (excluding Tibet) 
in 1996 to test whether market reform inherently reduces the relative returns to the cadre 
position. He not only analyzes the current magnitude of the cadre advantage but also 
compares the economic returns to cadre position and entrepreneurship. He finds no 
evidence of declining cadre advantages in the second decade of reforms due to the 
privatization of rural public enterprises at a national level; the economic advantages of 
cadre households are of comparable magnitude to those of private entrepreneurs. These 
findings suggest that the expansion of the market economy in rural China creates two 
distinct opportunities for success and income sources for cadre position and 
entrepreneurship.  
Economic reform in rural China established a rural labor market, which generally 
consists of an agriculture sector and a non-agriculture sector. The labor arrangement in 
the agriculture sector is included under the ‘Household responsibility system’ (HRS)12
                                                 
12 The Chinese Government introduced the HRS to the whole country in 1978. HRS allows land to be 
owned by the collectives and contracted out to households. Under HRS, households need to fulfill a state 
production quota for certain agriculture products, and to deliver a levy to the collectives. Given the 
fulfillment of production target, they have their autonomy to allocate their resources, decide production 
structure and determine income distribution among family members. 
 
and it has fundamentally improved the labor incentive system.  Meng (2000) finds that 
under the new HRS, the household labor allocation in this sector has gradually shifted 
towards a market-oriented system.  Their income was distributed upon labor productivity 
and labor supply which responded to market signals, which, in turn, generated large 
productivity gains in this sector. Meanwhile, the development of the HRS has brought 
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about a dramatic growth of the rural non-agriculture sector. Between 1978 and 1983, the 
formerly commune and bridage enterprises (in place during the pre-reform era) were 
transformed to rural township, village-owned enterprises (TVE) by applying the HRS to 
their processes and changing their income distribution system from the work point system 
to a within-firm wage system. Managers of most TVEs had decision-making power over 
wage determination from as early as 1985. However, labor recruitment in TVEs moved 
quite slowly towards a market system, and they were not much more flexible in their 
hiring and firing of labor until the early 1990s. At the same time, other privately-owned, 
joint venture and fully foreign-owned firms have become their biggest competitors in the 
non-agriculture sector.  
To avoid open unemployment and guarantee a sufficient supply of grain to the 
cities13
Economic reform in urban China started with liberalizing the product market 
progressively, and then it proceeded to labor market reform at a much slower pace, which 
was not as successful as product market reform. Meng (2000) finds that the labor market 
reform in the first decade failed in increasing worker incentives, and it did not result in a 
productivity-related wage determination system. Due to the segregation of rural and 
urban areas, the labor markets prove to be incredibly different in these two areas. The 
urban labor market is complicated in terms of invisible constraints placed on labor 
mobility, multiple ownership structures of enterprises, and political sensitivity. The wage 
rates, for example, often deviated from the market rate due to rigid wage systems and 
government interventions in the labor market. However, political status in China is 
generally treated as one factor in the income equation, in accordance with how 
, the government has created segregation between rural and urban areas under the 
household registration system since the CCP came to the power in 1949. The highly 
restrictive labor mobility policies excluded rural people from working in the cities. Rural 
workers were not covered under the same housing, medical expenses and social security 
program with urban employees. This feature did not undergo significant improvement 
until the beginning of the 1990s, when urban industrialization heavily demanded rural 
labor in urban areas.  
                                                 
13 There was no documented justification for this policy. Meng (2000) proposes a potential reason that the 
marginal rate of technical substitution between land and labor was relatively higher in rural areas. 
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economists treat human capital in most literatures on the returns for schooling and 
income inequality.  
Empirical studies of the returns to the political status of the labor market of urban 
China generally proceed from the following perspectives: (1) if political capital and 
human capital are supplements or substitutes; (2) does Party membership affect rent 
seeking or screening; (3) is Party membership demand determined or is supply 
determined; (4) political capital in different ownership sectors; (5) the endogeneity 
problem of Party membership. In the following sections, I summarize the current studies 
and their findings in each of these categories.   
 
2.2 Human Capital and Political Capital, Substitutes or Complements? 
Among the considerable body of empirical literature on the return to human capital in 
China, a few studies compare it to returns on CCP membership in urban China. Dickson 
and Rublee (2000) provide a good profile analysis on all CCP members surveyed in 
CHIP 1998. They examine the impacts of CCP membership and human capital on the 
regular wage and total monthly income (including bonuses and various subsidies as well) 
in 1988. They do find monetary benefits for the individuals with CCP membership. When 
they further break CCP membership into rank-and-file and cadres14
                                                 
14 Dickson and Rublee (2000) defined CCP members who work as laborers, office workers, and 
professional and technical workers as rank-and-file members, and those who work as managers or officials 
as cadres. 
, they find those with 
more political capital (cadres) benefit more than regular members in the regular wage 
equation. A cadre position is more important than a college education for regular wages, 
while rank-and-file membership is not as important as a college education. However, the 
impacts of cadre and rank-and-file on the total income make little difference. The cohort 
analysis of determinants of regular wage and total income come to this conclusion: the 
political affiliation, rather than human capital, is most important to 41-50 cohorts who are 
educated and first gained employment during the Cultural Revolution. Their finding of 
less explanatory power of the total income equation than the regular wage equation is 
consistent with previous research (Griffin, Zhao, 1993; Walder 1995; Xie and Hannum, 
1996). Their findings imply that wages in China are distributed according to seniority and 
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education.  However, bonuses and subsidies are less dependent on an individual’s 
attributes than on the profitability of SOE itself.  In turn, SOE’s profitability is itself less 
dependent on performance than on government-set prices and soft budget constraints. In 
this dissertation, I study only current workers rather than all individuals in the CHIP. 
Liu’s article (2003) is among the early attempts by economists to present a theoretical 
discussion of treating CCP membership as political capital in the urban labor market in 
China. Like human capital, he treats political capital as “productive investment embodied 
in people, including political skills and the characteristics as having belief in and being 
trusted by a certain political Party.” Making an effort to join the CCP and, in the process, 
subjecting one’s self to a greater degree of political scrutiny and responsibility, are part of 
the investment in political capital. Since the CCP follows the constitution of the Party 
(CCP National Congress 2002), recruiting members who play an ‘exemplary and 
vanguard role’ in production and social activities, the people generally devote resources 
towards the goal of being admitted into the Party, in much the same way that people in 
the West take certain actions to be admitted into a selective college or university. It is 
anticipated that the investment on political capital would be paid off. Higher return in the 
labor market could be one of ways in which it is compensated.  
Liu (2003) empirically explored the relative importance of human capital and 
political capital in the labor market of urban China by using the CHIP 1988 survey data. 
Based on the sample of household heads who held full-time jobs, Liu (2003) first split 
this into Party members and other heads. OLS estimates in two separate regressions show 
that the differences in the rates of return to human capital are not statistically significant 
between Party members and other heads.  Liu (2003) further restricts the heads’ sample 
to Father-Child pairs to study the determination of Party membership attainment. The 
logistic regression of Party membership finds that human capital does not play a 
significant role in determining investment in political capital.  Liu (2003) concludes that 
human capital and political capital appear to be neither substitutes nor complements.  
However, the estimates from the sample of Father-Child pairs indicate that if a worker’s 
father holds CCP membership, as a proxy variable for political-capital endowment from 
the older generation, is a crucial factor in the child’s attainment of political-capital; 
political-capital endowment proves to be a more important influence than either parental 
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income or education.  In contrast, Liu (2003) finds that parental income plays a key role 
in determining children’s educational attainment. Other empirical results show that both 
human capital and political capital have positive and significant effects on the heads’ 
earnings and household income, as well as on the welfare of the family15
 
. CCP 
membership is estimated to increase the head’s earning by 4.29%, after controlling for 
the occupations and ownership of employment. The disposable income per person is 
higher among the families headed by CCP members by 3.5%, than in the households 
headed by NonCCP workers. CCP membership has a positive effect on the welfare of the 
family in monetary and non-monetary terms as well. CCP members receive, on average, 
4.4% more housing subsidy than NonCCP members do, and they are more likely to 
possess private sanitary facilities, a private kitchen, and a telephone. Dickson and Rublee 
(2000) and Liu (2003) only use 1988 CHIP data, so there is no more room to study the 
possible change in the returns to the political capital and human capital in the more recent 
reform era.  
2.3 Screening and Rent Seeking  
Bishop and Liu (2008) use urban CHIP data in 1988 and 1995 to test the hypothesis 
that the Party successfully supplements (after economic reform) education as a way to 
screen for ability, commitment, and quality in the labor market. The evidence of a large 
Party premium for less well-educated workers supports their hypothesis. They examine if 
the CCP premium of males and females varies with schooling level,16
                                                 
15 Liu (2003) computed the implicit dollar amount of in-kind housing subsidies. It is equal to the market 
rental value of the lodgings minus the net rental payment made by the head of the household. 
 respectively, and 
compare the CCP premium at each educational level to a potential earning gain if they 
have a higher education. Interestingly, they find that higher education would make high 
school graduates earn more than if they have a CCP membership. This phenomenon 
happens because the lowest educated CCP members accrue the highest CCP premiums.  
Specifically, in 1988 and 1995, they find that it is much more valuable for a low educated 
male worker (primary school graduates and junior high school graduates) to join the 
16 Cadre defined in Bishop and Liu (2008) includes those who are responsible officials of government or 
institutions in the 1998 data code book, and those who are cadre and work for the government, party organs 
and, organizations in 1995. 
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CCP, as opposed to increasing their schooling levels. However, a high school male 
graduate is better advised to continue his education than join the CCP.  
For females in 1988, returns to CCP membership are higher than for education. 
Females’ education and the CCP premium are both larger than their male counterparts. 
But, in 1995, higher education brings up more benefits for primary school female 
graduates and high school female graduates than does joining the CCP, but junior high 
school graduates are even better off as a result of joining the CCP. Females’ education 
premiums are greater than males in 1995 as well. For example, an earning premium for 
primary school females with CCP membership is 21.4% while it is only 9.5% for primary 
school males in 1988. For both genders, the CCP and education premiums skyrocket in 
1995. It is not hard to understand that, to maintain its political power, the Party adjusted 
its recruitment strategy to allow more educated candidates to join the Party. By doing so, 
it tried to adapt to the new economic environment that its reforms were creating.  
Although the Party still follows the constitution of the Party (CCP National Congress 
2002), in recruiting the members who play an ‘exemplary and vanguard role’ in 
production and social activities, the definition of this example proves quite different 
during the reform era than it did during the revolution era. Since the description of the 
ideal worker includes the characteristics of being highly motivated, well-educated, and 
productive, these have become important criteria in the recruitment17
There is another argument that the reforms in the labor market created the 
opportunities for CCP members to translate political power directly into higher labor 
market earnings.  Especially since the Deng Xiaoping’s southern tour speaking, the 
policy has allowed for economic inequality on the premise that an “advanced and richer 
region could help a less advanced and poorer region and both could get rich together 
, and we would 
expect a certain screening effect to be associated with Party membership. However, given 
the different labor allocation and wage determination systems in the SOS and the NSOS, 
I will discuss in this dissertation whether such a screening effect had occurred in both the 
SOS and the NSOS and whether two decades of economic reform has had a different 
impacts on the screening effects in each sector. 
                                                 
17 Entrepreneurs and skilled expertise have been allowed to join the CCP since July 2001. 
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later.” Economic development not only influences people’s ideologies, but also induces 
the CCP to adjust itself to adapt to this new environment. Public concern rises with the 
general corruption of those with strong political capital. Given the difficulties in fully 
measuring the degree of general corruption in terms of wages or salaries, it is only 
feasible to discuss whether rent seeking exists if CCP membership is used as a device to 
confer benefits for favored groups (Schnytzer and Susteric 1998).  Liu and Bishop (2008) 
particularly examined the earnings of Party officials (Cadre) and their spouses in the 
1988 and 1995 CHIP, and they found the existence of rent-seeking particularly in 1995. 
Liu and Bishop (2008) restrict the sample to matched pairs of working husbands and 
wives. To address rent seeking questions, they test whether direct economic benefits flow 
to all CCP members, or mostly to Party officials (cadres), and whether Party members 
indirectly benefit through higher wages being paid to their spouses. They interpret either 
rising premiums to cadres or rising spouse premiums as evidence of rent-seeking. They 
did find a rising premium to cadres from 1998 to 1995, but little changes in spousal 
premiums. There is little economic benefit for either CCP membership or Party officials 
(cadres) in 1988 when the wages were still set by a strict formula. Male CCP members 
earned only 4% more on average than Non-CCP members, while females’ CCP premium 
was three times the size of those received by males. In contrast to the findings of 
Morduch and Sicular (2000) in rural China18
However, the answers change in 1995. Both sexes received similar sized premiums. 
The male Party premium has become threefold as a result of recent labor market 
liberalizations. Cadre premiums rose to 6% for males and 15% for females in 1995. But 
spouse premiums for male and female heads of household rose only slightly (only 3%). 
, they found no statistically significant 
earning advantages for male and female cadres in urban China in 1988. Male cadre 
members earned only 2 Yuan more than rank-and-file Party members on average. The 
evidence shows little benefits acquired through the membership of the spouses in 1988. If 
a female spouse was a CCP member, then the husband earns about 4% more in 1988; by 
contrast, female head of households do not benefit from their spouses’ memberships 
statistically.  
                                                 
18 Morduch and Sicular (2000) use 4-year longitudinal household data set (1990 – 1993). 
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They view the rising premiums to cadre and spouses of Party members as indicative of 
rent-seeking. Comparing the results in 1988 to 1995, they show that the earnings benefit 
became more dependent on political status and education in 1995 than in 1988. This 
might mean that liberalization brings not only greater labor market rent-seeking but also a 
greater capacity to earn wages that reflect one’s ability.  
 
2.4 Supply Determined or Demand Determined 
Appleton et al. (2006)19
                                                 
19 Appleton et al. (2006) is a working paper, which was further revised and published in 2009. 
 examine whether membership is primarily determined by 
individuals' demand or the CCP's screening by using CHIP data in 1988, 1995, and 1999. 
They argue that coexisting rising wage premiums of CCP members and rising CCP 
membership recruitments are consistent with a so-called ‘demand-determined’ 
membership hypothesis if costs of memberships to individuals are heterogeneous. 
However, most findings in their cross-sections show that some worker characteristics that 
increase the probability of being a Party member decrease the wage premium of 
membership. These findings suggest that membership is primarily determined by the 
CCP screening rather than by individual demand for the membership. In response to the 
question of whether membership is primarily determined by individuals' demand or the 
CCP's screening, they tend to answer it by analyzing the correlation between the 
coefficient of determinants of CCP membership and the difference in the coefficients of 
determinants of the CCP members' wage equation and the NonCCP members' wage 
equation. A positive correlation indicates Party membership is demand-determined while 
a negative correlation indicates CCP being selection-dominant. Empirically, they used a 
binary probit model for CCP membership and obtain the predicted probability of being a 
CCP member by altering a given explanatory variable while taking the mean value of all 
other variables. They find a higher probability of membership being associated with the 
characteristics of being male, white collar, having longer working experience and a 
higher educational attainment. They obtain a rising predicated probability of membership 
in the private sector from 1988 to 1999, 1% to 7%. Compared to the continuous high 
probability of membership (16% to 23%) in SOEs in three years, a much smaller 
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probability in the private sector indicates that recruitment there may be more difficult and 
offer lower benefits for members. 
The predicted wage premium of CCP members over other workers is calculated from 
two wage equations, one for CCP members and the other for other workers. To make a 
comparison, the wage premium is also evaluated in an analogous way. They found that 
some worker characteristics, such as being male, white collar, longer working experience, 
and higher educational attainment, raise the likelihood of a worker being in the CCP but 
reduce the wage premium for membership. They view it as evidence to support their CCP 
screening hypothesis. 
But there is no clear pattern of a correlation for employment in the SOE although it 
has a higher probability of membership than that of the private enterprises. Most 
researchers agree that the political implications of the growing benefits for CCP members 
are considered to be desirable because they help to ensure that the reforms are self-
sustaining. In recent economic reform, the greater managerial autonomy built in the SOE, 
coupled with competition from an expansion of the NSOS, is expected to lead to a more 
productive-related wage setting rather than a political-loyalty dominant wage system in 
the SOS. However, in order to secure high returns for CCP members, Party membership 
could still play a role in the rewards system of the SOS.  As far as the NSOS is 
concerned, the existence of a Party premium in the NSOS could be due to either a 
signaling effect of Party membership. Additionally, economic reform in the second 
decade allowed for further labor mobility between the SOS and the NSOS in comparison 
with the first decade.  Coupled with severe competition in the labor market20
 
, individuals’ 
decision of political capital investment and choice of ownership sector are expected to be 
closely related to their expected earnings. This dissertation will comprehensively 
examine how selection effects influence workers’ economic returns and how Party 
premium vary by ownership sectors.  
                                                 
20 In urban China, the registered unemployment rate was 2.9%, but the real unemployment rate was 4.8% in 
1995. The real unemployment rate rose dramatically to a peak in 1997 and 1998 at 9%, and then gradually 
dropped to 7% by 2003. Source: Lee and Warner (2007) 
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2.5 CCP Members in Different Ownership Structures 
Meng (2000) compares the impact of three ownership structures, SOEs, Urban 
Collective Enterprises (UCEs) and private enterprises, based on the firms’ average labor 
compensation level in 1985, 1990, 1991 and 1992. The findings show that workers in 
private enterprises had the highest income. The labor compensation in SOEs and UCEs 
are heavily determined by retained profits per labor while in the private sector, labor 
compensation is determined by productivity – value added per labor. 
The earning structures are expected to be different across different forms of 
ownership, as are the economic returns to CCP membership. Lam (2003) looks into the 
Party premium by gender in SOEs, collective enterprises, and private enterprises. He uses 
1996 survey data in Shanghai collected by the Institute of Economics, Shanghai 
Academy of Social Science. He finds that there are significant economic advantages for 
male CCP members in SOEs (8.6%) and collective enterprises (12.5%), but none in 
private enterprises. The partial earning advantage of male CCP members in the SOE 
becomes possible through their attainment of high-paid government jobs. Although CCP 
membership did not directly affect the women’s net earnings at all, it contributes 
indirectly by increasing their probability of attaining professional jobs in collective 
sectors. He also finds that both a father’s political capital21
 
 and own years of schooling 
contribute to the attainment of CCP membership and government jobs for male workers 
in the SOE in China, but they don’t contribute to the attainment of CCP membership for 
female workers in any ownership form. His findings only provide a limited picture of the 
Party premium across ownership sectors in one city, Shanghai in urban China. This 
dissertation has a much broader view of urban China in three years. 
2.6 Endogeneity of Party Membership 
Geishecker and Haisken-DeNew (2004) and Gerber (2000), using Russian data, and 
Li et al. (2007), using a sample of Chinese twins, all find that the observed return to Party 
membership can be explained by unobserved productivity characteristics. CCP 
membership may be correlated with the effects of unobserved ability or family 
                                                 
21 Liu (2003) uses a father’s political capital status as a proxy for political-capital endowment. The 
empirical results show that it is an important determinant of his children’s educational attainment. 
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background, which could bias the OLS estimates of the effect of the CCP membership on 
earnings.  Li et al. (2007) find important evidence that OLS estimates of the returns to 
CCP membership is biased upward. They use a unique twins data set collected in 5 cities 
in urban China by the Urban Survey Unit of NBS in June and July in 2002. To control for 
the effects of omitted ability and family background, they follow Ashenfelter and 
Krueger (1994) to apply GLS estimator by using the SURE model. They also use within-
twin-pair fixed effects estimator based on the first difference between twins. 
Their OLS estimate shows a 10% Party premium, while within-twin-pair estimation 
brings it down to almost zero. GLS estimate of Party effect is consistent with FE 
estimate, showing quite small (non-significant) pure Party effects but large effect of 
omitted ability and family background. They conduct a series of robust sensitivity on 
omitted variable biases, measurement errors and within-family externality. They follow 
Ashenfelter and Rouse (1998) and conduct a correlation analysis. The testing results help 
them to conclude that zero within-twin-pair estimation can tighten the upper bound of the 
return to Party membership in the absence of within-family externality. Meanwhile, they 
test if the positive within-family externality does exist, and then fixed effect estimator 
might underestimate the true returns to Party membership. The findings on the sibling 
effect from both the twins and non-twins sample indicate that co-twin sibling’s Party 
membership has mainly picked up the effects of unobserved high ability rather than 
within family externality. These interpretations suggest that OLS estimate of Party effect 
is biased up because of omitted ability and the Party members fare well not because of 
their political status but because of the superior ability.  They do not have a good 
instrumental variable to deal with the potential measurement error and simultaneity 
problem directly, but they follow the formula in Freeman (1984) to examine the relative 
bias of the FE estimate versus the OLS estimate. They did not find that measurement 
error is a serious problem in their data.  
Another concern is simultaneity. It occurs if those with higher earnings are more 
likely to join (or to be selected by) the Party. Without specific testing, Li et al. (2007) 
argue that the zero within-twin-pair FE estimate suggests that if simultaneity causes any 
upward bias it would not be very important. To address a potential endogeneity bias in 
the estimates, Liu (2003) uses CHIP 1988 and generated a subsample of father-child pairs 
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who held full-time jobs. The father’s Party membership status and the father’s education 
were used as key instruments of political capital endowment to obtain a 2SLS estimate. 
But, contradictory to the findings in Li et al. (2007), he finds that accounting for 
endogeneity of ‘CCP membership’ raises the impact of the political capital on the 
earnings by about 4 times compared with the OLS estimate. The estimated impact of 
CCP membership on the earnings of young adult workers increases from 11% based on 
the OLS estimate, to 43% based on the 2SLS estimates. The logistic regression of CCP 
membership attainment shows that the political endowment of the family, rather than 
parental income or education, is an important determinant of CCP membership. 
Lam (2003)22
Similarly to this finding, Appleton et al. (2009) do not find selectivity to be a serious 
problem. They find a rising wage gap between CCP members and other workers from 
29% in the 1988 CHIP to 33% in the 1995 and 1999 CHIP. Based on OLS estimates, an 
average worker would have earned 10% more in 1988 if he was a CCP member, rising to 
14% in 1995 and 1999. Since they interpreted two separate wage functions for members 
and nonmembers, respectively, and then predicted wage premiums, they did explain why 
sample selectivity does not appear to be a significant problem in most cases and they 
could rely on OLS estimates in the two equations. There is no evidence that the rising 
wage premium for Party members is due to an increase in the average ability of members 
or an increase in the returns to ability. 
 use whether the father was a CCP member to identify the impact of 
Party membership and find no evidence of a selectivity bias in OLS estimates. She 
applies the Heckman model to correct for selection but it is generally hard to find 
convincing identifying variables for Party membership and the result shows insignificant 
selectivity bias. 
They use parental Party status in the 1999 CHIP data as an instrument to construct 
sample selection correction terms in each equation. But they are all statistically 
insignificant. In 1988 and 1995, they use a subsample of households containing parent-
child pairs of workers and employ the parental membership as an instrument for own 
membership. Sample selection terms appear to be insignificant in most cases of 1988 and 
                                                 
22 Lam (2003) is a working paper. It is short of description of how the author did sample selection 
correction. 
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1995, with the exception of non-members in 1988. Their findings alleviate their concerns 
of biasness of OLS estimates in separating wage equations. 
Alternatively, in order to better control for the endogeneity of membership in the 
cross-sectional approach, they constructed a retrospective panel data from 1995 to 1999 
based on recalled wages of more than six thousand responders in the 1999 CHIP. Since 
they had additional 503 households who had experienced retrenchment since 1994 
included in CHIP 1999 data23, they obtained fixed effects estimates for two groups of 
workers: retrenched workers and non-retrenched workers24
 
, respectively. The model 
includes interaction terms of Party membership with year dummies in both groups and 
interaction terms of Party membership with reemployment dummy which is time varying 
in the group of retrenched workers. However, CHIP 1999 does not contain the 
information when the respondents joined the CCP and has very limited time-variant 
variables in the data. Therefore, they were only able to investigate how the wages of CCP 
members in 1999 in each group had changed during the years between 1995 and1999, 
compared to other workers in 1999. They found that the rising CCP-NonCCP wage 
premium of non-trenched workers exists even after controlling for the unobserved time 
invariant individual characteristics during the period, but it does not hold among 
retrenched workers. Among retrenched workers, those CCP members in 1999 who had 
been retrenched were not rewarded better than other retrenched workers. However, the 
predicted wage of these CCP members if they got reemployed was less than if they 
remained in their old job. These findings suggest that the wage premium of Party 
membership ‘was tied to the jobs that they held in 1995 and do not survive retrenchment 
and reemployment’. They concluded that the rising premium was neither due to an 
increase in the unobserved productivity of CCP members nor due to an increase in the 
returns to ability. It might be ‘a by-product of the general increase in wage differentials 
during the transaction from planning’ or indicate ‘a limitation in the extent to which the 
Chinese labor market has become competitive.’  
                                                 
23 The owner of CHIP data did not provide me this additional group, so the CHIP data in this dissertation 
does not contain it. 
24 Retrenched workers are defined if they were retrenched at any time between 1992 and 1999/2000. It is 
time-invariant.  
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2.7 Other Studies on Economic Returns to CCP Membership  
Walder (1995) found no significant effect of CCP membership on either income or 
becoming a professional in urban Tianjin in 1983. He used data from a 1986 survey of a 
multistage stratified random sample of 1,011 households. But, the sample was drawn 
only in the urban districts of Tianjin and the wage-earner in each household whose birth 
date was closest to October 1 was interviewed. Li et al. (2007) tested the hypothesis that 
Party members in the older generation have a higher unobserved ability than non-Party 
members. They included interaction of the Party membership and age in OLS and FE 
estimations, respectively. The Party effect in OLS regression increases with age and the 
Party membership has a positive effect for those older than 29. But, in contrast, both the 
Party effect and the interaction effect are gone in FE estimation. They argue that if the 
Culture Revolution during 1966-1976 interrupted the education and job career of many 
Urban Chinese who were born between 1950 and 1968, education and job experience 
may not fully pick up the ability of these people. 
Dow and Jhee (2005) analyze monthly per capita household income by using the 
1988 and 1995 CHIP rural and urban survey data. The income gap between the 
households with at least one CCP member and other houses was larger for rural 
households than urban households in 1988 and 1995. At an overall level, the income gap 
increased from 33.8% in 1988 to 57% in 1995. They applied the Oaxaca (1973) 
discrimination methodology to decompose the difference in monthly per capita household 
income between CCP households and other households. They found a 24% income 
premium to CCP-households in 1988 due to the market discrimination, but that it 
decreased to less than 17% in 199525
                                                 
25 Dow and Jhee (2005) is a working paper and does not provide the tables for the decomposition results. 
. A narrower range of coefficient differentials in 
1995 indicates that a labor market rewards CCP members in a more similar way to the 
general public. As the labor market is allowed to be tied more to workers’ productivity 
and human capital, the general public has more incentive to pursue higher education. But, 
the compensation system in the labor market between rural and urban China is different, 
it would be better to conduct a separate analysis. 
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Chapter 3  
Selection Process for Membership in the Communist Party 
 
In Chapter 2, I presented findings in current empirical studies that are relevant to 
economic returns to Party membership in China. Most studies treat Party membership as 
a type of political capital in the study of the earning equation in China. Some of them 
examined the determinants of Party membership and compared the return to membership 
to human capital; others provided important information to the trend of change in returns 
to political capital. But only a few studied the returns across different ownership sectors. 
Since ownership sectors are crucial for potential variations in earnings, the findings of 
such a study would provide implications about whether the reform policy on ownership 
affects the decision of political investment and economic outcomes.  
This chapter starts with a brief discussion of the selection process for Party 
membership in China. Being a CCP member is different from being a member of a 
political Party in the U.S.A.  In the United Stated of America, because parties compete 
against each other for power, financial support and personnel in political competition, 
they are more open to recruiting new members. Individuals’ political investments are 
driven by their personal preferences and ideological loyalties. Membership is not likely to 
have an influence on one’s career or economic circumstances. However, in China, the 
CCP has a monopoly on political power and plays a key role in administering the 
economy. In order to secure its monopolistic position, it becomes very important to 
maintain the loyalty of membership via a relatively strict selection procedure. 
When submitting a formal application to a CCP branch in their school or work unit, 
any adult individual (18 years of age or older) could express their desire to become a 
CCP member.  The applicants must declare loyalty to the CCP and actively participate in 
political activities, including lectures conducted by the CCP branch secretary, off-work 
sessions to study the CCP constitution, and current policies. Some activities are voluntary, 
including community service organized by the Party. Regular reports and self-assessment 
are required by CCP branch authority to record the activists’ performances. Each 
applicant is assigned two CCP member liaisons who regularly report to the CCP branch 
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authority about their observations and evaluations of the application’s progress towards 
the standards of CCP membership. 
The applicant is generally monitored for at least three years, during which time they 
must make a consistent effort to meet all of the CCP standards. When the CCP branch 
believes that it is time to make a more thorough evaluation, usually about two years after 
the application has been initiated, it comprehensively examines the applicant’s political 
performance, personal, and parental histories, and kinship and marriage connections. 
Then the applicant is given a closed-door evaluation meeting that involves all of the CCP 
members in the branch and the applicant’s co-workers who are not CCP members. Any 
serious doubt on the part of either a non-Party co-worker or a Party member could mean 
failure, and that the applicant needs to improve before being considered for another 
closed-door evaluation. If the potential candidate receives sufficient support during the 
closed-door evaluation, he or she will become a one-year probationary CCP member. 
Probationary CCP members are still closely monitored by the CCP branch before 
becoming formal Party members. The current constitution of the CCP requires the Party 
members (especially the Party cadres) to possess both political integrity and professional 
competence and play an exemplary and vanguard role in work, product, study and social 
activities. The strict selection process allows the Party to better collect tangible and 
intangible information on the candidates not only through the observance of their 
performance, self-evaluation and objective evaluation by others, but also through their 
self-report on what they learn, what they think about the Communist ideology and what 
they can do to serve the people. By doing so, the Party is able to make a judgment on 
their political loyalty, communist consciousness and professional competence. In a word, 
the whole process serves to select people who possess political capital, but also serves to 
select people who have productive skills no matter what ownership form of their work 
unit is. 
The strict selection process for CCP membership also changes with some particular 
criteria of recruitment emphasized by the CCP over time. In the revolutionary period 
prior to 1949, revolutionary ideals and loyalty to the CCP were the most important 
qualities; in the planning period between 1950 and 1978, class background, including 
parental membership, became the first criterion. Before the Cultural Revolution, 
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professional competence rose in importance so that exemplary workers were often 
targeted for recruitment. During the ten years’ Cultural Revolution, intellectuals were the 
group most excluded. Since 1978, when the market reforms set economic growth as the 
first target, the CCP started to recruit more educated applicants. By the 15th Party 
Congress in 1997, the percentage of Party members with a senior high school or better 
education was 43.4%, up from 12.8% in 1978; in addition, 92% of the central committee 
members had at least some college education (Dickson (2003)). Although it is hard to 
examine whether the CCP abandoned or started to abandon its core beliefs when exposed 
to the market reform in this study, we can observe an remarkable increase in membership 
as the CCP has loosened its control for the economy gradually during the market-oriented 
transition, from having 3.8% of China’s population in 1978 to 5.2% in 2002 when it 
reached 66.4 million strong (Song and Appleton, 2006). To develop productive forces, 
the Party explores its own way to make changes during twenty years’ economic 
transaction. It is not surprising to assume that traditional Communist ideology has been 
greatly challenged by some policies of economic reforms. For example, Deng Xiaoping’s 
administration proposed the policy of “allowing some to get rick earlier’ on the premise 
that “advanced and richer region could help less advanced and poorer region and both get 
rich together later”. Its ‘open-up’ policy made significant contributions to economic 
growth in China. But it also raised the question to the Party how to preserve the 
ideological unity of CCP. Morduch and Sicular (2000) explained the economic reform in 
rural China as being “incentive-compatible” reform, since the government needs CCP 
members’ corporation to accomplish economic reform. One of the most effective ways is 
to allow them to enjoy more monetary gain over other workers. If so, comparing to the 
ideological fever during pre-reform period (especially during Culture Revolution), the 
value of Party card is more likely to be measured by a monetary term rather than 
ideological term within reform era. If the perception that membership signaling ability as 
education does in the labor market and would be associated with monetary rewards 
prevails along the economic reform, the incentives to join the Party will be not only 
subject to ideological beliefs, but also (or more likely) to economic cost and benefit 
associated with their rational choices within reform era. Given the process of getting the 
membership within economic reform era, the Party membership is modeled as a choice 
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variable in the following chapter. It is considered as a general equilibrium between 
supply and demand in a reduced model. I also examine how CCP members are rewarded 
in urban China over time and how it differs across different ownership sectors in Chapter 
6. 
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Chapter 4  
Theory Discussion and Econometric Model 
 
4.1 Theory Discussion 
Liu (2003) and Appleton et al. (2009) discussed an existence of market for Party 
membership. Anyone who is 18 eighteen years old and not a political offender is eligible 
to apply for Party membership. In a market economy, the CCP actively seeks new 
recruits and many people actively compete for membership at the same time.  Liu (2003) 
argues that since joining the CCP is a voluntary process, people who join the Party can be 
assumed to expect to gain utility. The costs of making the choice to join the Party are 
mainly nonmonetary. For example, applicants to the CCP have to invest time and effort 
in studying the doctrine of the CCP, behave according to the code of the Party, and meet 
the Party’s standards for political trustworthiness. The benefits of joining the Party 
include pecuniary gains, and non-pecuniary gains, such as better career prospects and 
improved social status. In theoretical discussion of Liu (2003), income and the effort 
devoted to join the Party are included in the utility function. He assumes a positive 
correlation between income and expected utility of joining the Party, while he posits a 
negative one between efforts and utility. People will pursue Party membership if, and 
only if, the net gain in utility is positive. In this dissertation, I discuss how workers are 
sorted into four groups based on their personal choices of Party membership and 
ownership structure of work unit. Government agents and all SOEs are classified into the 
SOS, while urban collective enterprises, urban private enterprises, and foreign-owned 
enterprises are grouped into the NSOS. SOEs are owned by and under the direct authority 
of the central or provincial government. Workers in the SOS are broken down into 
CCP/SOS and NonCCP/SOS categories based on their Party membership affiliation. 
Similarly, the CCP/NSOS category includes Party members in the NSOS, while other 
workers in the NSOS are grouped into the NonCCP/NSOS category. Given these four 
choices in the labor market, I assume workers select the one which gives them the largest 
expected utility gain. For example, workers self-select themselves into the CCP/SOS 
category if, and only if, their utility gain from this choice is expected to be greater than 
31 
 
that of their other choices. People measure the expected utility gain differently, mostly 
depending on their preferences, willingness, and characteristics. For those who wish to be 
appointed to prominent positions in the administrative ranks in government agencies, 
Party membership is a must. Meanwhile, there is no doubt that the Party card screens 
political skills, although we are not sure if it represents productive skills as well. In the 
SOEs, it generally plays an important role in the competition of recruitment and 
promotions if all other abilities of candidates are the same. People usually expect a higher 
income and utility gain in the SOS if they join the Party. In contrast, the NSOS is tied to 
the market and the returns are determined by productivity. If Party membership is a proxy 
for political skills only, it would not be rewarded (or even worse) in the NSOS. If it 
represents both political and productive skills, then it is reasonable to treat Party 
membership as a screening factor in the labor market, and expect that the Party card is 
associated with a higher income in the NSOS as well. If the SOS compensates the 
productivity in a same way as what the NSOS does, then CCP members are expected to 
be rewarded more in the SOS than in the NSOS. However, the reforms in the SOS did not 
make it fully privatized, there is no a clear consensus how the SOS compensates CCP 
members differently from the NSOS, but I would expect smaller difference across sectors 
over time. Jefferson and Singh (1999) found that wages in SOEs and UCEs became more 
associated with labor productivity and bonuses were more driven by profits. In most of 
the existing literature, it is assumed that the efforts to join the Party are the same across 
the ownership sectors. However, the effort to join the Party and the expected utility gain 
of joining the Party could differ across sectors. As a source of new jobs and economic 
growth, the NSOS represents a new productive force but not all the firms in the NSOS 
have Party organizations, especially privately-owned or foreign-funded enterprises during 
the early stage of economic reform. Dickson (2003) finds that “the new collectively and 
privately owned and foreign-funded enterprises as being created so fast that the Party 
cannot create organizations within most of them, and many of them do not even have 
Party members in them.” In a special economic zone, Shenzhen, he found that only 17 of 
more than 13,000 private enterprises had basic level Party organizations,  and less than 1 
percent of workers in private enterprises were Party members during the 1990s (Dickson 
2003). Since there are not as many Party organizations embedded in the NSOS as those in 
32 
 
the SOS, workers with a willingness to join the Party in these enterprises have to make 
more effort to figure out if there is a Party organization in their work place first and then 
seek out local Party organizations or other local organization, such as Federation of 
Industry and Commerce to process their applications26
As a major component of the NSOS in urban China, UCEs, which are usually owned 
collectively by workers and other economic entities such as a city or a district authority, 
are more likely to have a Party organization than other firms in the NSOS. Since 1979 the 
government has diversified the types of UCEs in order to alleviate serious urban 
unemployment. UCEs employed educated urban youths and contributed 26.5 million 
employment positions, which was 31% of the total employment in the SOS in the early 
1980s. UCEs developed rapidly in various types, including urban ‘large collectives’ 
(dajiti), urban ‘small collectives’ (xiaojiti) and urban neighborhood cooperatives in the 
1980s (Guo 1998). Urban ‘large collectives’ are affiliated with a district government 
under a municipality or a county, while ‘small collectives’ and cooperatives are affiliated 
with a neighborhood (the grassroots organizational government in urban areas). The Party 
organizational system remains effective in most UCEs and the Party recruits pioneer 
vanguard there. Since the shareholding reform in 1992, many UCEs were re-organized 
and registered as shareholding companies or private firms in the 1990s. Meanwhile, the 
launch of restructuring SOEs national-widely also regrouped numerous SOEs into the 
NSOS in terms of various ownerships, which diversified the composition of the NSOS 
and created organizations to link the state and the NSOS. Additionally, with more Party 
organizations been also set up in the NSOS in the 1990s,  it is not surprising to see 
various sources for Party members in the NSOS: some Party members were recruited by 
the Party organs in the NSOS, some were already Party members in school before they 
. The needs to seek out the Party 
organizations to submit the applications offset their expected utility of joining the CCP. 
But during the years that have been studied in this dissertation, CCP had speed up to 
forge the relationship to the NSOS and facilitate their applications. For example, Party 
organization had been also set up in certain joint-ventured enterprises by 1991 (Dickson 
2003).  
                                                 
26 Before 2001, the party even set up a ban on admitting owners of private firms into the party, which 
makes party building in the NSOS slower and more difficult. 
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worked in the NSOS or in the SOS before SOEs were reorganized to the NSOS, some 
Party members left the SOS and ‘plunged into the sea’ (Xiahai) to be entrepreneurs in the 
NSOS27 and some Party members were reemployed by the firms in the NSOS after they 
were laid off in SOEs28
Given the above comparison of the benefits and the cost of joining the Party between 
the SOS and the NSOS, I would expect politically ambitious workers to be more likely to 
self-select in the CCP/SOS category, and more risk-avoiders and stable-work seekers to 
fall into the NCCP/SOS category, while innovators would be more likely to be in the 
CCP/NSOS.  The least politically ambitious workers would choose to be in the 
NCCP/NSOS. For example, people who prefer to have a job in the SOS are more likely 
to self-select to join the Party, although not everyone who applies for Party membership 
in the SOS will finally be approved, due to the selection process of the CCP. If the 
distinct characteristics of CCP workers in the SOS, which make them better suited for the 
requirements of the Party and SOS, enable them to earn more, then it is necessary to 
control for selection effects in the earning equation.  
. The Party has tried to increase their connections in the NSOS, 
especially after 1992 because the rapid development of the NSOS created incentives to 
meet the demand and supply of Party membership in this sector. The people who self-
select into private enterprises and joint ventures as prospective managers are innovative 
and productive, and are also attractive to the Party as potential vanguards and models in 
leading the masses along the path of economic reform.  Local Party committees actively 
found ways to cooperate with private entrepreneurs to enhance the local economy before 
the ban on private entrepreneurs was lifted in 2001. Shenzhen even created special Party 
branches for entrepreneurs who joined the Party (Dickson 2003). Entrepreneurs in the 
NSOS also sought out a close relationship with the Party in order to gain access to the 
resources controlled by the Party. Although there are not as many Party organizations in 
the NSOS as in the SOS, I would expect a change to exist between the two sectors, in the 
relative efforts that workers made to join the Party, especially as the economic reform 
proceeded from its second decade to its third decade. 
                                                 
27 Since 1992, the party has encouraged its members to plunge into the sea of private enterprises, known as 
Xiahai.  Xiahai entrepreneurs are found to be older and better educated than Non-party members. 
28 The policy of restructuring SOEs has been a nation-wide implementation since 1995.  
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This dissertation examines how the characteristics of workers are different in four 
categories, how they are different in affecting the probability of each choice, how their 
earnings vary depending on Party membership in each sector, and how the impact of 
human capital on earnings varies with alternative choices. Additionally, selection 
correction terms are controlled in each earning equation to investigate potential selection 
effects. In the following sector, I describe an econometric model applied to control for 
selection bias in earning equations. 
 
4.2 Econometric Model  
A potential empirical problem in most existing studies on the earning determination 
in China is the selectivity bias due to the assumption of exogenous ownership sector 
choice and CCP membership affiliation. I assume that each worker faces four choices, 
delineated by investment on the political capital and their sector status: the CCP/SOS, the 
NonCCP /SOS, the CPP/NSOS, and the NonCCP/NSOS. I adopt Lee’s (1983) Mlogit-
OLS two-stage estimation procedure. It allows us to study polychotomous choice 
problems with mixed continuous and discrete dependent variables. Rational individuals 
target to maximize their utility and their willingness to choose different statuses, 
depending on the order of utility provided by the different choices. Let ijV  be the 
maximum attainable utility of worker i if he chooses the choice j. Following Trost and 
Lee (1984), we assume that this indirect utility function is a linear function of a vector of 
exogenous variables.  
ijijij uZV += 'γ   (1) 
where,   
Ni ,,2,1 =  individuals; 
Mj ,,2,1 = types of choices that each individual faces; 
=iZ a vector of exogenous individual characteristics affecting the selection; 
='jγ a vector of unknown utility parameters for status j; 
=iju a disturbance term with a zero population mean and constant variance; 
The earning equation is given by  
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ijijij xY εβ += '    (2) 
Where, =ijY natural logarithm of annual earnings; 
=ix a vector of exogenous individual characteristics determining the annual earnings. 
='jβ a vector of status-specific annual earnings parameters; 
 ),0(~ 2jij N σε  
Following Gyourko and Tracy (1988), we define an indicator variable 
jIi =  IFF individual i chooses the status Mjj ,,2,1, =  
And the choice depends on the maximized utility, which is 
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Following Trost and Lee (1984), we define  
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Combining (1), (3) and (4) we obtain 
ijiji ZIFFjI 'γω <=            (5) 
An worker i is expected to select alternative j if ijijikikMk
ZuuZ ')'(max
,,1
γγ <−+
=  . A 
high value of uij makes this selection more likely by reducing the value of ijω . This may 
come via wages, i.e., a higher value of uij could be from a higher value of ijε . Assume 
the disturbance iju are independently and identically Gumbel distributed, and the 
corresponding cumulative and density functions are 
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Then the choice model can be estimated as a multinomial logit model  
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Since the observations in each status choice are restricted to those who choose this 
status, then the conditional annual earnings in individual desired status becomes: 
[ ] [ ] [ ]ijijijijijijijiij ZEXZYEjIYE ''' γωεβγω <+=<==     (7) 
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If ijω has a direct impact on earnings, which is indicated by [ ] 0' ≠< ijijij ZE γωε , and were 
we to simply estimate earning equations on a random sample of individuals partitioned 
by the choices, then OLS estimates would be biased because of nonrandom selection. To 
correct the selectivity bias, ijε and ijω are assumed to be joint normally distributed 
(Heckman 1974). A two-step selection correction procedure can be used by transforming
ijω  into a standard normal random variable (Lee, 1983; Gyourko and Tracy, 1988).  
[ ])'(1* ijij ZF γω −Φ=     (8) 
where Φ denotes the cumulative distribution function (cdf) of the standard univariate 
normal distribution. And 
[ ])'(' 1* ijijijij ZFIFFZ γωγω −Φ<<  
which indicates that  
[ ])'(1* ijiji ZFIFFjI γω −Φ<=       (9) 
And given [ ] [ ]ZEZE jijijjijij '|'| γωωσγωε ωε <=<    (Cameron and Trivedi, 2005), the 
conditional earning can be obtained by using a standard approach as following 
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where φ  denotes the probability density function (pdf) of the standard univariate 
normal distribution. ωεσ is covariance between ijω and ijε . 29
Therefore, a two-step procedure to consistently estimate 
 
jβ in the earning equations 
requires, first, that we apply the multinomial logit maximum likelihood method in the 
polychotomous choice equation to obtain jγ and construct the selectivity correction terms 
called inverse Mills ratio for each status choice. 
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29 Derivation is provided in Appendix E. 
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Second, the selectivity correction terms are included in the earnings equation for each 
individual and run separate ordinary least squares (OLS) earning equations for 
individuals who fall into different categories 
ijijjjiijijjjjiij vXvXY ++=++= λδβλρσβ ˆˆ
''            (12) 
The term ijjλδ ˆ  represents the difference in the earnings due to unobserved 
productivities between individuals who self-selects into status j ( 0ˆ ≠ijλ ) and the 
individuals with the same observable characteristics but who selected at random and are 
assigned to status j ( 0ˆ =ijλ ). The sign of jδ  equals that of ωεσ . If a high value of uij 
makes the selection of alternative j more likely by reducing the value of ijω , that implies 
high values of ijε go with high values of uij . This would give a negative ωεσ . A negative 
sign means that those with a higher earnings capacity for alternative j (a bigger ijε ), have 
a higher utility for j (a larger uij  and lower ijω ). Because ijλ̂ is negative, a statistically 
significant and negative estimate of jδ  means a positive selection effect on the earnings 
equation ( ijjλδ ˆ > 0), which shows individuals who are more likely to select status ,j earn 
more than those randomly assigned individuals, given the same characteristics.  
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Chapter 5  
Data Description and Sources 
 
5.1 Identification 
In chapter 4, I discussed the empirical model and the econometrics used in this 
dissertation. In this chapter, I present the estimating equation based on the empirical 
model described in the previous chapter, and then define the dependent and independent 
variables.  
I start in this section with the earnings equation of four groups that have different 
personal choices of Party membership and ownership sectors. Then, the dependent 
variable and independent variables are defined in the earnings equations and the 
identification in multinomial logit model is presented. In section 5.2, I discuss the data 
sources, components of annual earning, and summary statistics of variables in the Mlogit-
OLS two-stage estimation procedure. 
The selection of Party membership and ownership sectors is modeled as given by: 
i
iiii
udummiesgiondummieslevelEducation
MinorityGenderExperienceExperienceiabletionidentificaFChoice
+
=
) Re ,  
,,,,,var ( 2
 
Based on previous studies on the labor market in China, it is expected that CCP 
workers in either sector are relatively older, more experienced, and have a higher level of 
education than other workers. Compared to NSOS workers, SOS workers are supposed to 
be more experienced and educated. 
By including the selectivity correction terms in the earnings equation (12) discussed 
in the previous chapter for individuals who fall into different categories, I can write the 
final estimating equation as follows: 
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ijY  in the equation is the log of annual earnings of individual i in group j. The 
definition of annual earnings and its components are presented in the next section. The 
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earnings equation includes standard explanatory variables: experience, gender, and 
educational levels. We would expect that the more work experience people have, the 
higher would be their annual earnings, and returns to an additional year of work 
experience increase at a decreasing rate. Therefore, the sign on Experience is expected to 
be positive while 2Experience  is expected to have a negative sign. Male is a binary 
variable indicating the gender of individuals, male (1) or female (0). The findings in 
previous literature show that males have higher annual earnings than females do, on 
average. The highest education that an individual attained is measured by five categories: 
four-year college (or more), two-year college, professional school, senior high, and junior 
high (or less). The omitted education group includes the individuals with junior high 
school education attained or less.30
Identification variables are desirable to achieve the Mlogit-OLS two-stage estimation. 
They are expected to impact only people’s choice but not their earning level. 
Identification in selection models can be achieved by functional form or exclusion 
restrictions. In 1999, three identification variables were available: the nature of the 
recruitment, parental years of schooling, and the parental CCP membership affiliation. In 
1995, only the “nature of recruitment” variable was available. However, we have to 
depend on the functional form (the nonlinearity of inverse mills ratio) to solve the 
identification problem in 1988, because none of the restriction variables was available. 
 It is expected that higher education will result in a 
higher earning, on average. 
The “Nature of recruitment”31
Given a theory of intergenerational endowments proposed by Gary Becker and Nigel 
Tomes, we do prefer to use the parents’ characteristics as the instruments of their 
 refers to whether individuals’ current jobs have been 
assigned by the government. We would expect that if the individuals’ current jobs had 
been assigned by the government, they would be more likely to have access to SOS jobs 
and have more motivation to join the CCP, compared with other recruitment alternatives. 
We believe the way that the individuals were recruited into the work unit potentially 
affects individuals’ ownership sector access and political participation, especially in a 
relatively sluggish economic system.  
                                                 
30 In 1999 CHIP sample, all CCP members at NSOS have at least junior-high school education. 
31 The creation of the identification variable “nature of recruitment” is explained in the data section. 
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children’s personal choice. In the traditional family in China, not only do the parents’ 
learning and skills help shape the preferences of the next generation such as choice of 
job, but also “political affiliation is one measurable dimension of family endowments and 
cultures” (Liu, 2003). These family background intentionally or unintentionally impart to 
their children the desirable traits required of a CCP member. In three waves of CHIP 
data, only the 1999 CHIP questionnaire asked the parents’ CCP membership affiliation 
and their highest education attained. We include them as instruments in 1999. 
 
5.2 Data Source 
The data used for the empirical work are taken from the 1988, 1995 and 1999 Chinese 
Household Income Project (CHIP).32
Griffin and Zhao (1993) describe the detailed sampling process for the 1988 survey 
data, which was conducted in the spring of 1989 and covered 10 provinces. Survey data 
were drawn from significantly large samples used by the National Bureau of Statistics of 
China (NBS).  Liaoning and Shanxi provinces were chosen to represent the north, Jiangsu 
and Guangdong were chosen to represent the eastern coastal provinces, Anhui, Henan 
and Hubei were chosen to represent the interior, and Gansu and Yunnan the west (Shu 
and Bian, 2003). Sichuan province is added to the previous ten provinces in the 1995 
survey.
 These surveys were conducted by the Institute of 
Economics, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS) for the years 1988, 1995 and 
1999. The questionnaires were designed in a relatively consistent way and provide a 
reasonable basis for a comparative study (Meng 2004). The 1988 and 1995 CHIP surveys 
consist of two data files: one in which the individual is the unit of analysis, and a second 
in which the household is the unit of analysis. We use only the urban individual survey. 
The 1988 CHIP samples 31,827 individuals from 9,009 urban households, and the 1995 
CHIP includes 21,694 individuals from 6,931 urban households, while the 1999 CHIP 
only samples 9,637 individuals from 3,255 urban households. 
33
                                                 
32 The 1988 and 1995 CHIP data are publicly available at the Inter-university Consortium for Political and 
Social Research and more fully described in the relevant codebooks. 
 However, only six provinces are included in the 1999 survey. They are Beijing, 
Jiangsu, Liaoning, Henan, Sichuan, and Gansu (Li and Hiroshi, 2006). Therefore, only 
33 Khan and Riskin (1998) provide a detailed description of the 1995 Survey. 
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five provinces were included in all three surveys. Table A.1 in Appendix A provides 
more information about the CHIP data in Urban China, including the number of 
observations in the surveys. 
In order to represent the regional conditions with cities and towns of various sizes34, 
the sampling procedures of the CHIP strictly chose respondents from the parent NBS 
sample. Although the CHIP is much smaller than the National Sample Surveys conducted 
by NBS, it is interesting to take NBS’ large-scale survey as a benchmark and compare 
some key variables in CHIP to the NBS sample. Panel a on Table 5.1 reports the mean of 
some variables for workers in CHIP. 52% to 54% of the workers in CHIP sample were 
male. This percentage is very close to 51% from NBS data. But, 78% to 82% of workers 
in CHIP sample were in State-owned Sector,35
 
 it was higher than the percentage from 
NBS data. The average wage in CHIP sample is comparable to that from NBS data. On 
average, the workers in CHIP earned more than those in the NBS sample. The average 
wage in State-owned units and urban collective units was slightly higher in CHIP sample 
that that from NBS sample, while it was opposite in other NSOS units. Panel b shows the 
growth rate of average wage in two samples, while Panel c shows the growth rate of GDP 
per capita. Although the growth rate of average wage in CHIP sample was higher than 
that in NBS sample from 1995 to 1999, it was quite close to the growth rate of GDP per 
capita during the same time period. Given the sensitivity of Party membership affiliation, 
there is no such information in the NBS sample. Additionally, CHIP data provide more 
individual information than the NBS does. A lot of previous studies by international 
scholars used CHIP data in their empirical analysis to study poverty, gender wage gap, 
and human capital in China. Therefore, we are confident with the quality and reliability 
of CHIP data. 
                                                 
34 NBS in China conducted the census of the National population in 1953, 1964, 1982 and 1990. The total 
population in 1988 was adjusted on the basis of the 1982 and 1990 censuses of the national population. 
Since 1983, the NSB has provided the annual national sample survey on the change in population, among 
which the samples in 1995 and in 1999 are 1% and 0.976‰ of the population, respectively. The total 
population in 1995 and 1999 are estimated on the basis of the annual National Sample Surveys on 
Population Changes. The NBS has been conducting an annual survey of urban households from 226 cities 
(counties) in China since 1986. 
35 Appendix B provides some potential reasons why the percentage of SOS in the CHIP is higher than that 
in the NBS sample. 
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5.3 CHIP Data and Components of Earnings 
In this dissertation, we investigate individuals in three survey years that are between 
18 and 65 years of age and currently employed. The earning variables used have a 
composition that is particular to China with a gradual economic reform system being put 
in place. The individuals’ earning defined as the cash income received from their work 
unit or their own private business.36
The reform on the wage-setting system during the 1980s attempts to link the wages of 
individuals to their labor productivity within firms. In 1985, the Ministry of Labor 
(MOL) announced that the budget to be allocated for wages would depend on the 
economic performance of SOEs and collectively-owned enterprises (COEs), which were 
allowed to allocate a wage budget based on individuals’ performances. Although various 
versions of this reform appeared in different regions and industries, the ‘wage plus bonus’ 
system was the most frequently adopted (Meng, 2004). However, due to a high 
monitoring cost of labor productivity, the bonuses
 Urban employees’ annual earnings are divided into 
the following components: all cash labor compensations such as wage, other wage 
income, other cash income, other labor income, and net income of private/individual 
entrepreneurship.  Table 5.2 summarizes these components of the annual earnings used in 
the dissertation in each year. Since the wage structure varies due to wage reforms in the 
1980s and the 1990s, we interpret the components of earnings in 1988 first, and then 
point out the changes in 1995 and 1999.  
37
Another widely implemented wage reform during the 1980s was the introduction of 
the “floating wage” system. Under this system, part of a worker’s basic wage and bonus 
became a “floating wage” as a reward to the employees on the basis of their own 
performance or the enterprises’ performance.  In 1988, 35% of responders in the CHIP 
had a positive floating wage. Aimed at bringing incentives into enterprises, the labor 
contract system was introduced into the sluggish labor market in 1983 (Liu 1998). The 
labor contract in management hierarchy mainly involves three ingredients, the so-called 
CMI: the contract management system (CMS), the manager responsibility system (MRS), 
 eventually became an extra 
component of wages. They are equally distributed among employees in most SOEs. 
                                                 
36 We drop the observations with zero annual earning. 
37 National Statistic Bureau defines bonuses as remuneration payment to workers for extra work. 
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and the internal contract system (ICS). The MRS and CMS stipulate the rights of the 
plant manager and liabilities of them to relevant state/responsibility organs (e.g. 
municipal government). Multiple-level contracts in the ICS represent the most complete 
hierarchy within which the enterprise manager operates. The parties in a contract are 
allowed to keep extra profit excess the target (output target or profit target) as so-called 
contractual income. Most of the time, the plant managers distributed the retained profit 
among the parties involved in the CIS according to the degree of their responsibilities. In 
1988, only 7% individuals had this contractual income. 
The labor contract system was also introduced to the new employees to break the 
‘iron rice bowl’ and stop offering a promised life-long job during the 1980s. The contract 
specifies the duration of the agreement between workers and firms, as well as the 
responsibilities and benefits of the respective parties, such as wages, fringe benefits, the 
nature of work, and required productivity standards (Liu 1998). Either the employee or 
the firm could decide to not renew upon expiration, or to terminate the contract under 
certain circumstances, such as employer’s default on the agreed wage payment, or a 
violation of labor discipline. The contracted monetary benefits to the employees (a 
contractor), if they fulfilled the contract-specified target, were also labeled as the contract 
income of employees. Liu (1998) provides a detailed description on this type of labor 
contract, and he interprets the employees with positive contractual income in 1988 CHIP 
as those on this contract basis. However, I prefer to interpret the contractual income as 
compensation to those in both cases. In 1988, the shares of workers on contract were 
10.1% in SOEs, 5.8% in COEs, and 20.7% in all other types of enterprises (Liu 1998).   
Compared with other countries such as the USA38
                                                 
38 Wages and salaries from the CPS consist of the total monies received for work performed by an 
employee during the income year. It includes wages, salaries, commissions, tips, piece-rate payments, and 
cash bonuses earned before deductions were make for taxes, bonds, union dues, etc. 
, the concept and measurement of 
earnings in China are more complex, because a significant part of individual income 
originates from non-market transactions. If one counts as earning only basic wages, a 
bonus, and other wages, etc. but ignores cash subsidies, the ‘true’ earning will be 
understated and any comparison with other countries will be misleading. It was therefore 
necessary to use a more broadly defined earning which included all cash income from 
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work units including subsidies in cash paid by work units. These subsidies paid to staff 
and workers are used to compensate special or extra labor or offset the impact of inflation 
on real wages. 39
The 1988 CHIP includes cash subsidies for heating, utilities, books and newspapers, 
nonstaple foods, and housing.
 
40
The major advantage of these data sources is the income data they provide, and they 
have been used in many previous studies, such as those of Knight, Li and Liu. But unlike 
the 1995 and 1999 CHIP data, less demographic variables are available in the 1988, such 
as the nature of recruitment, actual work experience, the years of working in a worker’s 
current job, and so on. To make empirical results comparable in three years, we created 
the variable “years of work experience” in 1988 following Liu (2003).
  The 1995 and the 1999 CHIP include the regional 
subsidies. As defined by the NBS in China, the 1995 and 1999 CHIP directly classify 
these subsidies, as a bonus into the so-called wage variable. But the 1995 and 1999 CHIP 
do not designate any explicit questions about the basic wage as shown in 1988 CHIP 
questionnaire. They only have the total wage payment listed by work units and some 
related components. I grouped them into wage component in the dissertation as shown on 
Table 5.2. Other cash income from work units such as the transportation subsidy and the 
single child subsidy, and other income generated from labor such as the income from the 
second job, all serve to compromise ‘Other Cash Income’ and ‘Other Labor Income’ 
components of the earnings in the dissertation. For owners of private enterprises and self-
employed businesses, the pre-tax net-income is included.  
41
For example, the SOS provided a job, or as we describe it, the organization 
“assigned” a job, to the unemployed (those people waiting for a job). In our CHIP data, 
 Another 
important variable which was used to create an identification variable is the “Nature of 
recruitment.” It refers to the way the individual was recruited into the work unit, a factor 
which is closely related to the labor market reform in China. To solve the severe urban 
unemployment problem since 1978, the government adopted different approaches.  
                                                 
39 The NBS includes these subsidies in the gross wage. 
40 The house subsidy in cash is counted as a component of the wage earning from the work unit. It differs 
from the Housing subsidy in kind and other income in kind, counted as part of the household income in 
Khan et al. (2001). 
41 Experience = age – education - 6 
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this is called “assigned by the government.” State-owned enterprises (SOEs) were also 
allowed to provide jobs to the unemployed sons and daughters of their employees. This 
practice is referred to as being “inherited from the parents” in the CHIP data. As the 
gradual decentralization of the 1980s started to abolish the lifetime employment practice, 
and allowed employers the autonomy to recruit new employees, people were able to find 
jobs for themselves, or through an employment agency.  This type of practice was a new 
phenomenon, as previously, workers had to accept the jobs assigned to them, regardless 
of their personal preference.  Given the multiple recruitment efforts and strategies, I 
created a dummy variable, named the “nature of recruitment”, which compared the major 
job entry type of being “assigned by the government” with other recruitment approaches. 
We include it as one of the identification variables in our study. 
Table 5.3 shows that annual earning rises in three years. Percentage of wage in annual 
earnings slightly increases from 88% in 1988 to 92% in 1999 while other cash labor 
compensations, including other wage income, other cash income and other labor income, 
decrease from 10.3% in 1988 to 5.8% in 1999.  
 
5.4 Summary Statistics of Three Years’ CHIP Sample  
Table 5.4 indicates that the proportion of CCP workers in the entire sample rose over 
time. 24% and 25.3% of workers in the entire sample are CCP members in 1988 and 
1995, while the proportion of CCP members rises to 30.6% in 1999. Specifically, 
CCP/SOS workers account for 22%, 23% and 27.2% of the full sample, while the 
CCP/NSOS category only accounts for 2% of all workers in 1988 and 1995, and reaches 
3.5% in 1999. Most CCP members work in the SOS, but the proportion decreases from 
1988 to 1999. For example, in 1988 and 1995, 92% of CCP members work at the SOS. 
But 88.7% of these CCP members work at the SOS in 1999, a smaller number than in 
1988 and 1995.42
Compared to the workers in the NSOS, we can find a higher proportion of workers in 
the SOS. For example, 78.2%, 82% and 79.2% of individuals in the entire sample work at 
the SOS in the three years. But in both sectors, the proportion of workers who are CCP 
 
                                                 
42 73.8%, 78.3% and 75% of NonCCP members have a job at the SOS during the three years, respectively. 
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members increase over time, respectively. Around 28% of workers at the SOS are CCP 
members in both 1988 and 1995, and then it increases to 34.3% in 1999. In the NSOS, 
this proportion also increases from 9% in 1988, to 11% in 1995, and even more so in 
1999, to 17%. Correspondingly, the percentages of other workers in both sectors decrease 
over time, although they comprise the major portion of employees.  
We provide both descriptive summary statistics with the full sample and four 
subcategories in Table 5.5 to Table 5.7: the CCP members in the State-owned sector 
(CCP/SOS); other workers (NonCCP) in the state-owned sector (NonCCP/SOS); CCP 
members in the Nonstate-owned sector (CCP/NSOS); and NonCCP workers in the 
Nonstate-owned sector (NonCCP/NSOS). 
The annual earnings are all measured in the 1995 RMB using a domestic 
consumption price index. We find that the average annual earnings are 4379.768 Yuan 
and 6251.3 Yuan in 1988 and 1995, and then this number increases to 8385.25 Yuan, 
which is 34% higher than that in 1995. We notice that CCP members have a considerable 
advantage in mean earning. CCP members make 25% and 37% higher earnings than 
NonCCP workers at the SOS and in the NSOS, respectively, in 1988.  Contrarily, the 
CCP-NonCCP unadjusted earning gap in the SOS increases to 30% in 1995 and then 
slightly goes to 31.5% in 1999. But this earning gap in the NSOS continues to narrow 
down to 22% in 1995 and 16.4% in 1999.  
The Table 5.5 to Table 5.7 shows that the average work experience is 22, 19.4 and 
19.7 years in the three years, respectively.  The average work experience of CCP 
members is around 28 years in 1988, 6 years higher than the overall average. It declines 
to 25 and 24 years in 1995 and 1999.  But the average work experience of NonCCP 
workers is 20 years and then stays at 18 years in 1995 and 1999. It might because more 
young people such as college students are recruited into CCP in 1990s. As expected, CCP 
members persistently have more years of work experience than NonCCP workers do. On 
average, CCP members have worked 8 years more than other workers in either sector in 
1988. Interestingly, in both sectors, it decreases to about a 7 and 6 year gap in 1995 and 
1999, respectively. 
Females and males are almost even in the data. The proportion of males is slightly 
higher than that of females, reaching 52%, 53% and 54% in three years. Among CCP 
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members, the males comprise more of the working population than females in either 
sector. For example, 78%, 73% and 69% of CCP workers at the SOS are males in the 
three years. Males also account for 61%, 54% and 62% of the CCP/NSOS. Han is an 
absolutely major part of all individuals in all three years.  We find that less than 5% of 
individuals are minorities in the three years. 
 The samples in the three years’ data show that the average education level increases 
over time. More than half of the workers in the entire sample only have a junior high 
school education or less in 1988, but this proportion goes down to 35% in 1995 and 24% 
in 1999. Although individuals with two or four years’ college education (or more) only 
account for 13% of entire sample in 1988, it increases to 23% in 1995 and reaches 34% in 
1999.  
Compared to other workers, CCP members tend to have higher levels of education, 
with a higher proportion of workers with a college education (or more) in the full sample. 
26.6% and 40.3% of CCP members have a college education (or more)43
In each sector, I also observe an increasing proportion of both CCP members and 
NonCCP workers who have completed a college education, but the SOS has a higher 
proportion than the NSOS. For example, 28% of CCP members in the SOS in 1988 have 
a college education but this proportion was as low as 10% in the NSOS in 1988. It 
increases significantly to 42.2% in the SOS and 18% in the NSOS in 1995, reaching as 
high as 55% in the SOS and 47% in the NSOS in 1999. In the SOS, the proportion of 
NonCCP workers with such an educational level rises from 11% in 1988 to 20.7% in 
1995 and 29.1% in 1999, but it is as low as 1.9% in the NSOS in 1988 and increases to 
6.6% and 18.3% in 1995 and 1999, respectively. 
 in 1988 and 
1995, and this number rises to 54% in 1999. The proportion of NonCCP workers who 
have completed this level of education is much lower, but it keeps increasing from only 
8.6% in 1988, to 17.7% in 1995 and 26.4% in 1999.  
Contrarily, the proportion of CCP members who have less than a professional school 
education is decreasing over time in both sectors. In the SOS, this proportion is 55% in 
1988, 37% in 1995, and only 30% in 1999. In the NSOS, the number appears to be 83% 
                                                 
43 A college education stands for either two-year college education or four-year college education or more. 
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in 1988, 69% in 1995, but only 38% in 1999. Other workers have a similarly changing 
pattern. The proportion in the SOS decreases from 78% in 1998 to 61% in 1995 and 56% 
in 1999. In the NSOS, it changes from 95% in 1988 to 86% in 1995 and 70% in 1999.  
In a word, CCP members in the SOS have a higher average education than both 
NonCCP workers in the SOS and CCP members NSOS, which have a higher average 
education than NonCCP workers in the NSOS. 
The industrial sector attracts the largest part of CCP and NonCCP workers in both the 
SOS and the NSOS sectors, but the proportion in 1999 declines significantly. This trend 
is consistent with that in Appleton et al. (2005). They find a gradual shift in industrial 
structure, with a declining share of employment in primary and secondary sectors but a 
rising share in service sector from 1988 to 2002. In this dissertation, I find that similar to 
1988, 42% of all individuals work in the industry sector in 1995, but only 29.2% in 1999. 
In the SOS, 27% and 28.7% of CCP members work at the industry sector in 1988 and 
1995, but only 20% in 1999.  This number is even higher in the NSOS, with 57% in 1988 
and 1995, but 41% in 1999. NonCCP workers present a similar pattern at two sectors 
with decreasing numbers over time. For example, 44% and 57% of NonCCP members in 
both sectors have a job in the industry sector in 1988, falling to 42.3% and 54.8% in 1995, 
and reaching as low as 31% and 37% in 1999. One of the possible reasons could be the 
expansion of other economic sectors due to greater openness in China in the late 1990s. 
For example, 10% of individuals work in the transportation sector in 1999, twice that in 
1995. Other economic sectors including the service industry, account for only 1.1% and 
2.6% in 1988 and 1995, but this number rises to 9.4% in 1999. The change in industrial 
structure could be also related to retrenchment in unprofitable SOEs in heavy industry44
                                                 
44 In order to reform the SOEs, the retrenchment, xia gang, was first experimented with in 1994 and finally 
launched fully in 1997. It aims to resolve the problem of overstaffing and inefficiency in the SOEs by 
laying-off a quarter or more SOE workers within a four-year period from 1997 to 2000. 
. 
Other sectors that we need to pay attention to are the commerce sector, real estate, and 
social organizations. 14.5% (14.5%, 9.2%) of the sample held a job in the commerce 
sector in 1988(1995 and 1999). In the SOS, 14% of NonCCP workers and 10% of CCP 
members work in the commerce sector in both 1988 and 1995, but this percentage falls 
below 9% in 1999. As expected, the workers in the NSOS are more likely to work in the 
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commerce sector than are those in the SOS. We observe that these proportions in the 
NSOS are all larger than those in the SOS. In the entire sample, more and more workers 
choose a job in the real estate sector over time. We observe 2.5%, 4% and 6% of the 
workers in this sector in three years, respectively.  Specifically, the NSOS has a much 
higher percentage of workers in the real estate sector than the SOS does in 1988 and 1995, 
but the difference becomes smaller in 1999 as more workers in the SOS and fewer 
workers in the NSOS choose real estate or consulting services. 8.6% (12.1%, 9.8%) of 
workers work in social organizations in 1988 (1995 and 1999). The proportion of CCP 
members in the SOS that work in CCP organizations or social organizations is more than 
twice of the average level, reaching 24.7% in 1988 and 27% in 1995 and 1999. However, 
only 5.3%, 9.3% and 8.1% of NonCCP members in the SOS work in social organizations 
in the three years, respectively. These numbers are even smaller in the NSOS. 
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Table 5.1 CHIP Sample v.s. NBS Data 
Panel a. Key variables 1988 
 
1995 
 
1999 
 
Variable 
CHIP 
Sample NBS 
CHIP 
Sample NBS 
CHIP 
Sample NBS 
SOS 78.2% 70.0% 81.8% 59.0% 79.2% 40.8% 
       Male 52.4% 51.5% 53.1% 51.0% 54.3% 51.0% 
       Average Wage ￥4,379.77 NA ￥6,351.30 ￥4,288.09 ￥8,385.25 ￥5,353.43 
       State-owned units ￥4,523.90 ￥4,223.59 ￥6,464.12 ￥5,625.00 ￥8,687.94 ￥7,762.82 
Urban Collective units ￥3,697.52 ￥3,250.32 ￥4,894.96 ￥3,931.00 ￥5,557.72 ￥5,246.69 
Other NSOS units ￥5,915.47 NA ￥7,305.14 ￥7,463.00 ￥8,572.65 ￥8,931.37 
       Panel b. Growth Rate of Average Wage From 1988 to 1995 From 1995 to 1999 From 1988 to 1999 
 
CHIP 
Sample NBS 
CHIP 
Sample NBS 
CHIP 
Sample NBS 
Average Wage 45.0% NA 32.0% 24.8% 91.5% NA 
       State-owned units 42.9% 33.2% 34.4% 38.0% 92.0% 83.8% 
Urban Collective units 32.4% 20.9% 13.5% 33.5% 50.3% 61.4% 
Other NSOS units 23.5% NA 17.4% 19.7% 44.9% NA 
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Table 5.1 (Continued) CHIP Sample v.s. NBS Data 
Panel c. GDP Per Capita  1988 1995 1999 
   GDP per capita ￥3,088.49 ￥4,854.00 ￥6,505.21 
   
       
 
 1988 - 1995  1995 - 1999 1988 - 1999 
   Growth Rate of GDP per Capita 57.2% 34.0% 110.6% 
    
Note: NBS data in 1988 was adjusted on the basis of the 1982 and 1990 National Population censuses. Since 1990, NBS data have been estimated on the basis 
on the annual National Sample Surveys on Population Changes. NBS Data of SOS Units is from Table ‘5-4 Number of Employed Persons at the Year-end by 
Residence in Urban and Rural Areas’ from 1952 to 1999. NBS Data of Average wage by ownership sector is from Table '5-23 Average Wage of Staff and 
Workers in State-owned Units by Sector' on China Statistical Year Book 2000. Average wage at an overall level is calculated based on Table '5-23 Average 
Wage of Staff and Workers in State-owned Units by Sector', Table ‘5-8 Number of Staff and Workers in State-owned Units at the Year-end by Sector’, Table 
‘5-9 Number of Staff & Workers in Urban Collective-owned Units at the Year-end by Sector’, and Table ‘5-10 Number of Staff and Workers in Units of other 
Types of Ownership at the Year-end by Sector’. GDP per capita is from http://www.chinability.com/GDP.htm
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Table 5.2 Components of Annual Earnings 
Components of 
Annual Earning 
1988 1995 1999 
Wage Regular wage/basic wage, 
Floating wage, bonuses,  
Subsidies, Contract income  
 1) allowance while waiting for job; 2) 
bonuses, subsidies such as housing 
subsidies in cash, medical subsidies, child 
care subsidies and regional subsides; 7) 
overtime wages; 8)wages paid for special 
circumstances.                                         
1) bonuse, 2) subsidies 3) layoff subsidies                                                            
Note: sum of these components are not 
necessarily equal to wage, so they are just 
sub-components of wage bill 
Other Wage 
Income 
Other  employee income Other employee income, Wage income of 
employees of individual enterprises 
Other employee income, Wage income of 
employees of individual enterprises 
Other Cash Income Other cash income from work 
unit such as bath and haircut 
subsidy, transportation subsidy, 
single-child subsidy, hardship 
allowance 
Other income from the work unit including 
hardship allowance;  
Other income from the work unit including 
hardship allowance 
Other Labor 
Income 
Income from a second job Income from a second job Income from a second job 
Net Income of  
Private/Individual 
Entrepreneurship  
Pre-tax net income of 
private/individual enterprises 
owned/operated by the 
household 
Pre-tax net income of private/individual 
enterprises owned/operated by the 
household 
Net income of private/individual enterprises 
owned/operated by the household 
Note: The 1988 survey asks about income in a typical month and this is simply converted to annual income by multiplying by twelve. In 1995 and 1999, 
information on annual income was solicited. Allowance while ‘waiting for job’ in 1995 is not unemployment pension. It is a part of wage payment to the 
employees who are waiting for back to work. In 1995, no formal bankruptcy mechanism was established and applied to SOEs, so it becomes the firms’ 
responsibilities to take care of the employees when the firms stop production due to a loss. Here we could treat it as allowance to temporary unemployment in 
1995.
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Table 5.3 Sample Mean of Components of Annual Earnings 
Components of Annual Earning 1988 1995 1999 1988 1995 1999 
Wage 3,872.738 5,680.022 7,697.637 88.4% 90.9% 91.8% 
 
(2140.414) (3436.033) (4672.794) 
   
       Other Wage Income 87.390 35.390 53.925 2.0% 0.6% 0.6% 
 
(274.926) (551.095) (620.529) 
   
       Other Cash Income 333.934 387.847 257.637 7.6% 6.2% 3.1% 
 
(568.991) (771.966) (914.318) 
   
       Other Labor Income 30.879 103.141 179.009 0.7% 1.6% 2.1% 
 
(333.236) (679.121) (1112.253) 
   
       Net Income of Private/Individual Firms 54.827 44.897 197.039 1.3% 0.7% 2.3% 
 
(1154.033) (737.782) (3263.859) 
   
       Annual Earning 4,379.768 6,251.297 8,385.246 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
  (2541.179) (3815.127) (5724.796)       
Note: Components of Annual Earnings are all measured in 1995 RMB using domestic consumption price index.  
Standard deviation is in parenthesis. 
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Table 5.4  Distribution of Workers by Ownership Sectors and Party Membership 
# of Workers 1988 1995 1999 Percentages 1988 1995 1999 
CCP/SOS 3,805 2,464 1,210 Percentage of CCP/SOS in full sample 22.0% 23.3% 27.2% 
CCP/NSOS 333 217 154 Percentage of CCP/NSOS in full sample 1.9% 2.1% 3.5% 
NonCCP/SOS 9,732 6,188 2,321 Percentage of NonCCP/SOS in full sample 56.2% 58.5% 52.1% 
NonCCP/NSOS 3,450 1,711 771 Percentage of NonCCP/NSOS in full sample 19.9% 16.2% 17.3% 
Full Sample 17,320 10,580 4,456 Sub total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
        CCP total 4,138 2,681 1,364 Percentage of CCP workers in full sample 23.9% 25.3% 30.6% 
NonCCP Total 13,182 7,899 3,092 Percentage of other workers in full sample 76.1% 74.7% 69.4% 
Full Sample  17,320 10,580 4,456 Sub total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
        
    
Among CCP members, Percentage of SOS 
workers  92.0% 91.9% 88.7% 
        Among Others, Percentage of SOS workers 73.8% 78.3% 75.1% 
        SOS Total 13,537 8,652 3,531 Percentage of SOS in full sample 78.2% 81.8% 79.2% 
NSOS Total 3,783 1,928 925 Percentage of NSOS in full sample 21.8% 18.2% 20.8% 
Full Sample 17,320 10,580 4,456 Sub total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
        
    
In SOS, Percentage of CCP workers 28.1% 28.5% 34.3% 
        In NSOS, Percentage of CCP workers 8.8% 11.3% 16.6% 
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Table 5.5 Summary Statistics in 1998 
Year 1988 Variable Interpretation All sample CCP/SOS NonCCP/SOS CCP/NSOS NonCCP/NSOS 
Obs 
 
17320 3805 9732 333 3450 
annualearning annual income 4379.768  5273.359  4230.872  5124.850  3742.328  
  
(2541.179) (2761.310) (2122.025) (4273.400) (2854.945) 
lnearning log annual income 8.281  8.506  8.259  8.425  8.080  
  
(0.455) (0.329) (0.430) (0.425) (0.528) 
state if ownership of the  0.782  1 1 0 0 
 
workplace is state-owned  (0.413) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
partymember if individual is partymember  0.239  1 0 1 0 
  
(0.426) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
experience work experience 22.038  27.714  20.209  28.209  20.342  
  
(10.816) (9.378) (10.528) (9.883) (10.808) 
experience2 square of working  602.673  856.015  519.239  893.109  530.583  
 
experience (516.888) (529.092) (473.161) (582.876) (514.484) 
male if individual is male 0.524  0.777  0.482  0.613  0.353  
  
(0.499) (0.416) (0.500) (0.488) (0.478) 
minority if individual is monority 0.038  0.046  0.035  0.018  0.040  
  
(0.191) (0.210) (0.183) (0.133) (0.195) 
fourcollege if individual has four years'  0.062  0.141  0.052  0.042  0.003  
 
college education (0.240) (0.348) (0.222) (0.201) (0.059) 
twocollege if individual has two or  0.068  0.139  0.058  0.063  0.016  
 
three years' college education (0.251) (0.346) (0.234) (0.243) (0.126) 
professional if individual has professional  0.112  0.172  0.118  0.063  0.032  
_school school education (0.315) (0.377) (0.323) (0.243) (0.177) 
senior_high if individual has senior high  0.249  0.191  0.274  0.216  0.247  
 
school education (0.433) (0.393) (0.446) (0.412) (0.431) 
junior_high or  if individual has junior high  0.510  0.357  0.498  0.616  0.701  
below school education or less (0.500) (0.479) (0.500) (0.487) (0.458) 
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Table 5.5 (Continued) Summary Statistics in 1988 
Year 1988 Variable Interpretation All sample CCP/SOS NonCCP/SOS CCP/NSOS NonCCP/NSOS 
Obs 
 
17320 3805 9732 333 3450 
industry If economic sector is industry 0.428  0.270  0.435  0.568  0.572  
  
(0.495) (0.444) (0.496) (0.496) (0.495) 
construction If economic sector is  0.035  0.029  0.033  0.033  0.047  
 
construction (0.183) (0.167) (0.178) (0.179) (0.211) 
transportation If economic sector is  0.068  0.068  0.077  0.066  0.041  
 
transportation (0.251) (0.252) (0.266) (0.249) (0.199) 
commerce If economic sector is  0.145  0.101  0.140  0.183  0.205  
 
commerce (0.352) (0.302) (0.347) (0.387) (0.404) 
real_estate If economic sector is 0.025  0.017  0.023  0.021  0.040  
 
 real estate (0.155) (0.128) (0.148) (0.144) (0.196) 
health If economic sector is public  0.046  0.056  0.052  0.045  0.019  
 
health, sports and social welfare (0.210) (0.230) (0.222) (0.208) (0.138) 
arts If economic sector is arts 0.073  0.105  0.085  0.021  0.010  
  
(0.260) (0.306) (0.278) (0.144) (0.097) 
organization If economic sector is party,  0.086  0.247  0.053  0.033  0.008  
 
government or social 
organization (0.280) (0.431) (0.223) (0.179) (0.090) 
other_eco Other economic sectors 0.095 0.108 0.104 0.030 0.058 
_sector 
 
(0.293)  (0.310)  (0.306)  (0.171)  (0.234)  
BJ Bei Jing 0.048  0.054  0.054  0.036  0.028  
  
(0.215) (0.226) (0.226) (0.187) (0.166) 
LN Liang Ning 0.106  0.114  0.085  0.162  0.151  
  
(0.308) (0.318) (0.279) (0.369) (0.358) 
JS Jiang Su 0.130  0.094  0.120  0.141  0.196  
  
(0.336) (0.292) (0.325) (0.349) (0.397) 
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Table 5.5 (Continued) Summary Statistics in 1988 
Year 1988 Variable Interpretation 
All 
sample CCP/SOS NonCCP/SOS CCP/NSOS NonCCP/NSOS 
Obs 
 
17320 3805 9732 333 3450 
HN He Nan 0.115  0.124  0.121  0.075   0.089  
  
(0.319) (0.330) (0.327) (0.264)  (0.284) 
GS Gan Su 0.065  0.078  0.067  0.069  0.043  
  
(0.246) (0.267) (0.251) (0.254) (0.204) 
AH An Hui 0.097  0.083  0.090  0.138  0.128  
  
(0.296) (0.275) (0.286) (0.346) (0.334) 
HB He Bei 0.110  0.127  0.112  0.102  0.085  
  
(0.312) (0.333) (0.315) (0.303) (0.279) 
GD Guang Dong 0.120  0.098  0.118  0.150  0.146  
  
(0.325) (0.298) (0.322) (0.358) (0.353) 
YN Yun Nan 0.103  0.121  0.114  0.075  0.055  
  
(0.304) (0.326) (0.318) (0.264) (0.229) 
SX Shan Xi 0.105  0.107  0.117  0.048  0.075  
  
(0.307) (0.310) (0.322) (0.214) (0.263) 
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Table 5.6 Summary Statistics in 1995 
Year 1995 Variable Interpretation All sample CCP/SOS NonCCP/SOS CCP/NSOS NonCCP/NSOS 
Obs 
 
10580 2464 6188 217 1711 
annualearning annual income 6251.297  7731.287  5959.548  6304.373  5168.379  
  
(3815.127)  (4162.489)  (3412.408)  (3546.343)  (4090.538)  
lnearning log annual income 8.570  8.836  8.533  8.595  8.320  
  
(0.639)  (0.513)  (0.628)  (0.594)  (0.710)  
state if ownership of the  0.818  1.000  1.000  0.000  0.000  
 
workplace is state-owned  (0.386)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  
partymember if individual is partymember  0.253  1.000  0.000  1.000  0.000  
  
(0.435)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  
experience work experience 19.375  24.735  17.910  23.410  16.444  
  
(9.591)  (8.380)  (9.432)  (8.287)  (8.812)  
experience2 square of working experience 467.394  682.008  409.722  616.396  348.009  
  
(387.961)  (416.453)  (361.131)  (385.317)  (308.641)  
male if individual is male 0.531  0.731  0.490  0.544  0.391  
  
(0.499)  (0.444)  (0.500)  (0.499)  (0.488)  
minority if individual is monority 0.043  0.039  0.046  0.051  0.040  
  
(0.204)  (0.195)  (0.209)  (0.220)  (0.197)  
fourcollege if individual has four years'  0.079  0.153  0.068  0.041  0.013  
 
college education (0.269)  (0.360)  (0.252)  (0.200)  (0.115)  
twocollege if individual has two or  0.156  0.269  0.139  0.138  0.053  
 
three years' college education (0.362)  (0.444)  (0.346)  (0.346)  (0.224)  
professional if individual has professional  0.171  0.203  0.186  0.134  0.072  
_school school education (0.376)  (0.403)  (0.389)  (0.341)  (0.258)  
senior_high if individual has senior high  0.244  0.169  0.263  0.244  0.281  
 
school education (0.429)  (0.375)  (0.441)  (0.431)  (0.449)  
junior_high  if individual has junior high  0.352  0.205 0.343 0.442 0.581 
or below school education or less (0.477)  (0.404)  (0.475)  (0.498)  (0.494)  
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Table 5.6 (Continued) Summary Statistics in 1995 
Year 1995 
Variable Interpretation All sample CCP/SOS NonCCP/SOS CCP/NSOS NonCCP/NSOS 
Obs 
 
10580 2464 6188 217 1711 
industry If economic sector is industry 0.415  0.287  0.423  0.571  0.548  
  
(0.493)  (0.453)  (0.494)  (0.496)  (0.498)  
construction If economic sector is  0.029  0.024  0.031  0.014  0.032  
 
construction (0.168)  (0.153)  (0.173)  (0.117)  (0.175)  
transportation If economic sector is  0.051  0.046  0.056  0.065  0.040  
 
transportation (0.220)  (0.209)  (0.230)  (0.246)  (0.195)  
commerce If economic sector is  0.145  0.096  0.141  0.171  0.227  
 
commerce (0.352)  (0.295)  (0.348)  (0.377)  (0.419)  
real_estate If economic sector is 0.039  0.029  0.036  0.074  0.061  
 
 real estate (0.194)  (0.168)  (0.186)  (0.262)  (0.239)  
health If economic sector is public  0.046  0.052  0.053  0.009  0.019  
 
health, sports and social 
welfare (0.210)  (0.222)  (0.223)  (0.096)  (0.138)  
arts If economic sector is arts 0.074  0.096  0.084  0.009  0.014  
  
(0.261)  (0.294)  (0.277)  (0.096)  (0.118)  
organization If economic sector is party,  0.121  0.268  0.093  0.055  0.018  
 
government or social 
organization (0.326)  (0.443)  (0.290)  (0.229)  (0.131)  
other_eco Other economic sectors 0.080  0.101 0.084 0.032 0.041 
_sector 
 
(0.272)  (0.302)  (0.278)  (0.177)  (0.199)  
BJ Bei Jing 0.068  0.091  0.069  0.051  0.034  
  
(0.252)  (0.288)  (0.253)  (0.220)  (0.183)  
LN Liang Ning 0.108  0.088  0.117  0.051  0.113  
  
(0.311)  (0.283)  (0.322)  (0.220)  (0.316)  
JS Jiang Su 0.109  0.086  0.095  0.166  0.184  
  
(0.311)  (0.280)  (0.293)  (0.373)  (0.387)  
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Table 5.6 (Continued) Summary Statistics in 1995 
Year 1995 
Variable Interpretation All sample CCP/SOS NonCCP/SOS CCP/NSOS NonCCP/NSOS 
Obs 
 
10580 2464 6188 217 1711 
HN He Nan 0.087  0.089  0.089  0.120  0.074  
  
(0.282)  (0.285)  (0.284)  (0.325)  (0.261)  
GS Gan Su 0.052  0.057  0.055  0.023  0.033  
  
(0.221)  (0.232)  (0.229)  (0.150)  (0.178)  
AH An Hui 0.073  0.063  0.066  0.083  0.110  
  
(0.260)  (0.244)  (0.248)  (0.276)  (0.313)  
HB He Bei 0.101  0.113  0.105  0.097  0.069  
  
(0.302)  (0.317)  (0.307)  (0.296)  (0.253)  
GD Guang Dong 0.089  0.090  0.072  0.138  0.143  
  
(0.285)  (0.286)  (0.258)  (0.346)  (0.350)  
YN Yun Nan 0.098  0.119  0.100  0.088  0.064  
  
(0.298)  (0.323)  (0.300)  (0.283)  (0.245)  
SX Shan Xi 0.097  0.091  0.112  0.051  0.058  
  
(0.296)  (0.287)  (0.315)  (0.220)  (0.234)  
SC Shi Chuan 0.118  0.114  0.119  0.134  0.119  
  
(0.323)  (0.317)  (0.324)  (0.341)  (0.323)  
assigned if the government  0.759  0.912  0.759  0.737  0.540  
 
assigned a job (0.428)  (0.283)  (0.427)  (0.441)  (0.499)  
Married if ever married 0.885  0.981  0.855  0.963  0.847  
  
(0.319)  (0.135)  (0.352)  (0.189)  (0.360)  
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Table 5.7 Summary Statistics in 1999 
Year 1999 
Variable Interpretation All sample CCP/SOS NonCCP/SOS CCP/NSOS NonCCP/NSOS 
Obs 
 
4456 1210 2321 154 771 
annualearning annual income 8385.246 10309.840 7842.396 8191.876 7037.613 
  
(5724.796) (5601.338) (4306.349) (4863.277) (8440.665) 
lnearning log annual income 8.862 9.114 8.817 8.851 8.603 
  
(0.613) (0.524) (0.583) (0.579) (0.693) 
state if ownership of the 0.792 1.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 
 
workplace is state-owned (0.406) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
partymember if individual is partymember 0.306 1.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 
  
(0.461) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
experience work experience 19.668 24.109 18.321 22.500 16.189 
  
(9.463) (8.543) (9.072) (8.397) (9.561) 
experience2 square of working experience 476.380 654.169 417.921 576.305 353.385 
  
(379.491) (402.127) (348.151) (368.184) (331.760) 
male if individual is male 0.543 0.693 0.490 0.617 0.450 
  
(0.498) (0.462) (0.500) (0.488) (0.498) 
minority if individual is monority 0.039 0.038 0.041 0.019 0.038 
  
(0.193) (0.191) (0.198) (0.139) (0.190) 
fourcollege if individual has four years' 0.114 0.199 0.090 0.169 0.043 
 
college education (0.318) (0.400) (0.286) (0.376) (0.203) 
twocollege if individual has two or 0.234 0.350 0.201 0.305 0.140 
 
three years' college education (0.424) (0.477) (0.401) (0.462) (0.347) 
professional if individual has professional 0.143 0.147 0.149 0.143 0.122 
_school school education (0.351) (0.354) (0.356) (0.351) (0.327) 
senior_high if individual has senior high 0.248 0.168 0.284 0.188 0.278 
 
school education (0.432) (0.374) (0.451) (0.392) (0.448) 
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Table 5.7 (Continued) Summary Statistics in 1999 
Year 1999 
Variable Interpretation All sample CCP/SOS NonCCP/SOS CCP/NSOS NonCCP/NSOS 
Obs 
 
4456 1210 2321 154 771 
junior_high if individual has junior high 0.244 0.127 0.262 0.195 0.385 
or below school education or less (0.430) (0.333) (0.440) (0.397) (0.487) 
industry If economic sector is industry 0.292 0.202 0.306 0.409 0.370 
  
(0.455) (0.402) (0.461) (0.493) (0.483) 
construction If economic sector is 0.043 0.036 0.050 0.058 0.031 
 
construction (0.203) (0.187) (0.217) (0.235) (0.174) 
transportation If economic sector is 0.103 0.137 0.102 0.045 0.064 
 
transportation (0.304) (0.344) (0.303) (0.209) (0.244) 
commerce If economic sector is 0.092 0.050 0.071 0.156 0.208 
 
commerce (0.289) (0.219) (0.256) (0.364) (0.406) 
real_estate If economic sector is 0.061 0.056 0.070 0.065 0.040 
 
real estate (0.239) (0.230) (0.255) (0.247) (0.197) 
health If economic sector is public 0.054 0.063 0.059 0.058 0.023 
 
health, sports and social 
welfare (0.225) (0.243) (0.235) (0.235) (0.151) 
arts If economic sector is arts 0.086 0.107 0.102 0.006 0.019 
  
(0.280) (0.310) (0.302) (0.081) (0.138) 
organization If economic sector is party, 0.098 0.195 0.081 0.045 0.008 
 
government or social 
organization (0.298) (0.396) (0.274) (0.209) (0.088) 
other_eco Other economic sectors 0.171 0.152 0.160 0.136 0.202 
_sector 
 
(0.377) (0.359) (0.367) (0.344) (0.402) 
BJ Bei Jing 0.480 0.452 0.477 0.156 0.237 
  
(0.500) (0.498) (0.500) (0.364) (0.426) 
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Table 5.7 (Continued) Summary Statistics in 1999 
Year 1999 
Variable Interpretation All sample CCP/SOS NonCCP/SOS CCP/NSOS NonCCP/NSOS 
Obs 
 
4456 1210 2321 154 771 
JS Jiang Su 0.164 0.149 0.178 0.091 0.160 
  
(0.370) (0.356) (0.383) (0.288) (0.366) 
LN Liang Ning 0.155 0.140 0.135 0.240 0.222 
  
(0.362) (0.347) (0.342) (0.429) (0.416) 
HN He Nan 0.187 0.204 0.199 0.149 0.132 
  
(0.390) (0.403) (0.400) (0.358) (0.339) 
GS Gan Su 0.135 0.136 0.146 0.110 0.106 
  
(0.342) (0.342) (0.353) (0.314) (0.308) 
SC Si Chuan 0.198 0.208 0.178 0.305 0.223 
  
(0.399) (0.406) (0.382) (0.462) (0.417) 
assigned if the government 0.694 0.838 0.692 0.727 0.471 
 
assigned a job (0.461) (0.369) (0.462) (0.447) (0.499) 
fmparty if father or mother is 0.414 0.435 0.426 0.481 0.332 
 
CCP member (0.493) (0.496) (0.495) (0.501) (0.471) 
fschooling years of schooling of father 7.963 7.823 8.103 7.643 7.825 
  
(3.931) (3.907) (3.971) (4.060) (3.810) 
mschooling years of schooling of mother 6.302 5.952 6.535 5.955 6.222 
  
(3.377) (3.316) (3.464) (3.279) (3.170) 
married if never married 0.892 0.969 0.868 0.955 0.833 
  
(0.310) (0.172) (0.339) (0.209) (0.373) 
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Chapter 6  
Empirical Results 
 
6.1  Introduction 
This chapter discusses the results from estimating the two-stage Multinomial Logit-
linear wage model presented in previous chapters. The resulting earning differentials are 
decomposed and Party premiums are predicted in the SOS and NSOS, respectively. 
Section 6.2 presents multinomial logit estimates. Recall that each worker faces four 
choices, delineated by investment on the political capital and their ownership sector 
status: CCP/SOS, NonCCP/SOS, CCP/NSOS and NonCCP/NSOS. The findings show 
that increased work experience, increased educational attainment, and being male pull 
workers from the NSOS category, and move them to the CCP/SOS category. Section 6.3 
and Section 6.4 thoroughly discusses the earning equations in four categories by using 
both OLS and M-Logit estimates. The different returns to years of experience, gender, 
education levels are compared between CCP members and other workers in either sector. 
There is strong evidence that investments in human capital play a more important role in 
the earning structure for NonCCP workers than for CCP workers in SOS. There are no 
significant different returns to most education levels of CCP members between two 
sectors, while returns to NonCCP workers with high education in the NSOS are 
significantly higher than that of their counterparts in the SOS in 1988, but the returns to 
human capital of NonCCP workers become indifferent statistically in 1995 and 1999. 
Section 6.6 shows decomposition of earning differentials and Section 6.7 predicts the 
Party premium in two sectors, respectively. The 1999 results indicate that the political 
capital became less important in the payment scheme in the NSOS, and that it was not 
accounted as a key factor of productivity in other enterprises in the NSOS. Section 6.7 
summarizes all the findings in chapter 6.     
 
6.2  Multinomial Logit Estimates 
Multinomial logit estimates of categorical choice for each year are presented in 
Tables 6.1 through 6.3. Each Table provides marginal effects of each variable on 
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probability of joining a particular category at the mean values of independent 
variables.  It was found that increased work experience, increased educational attainment, 
and being male are the statistically significant variables which seem to pull workers from 
the NCCP category in either sector, and move them to the CCP/SOS category. 
Specifically, one more year of work experience always increases the probability of being 
in the CCP/SOS category in 1999 and it does so until 85 (81) years of experience in 1988 
(1995). The magnitude of the increase in the probability starts to decrease at 43 (44) years 
of experience in 1988 (1995). Being male significantly increase the probability of being 
in the CCP/SOS category, while it decreases the probability of being in the NonCCP/SOS 
and NonCCP/NSOS categories. Compared with workers of less than senior high school 
education, those of other education levels are significantly associated with bigger 
probability of being in the CCP/SOS category, but less likely of being in NonCCP 
categories in either sector. The impacts on CCP/NSOS category are usually minimum or 
insignificant.  
Meanwhile, the higher the education level, the more likely a worker will be a CCP 
member at SOS. For example, compared to non-senior-high-school graduates, a worker 
with a four-year college education (or greater) was 35% more likely to be in CCP/SOS 
category in 1988, while a professional school graduate was 19% more likely to be in this 
category. In fact, all levels of higher educational attainment appear to significantly 
increase the probability of joining the CCP/SOS category when compared to participants 
with less than three years of senior high school. But the impact went down in 1995 and 
then went up in 1999. For example, compared to non-senior-high-school graduates, the 
impact of a four-year college education (or greater) fell to 28% in 1995 and then went up 
to 47% in 1999. 
However, educational attainment seems to reduce the probability of being a NonCCP 
worker in both SOS and NSOS. The coefficients of education dummies in CCP/NSOS 
are very small in both 1988 and 1995. And while some significance was found for this 
group, their impacts are minimal at best. In 1999, workers with a college education have 
a significantly different probability of being in CCP/NSOS than workers with a junior 
high school attainment (or less). 
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The marginal effect of gender is not statistically significant or minimal in CCP/NSOS 
category, but does show that males were more likely to be recruited into CCP/SOS than 
females during the three years under consideration in this dissertation. In 1988, males had 
a higher probability of choosing CCP/SOS and CCP/NSOS categories45
For the three years presented in this study, the data indicate that being in the Party 
organization sector is associated with higher probability of being in the CCP/SOS when 
compared to other economic sectors, but associated with lower probability of being in the 
NonCCP/NSOS category. Compared to other economic sectors, it is associated with 
smaller probability of being in the NonCCP/SOS category in both 1988 and 1995, and the 
coefficient becomes non-significant for this category in 1999.  
 than females, but 
a lower probability of being in NonCCP/SOS and NonCCP/NSOS categories. In 1995 
and 1999, the same pattern was found except that the gender variable does not have 
significant impact on the probability of choosing the CCP/NSOS category. 
The commerce sector, on the other hand, is always associated with higher probability 
of being in either category of the NSOS when compared to other economic sectors, but a 
lower probability of a worker being in NonCCP/SOS. Interestingly, the industry sector is 
significantly associated with smaller probability of being in the CCP/SOS category when 
compared to other economic sectors during these three years. It significantly pulled 
workers from SOS and moved them to NSOS in 1988 and 1995, which is indicated by 
positive coefficients of industry sector in both categories of the NSOS. But it is 
associated with higher probability of being in the NonCCP/SOS category in 1999 when 
compared to other economic sectors in the omitted group.  
Suppose we regard Guangdong as representing the southern coastal area, Liaoning for 
the north-eastern area, Jiangsu for the eastern coastal area, Anhui and Henan for the 
interior area, Shanxi and Gansu for the north-western area, and Sichuan for the south-
western area. The results indicate that workers in the southern coastal area, interior area 
and the north-east areas have a greater chance of being in the NSOS due to the 
development of economies from the late 1980s to the 1990s. Specifically, the north-
eastern area (Liaoning) has a larger probability of being in NonCCP/NSOS category in 
                                                 
45 The marginal effect of gender is minimal (0.005) in CCP/NSOS category although it is statistically 
significant. 
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1988 and 1995, and it pulls workers from SOS categories and moves them to two NSOS 
categories in 1999. The southern coastal area (Guangdong) has a larger probability of 
being in NonCCP/NSOS category in 1988 and it moves workers to CCP/NSOS as well in 
199546
 
. Province Anhui initiated HRS in the rural area, the concept of market economy is 
supposed to be accepted more broadly than other interior area. In the data, it is found that 
Anhui has larger probability of being in NonCCP/NSOS category but smaller probability 
of being in SOS category in 1988 and 1995. 
6.3  Earning Equations 
The main results and analyses in the selection correction section are from two-stage 
estimation. The estimates for each year are presented in Table 6.4, Table 6.5 and Table 
6.6. Obtained by using bootstrap with 1000 replications, the standard errors for the two-
stage estimates are displayed in parentheses. Note the annual earnings are all measured in 
1995 RMB using the domestic consumption price index. Similar to what studies of most 
industrialized and developing market economies found, 20% to 40% of the earning 
variation can be explained by experience, education levels, gender, and economic sectors 
(Miller 1987; Kidd and Meng 1997).  
In all categories expect for CCP/SOS in 1988 and CCP/NSOS in 1999, “years of 
experience” significantly increases the individuals’ annual earning at a decreasing rate in 
each year, which exhibits a traditional inverse-U-shape as in a market economy (See 
Figure 6.1).  
This marginal effect is relatively higher for NonCCP workers in the SOS, comparing 
to CCP/SOS category. For example, Table 6.7 shows an average return of one additional 
year of work experience when a worker has worked 15 years. Given 15 years of 
experience, the average return of one additional year of experience is generally lower for 
CCP members than that of comparable NonCCP members in the SOS and across time. 
The log earning of CCP workers in the SOS keeps increasing along with years of 
experience in 1988, especially for CCP workers in the SOS. It is similar to the findings in 
Meng (2000) and Shao (1992), which indicates that China’s experience-earning profile 
                                                 
46 1999 CHIP data do not contain province Guangdong and Anhui. 
 
68 
 
different from other market economies in 1980s. But Meng (2000) and Shao (1992) do 
not break it down by CCP membership. They find that the earnings in SOEs are mainly 
determined by seniority rather than productivity until 1990, with evidence of continuous 
increase in log earning over years of experience until retirement. Although Japan has a 
similar earning-experience profile, lifetime employment in Japan is endogenously 
determined by the joint investment of firms and workers in firm-specific skill training, 
which, in turn, has pushed the wage determination system to help workers maintain a 
long tenure. However, most SOS firms in urban China were not given the autonomy to 
recruit workers until late 1980s. Lack of labor mobility is one of the potential reasons 
why the wage structure was not able to reflect actual labor productivity. Additionally, 
ownership structure of SOS determined that the wage reform mainly focuses on equal 
distribution of profit-related bonuses rather than productivity-related factors in 1980s. 
Interestingly, earning-experience profile in the SOS becomes closer to that in other 
market economy in 1995 and 1999. However, the marginal effect in 1988 and 1995 in the 
NSOS is opposite to that in 1999. For example, given 15 years of experience, the average 
return of one additional year of experience in 1988 is higher for CCP members than that 
of comparable NonCCP workers in the NSOS. But it is reversed in 1999. 
Gender is positively related to annual earning in each category. However, in the SOS, 
inferential statistics (see Table 6.8) show that gender does not significantly contribute to 
CCP workers’ earnings in the SOS, while male NonCCP workers have statistically 
significantly higher earnings than female counterparts. I find that male CCP members do 
not have significantly different earnings (on average) from their female counterparts at 
SOS during the three years examined for this study. But, NonCCP workers’ gender effect 
in the SOS even statistically increased from 1988 to 1995 and from 1995 to 1999 as well 
(See Table 6.9 and Figure 6.2). This indicates that gender is not a key determinant of 
earnings in the SOS as long as s/he joins the CCP. One potential explanation might be 
that the difference in occupational positions of CCP members in the SOS is not as big as 
comparable NonCCP workers and relatively egalitarian payment scheme at SOS 
guarantees a similar paycheck to workers in similar position. 
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In the NSOS, male NonCCP workers in the NSOS do not have significantly different 
earnings (on average) from their female counterparts in the NSOS in 1988, but gender 
effects in NonCCP/NSOS category become significant in 1995 and 1999 (See Table 6.8). 
I find a significantly rising gender earning differential for CCP workers and other 
workers over time47 (See Table 6.9 and Figure 6.2), which is consistent with findings of 
Appleton, Song and Xia (2005), who examined aggregate level trends from 1988 to 
200248
Another recent study finds a significant difference in the coefficients of gender 
between CCP members and other workers’ earning equations in 1988 and 1995, but not 
in 1999 (Appleton, Knight, Song and Xia, 2003).
. Bishop et al. (2005) and Gustafsson and Li (2001) find a small increase in the 
unadjusted gender earnings gap between 1988 and 1995. For example, it is 0.1854 log 
points in 1988 and 0.2199 log points in 1995 in Bishop et al. (2005). Bishop et al. (2005) 
find that the unexplained average gender earnings differential slightly increases (from 
0.1323 log points to 0.1349 log points) over the same time period, while the ratio of 
unexplained portion to the total average earnings gap, often viewed as evidence of 
discrimination declined from 71% to 61%. This decline in discrimination is almost 
entirely concentrated in the lowest decile of the earnings distribution. It might because 
higher female returns over time to both education and experience for low earning women. 
Bishop et al. (2005) also find that low earning workers benefit the most from Party 
membership and for males this benefit has been growing over time. In contrast, high 
earning workers gain almost no earnings benefit from Party membership in 1995. They 
interpret it that Party membership identifies higher human capital among low education, 
low earning workers. 
49 In this dissertation paper, a pair-wise 
inference test50
                                                 
47 I use pair-wise inference test to compare the coefficients over every two years. Table 16 shows the 
results of inference test. 
 was used to compare coefficients of the corresponding variables between 
CCP members and other workers in each sector. Results in Table 17 show that at SOS, 
the gender differential of CCP workers is significantly smaller than that of other workers, 
48 Appleton, Song and Xia (2005) examined the gender effect in the whole CHIP sample, rather than 
breaking it down by ownership sectors. 
49 Appleton, Song and Xia (2003) do not consider endogeneity of both CCP membership affiliation and 
ownership sector choices. 
50 Assuming the independent samples, the inference test statistic is (b1 – b2)/squareroot(v1+v2). 
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particularly in 1988 and 1995. Compared to the CCP gender differential of 2.7% in 1988 
and 5% in 1995 (neither is statistically significant), male NonCCP workers have a 
significantly higher average earning than their female counterparts by 9.7% in 1988 and 
14% in 1995 at 5% significance level. The difference in gender coefficients is statistically 
significant at 5% significance level for both years, respectively. Again, it might because 
the difference in occupational positions of CCP members in the SOS is not as big as 
comparable NonCCP workers for both years and relatively egalitarian payment scheme at 
SOS guarantees a similar paycheck to workers in similar position. But, the gender effect 
gets closer in 1999. It rises for CCP members in 1999 while declines for other workers, 
which make no significant difference in gender coefficients of these two groups.   
In the NSOS, there is no such statistically different gender effect during either of the 
three years examined by this study. Compared to SOS, we find greater gender earning 
differentials at NSOS for CCP members and other workers during the three years 
examined, with the exception of NonCCP workers in 1988. This is consistent with the 
findings of other studies that show the NSOS have a larger log gender wage gap than 
SOS, since SOS is less privatized than NSOS (Liu, Meng and Zhang, 2000; Zhang, 2004). 
The pair-wise inference test (See Table 6.10) in the dissertation paper shows that the 
difference in the coefficients of gender between the two sectors is statistically significant 
for CCP members during both 1988 and 1999, while for other workers the difference 
across the two sectors is only statistically significant in 1999.  
For example, male CCP members at SOS have a 6.4% higher annual earning than 
female members in 1999, compared to a 37% gender earning differential for CCP 
members at NSOS. The gender earning gap for NonCCP members in 1999 is 8.6% at 
SOS, while it reaches as high as 25.1% at NSOS.  
NSOS in urban China was still at the rudimentary stage in 1988, and as discussed in 
the previous section, UCEs were a major component of NSOS. Given the egalitarian 
ideology in the whole society since the liberation of China, the equality of men and 
women was strongly advocated in both sectors. The reward system in the NSOS differed 
from that in the SOS in terms of more autonomy and in terms of reward according to 
performance, but not in terms of gender discrimination. It is not surprising to see little 
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difference in gender effects across these sectors during that time. But when compared to 
NSOS in 1999, which has been further privatized, less autonomy at SOS results in a 
relatively more equalizing wage structure between male and female workers.  
Regarding the ethnic effect on workers’ earning in urban China, two-stage estimation 
does not present statistical evidence that earning discrimination exists between Han and 
Minority in urban China during the three years examined in this study. It is consistent 
with the findings of other studies which examined earning determination in urban China. 
Appleton, Song and Xia (2005) found a much smaller discrimination against ethnic 
minorities exists than in other countries.  
 
6.4  Education Effects 
Another coefficient comparison of interest occurs between educational levels. We 
find that workers’ earnings increase with human capital investments, but the returns from 
these investments are not always consistent over time or across sectors. Most studies 
using “years of schooling” in the wage equation find low rates of return for one 
additional year of schooling in urban China (Li, 2003; Zhang, 2004; Fleisher & Wang, 
2004).  
For example, Li (2003) uses the same 1995 CHIP data and found the rate of return to 
be 5.4% without controlling for the sample selection. Zhang (2004) found that the rate of 
return is highest in private/individual-owned enterprises (4.3%), and lowest in urban 
collective enterprises (2.4%), while utilizing selection correction in the employment 
ownership sector choices51
                                                 
51 Zhang (2004) uses the years of schooling in 1995 CHIP data instead of educational level to study the 
structural wage differentials, because the limited number of observations in a certain sector with a certain 
educational level may not provide reliable sector-degree-specific returns to education. 
.  Knight and Song (2003) use CHIP 1988 and 1995 data and 
include educational level dummies in the earnings function for individual workers in 
Urban China. They find that the returns to education rose dramatically between 1988 and 
1995. For example, the earnings difference between college graduates and primary 
school-leavers, ceteris paribus, was 9 percent in 1988 and 38 percent in 1995. It suggests 
that market forces have come more important in certain respects. Although the present 
study secured a relatively small sample size for the third choice group (CCP/NSOS), 
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“educational level” will still be used as a variable to capture nonlinear education effects. 
The analysis for how education determines earnings by categories will be presented in the 
following section. 
  
6.4.1 CCP Members and Other Workers at State-owned Sector 
Column (2) and Column (3) in Tables 6.1152
 
 show that in 1988, all educational levels 
have different returns in the SOS as opposed to omitted education level, or “junior high 
school education or less”, with higher education yielding higher returns to both CCP 
members and other workers. But in 1995 and 1999, for CCP members in the SOS, only 
college education matters statistically. Figure 6.3 illustrates these coefficients of each 
education level dummy for the CCP/SOS and NonCCP/SOS categories. 
6.4.1.1 Horizontal Analysis across Categories 
Coefficient comparisons were conducted for each educational level between CCP and 
NonCCP members at SOS. In this dissertation, median to high educated workers are 
divided into three groups: those who had a professional school education, two years of 
college education, or a minimum of four years’ college education. The findings in Table 
6.12 indicate that the earning differential of CCP members at each of three high 
educational levels is statistically smaller than that of comparable NonCCP workers in this 
sector in 1988 and in 1995.  
For example, in 1988, the earning differentials between CCP members with four 
years of college education (or more), two years of college education, professional school 
completed, and those in the “omitted education” group are 16.7%, 11.3% and 5.1% at 
SOS respectively, compared with 29.3%, 19.8% and 12.6% earning differentials for 
NonCCP workers.  This implies that a median- to high level of education is more 
important in terms of raising earnings to workers that are not CCP members in 1988 and 
1995. However, the contribution of median- to high education to CCP workers’ earnings 
at SOS does not lead them to be statistically different from other workers. Only a four-
year college education makes the earnings gap for other workers statistically larger than 
                                                 
52 All the coefficients of education dummies could be found in Table 6.4 – 6.6 too. 
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for CCP workers in 1999. The difference in returns between median- educational levels 
and the omitted group is getting closer for CCP members and other workers in SOS.  
 
6.4.1.2 Vertical Analysis over Time 
 For the three years examined in this study, the returns (in percentage term) to CCP 
members with two years’ college education (or more) at SOS are all significantly 
different from those with junior high school education or less (See Table 6.11).53 Figure 
6.4 illustrates coefficients of education level dummies for the CCP/ SOS and 
NonCCP/SOS by years. At SOS in 1998, CCP members with four years of college 
education (or more) receive a 16.7% (21.9% and 35.5%) higher annual earning than those 
with junior high school education or less (1995 and 1999). When compared to CCP 
workers in the “omitted education” group, returns are 11.3%, 13.8% and 27.7% higher 
(for our three years respectively) for CCP workers with two years of college education. 
Tables 6.13 and 6.14 show inferential testing results for the coefficients of CCP members 
and other workers across two years, respectively. For CCP workers in the SOS, the 
different returns for college education do not statistically change from 1988 to 1995 or 
from 1995 to 1999. Only the coefficients for college education from 1988 to1999 are 
significantly different, with 1999 being higher54
 Each educational level attained by NonCCP workers at SOS leads to a significantly 
different return when compared to those in the omitted group. Interestingly, the 
coefficients for “two years of college education” and “four years of college education (or 
more)” dummies in NonCCP workers’ earning equation at SOS increase significantly 
over time.  
.  
 For example, compared with the omitted education group, the return is 29.3% higher 
for those with four years’ college education (or more) in 1988, and then it significantly 
increases to 38.3% and 61.6% in 1995 and 1999, respectively. The coefficient for 
professional school dummy significantly increased from 1988 to 1995, as did that for 
senior high school dummy from 1995 to 1999.  
                                                 
53 The individuals with junior high school education or less are in the omitted education group. 
54 We use pair-wise inference test to examine the differences in the coefficients of the same education level 
dummies across any two years. 
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 This pattern indicates that the investments of human capital did play an increasingly 
important role in the earning structure for NonCCP workers at SOS throughout three 
stages of economic reforms. However, the change in impact of human capital on CCP 
workers’ earnings was neither as quick nor as strong as it was for NonCCP workers at 
SOS.  
 
6.4.2 CCP Members and Other Workers at Nonstate-owned Sector 
Column (4) and Column (5) in Table 6.1155
The influence of a gradual economic market reform on NSOS from the years 1988 to 
1999 is worth noting. During the first ten years of the economic reform, urban collective 
enterprises (UCEs) were the major component of NSOS, and existed alongside a small 
number of private/individual/foreign-owned enterprises known as “urban private 
enterprises” (UPE).  
 shows that, in NSOS in 1988, all the 
educational attainment except for having a professional school education yield 
significantly different (higher) returns for CCP workers than having a junior high school 
education (or less).  The impact shifts to professional school and senior high school 
education in 1995. Having a college education still brings a large return for them in this 
year although the coefficients are not statistically significant. More interestingly, only 
four years of college education (or more) yields significantly different returns than junior 
high school education (or less) for CCP/NSOS workers in 1999. Statistically, the 
coefficients of two-year college education and professional school education are not 
significant in this category, but they still show a much higher return compared with that 
of junior high school education (or less). In 1998 however, none of the educational levels 
have statistically different returns for other workers in NSOS, as opposed to the omitted 
group. But all educational levels had significantly higher returns for NonCCP workers 
than did “a junior high school education (or less)” in 1995 and 1999. 
UCEs accounted for 92.5% of the enterprises at NSOS in the 1988 CHIP sample. 
UCEs were officially intend to both soak up surplus labor in urban cities, available 
because of  limited educational opportunities for the growing number of senior high 
                                                 
55 You can also find the coefficients of education dummies in Table 6.4 – 6.6. 
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school graduates, and to meet social needs that were insufficiently being addressed by the 
SOS. This was especially true in the construction, catering and consumer goods 
production sectors. The NonCCP workers who were recruited into NSOS were mainly 
those with a senior high school education or less. This proportion reaches as high as 94.8% 
in 1988. In these entities, employees with a higher level of education do not play a 
dominant role in the earning structure at the initial stage of the economic reform.  
Two-stage estimation in the 1988 CHIP sample indicates that having more than a 
senior high school education does not lead to significantly different returns for NonCCP 
workers when compared to those with less than senior high education at NSOS. As far as 
CCP members at NSOS are concerned, only the college education matters. For example, 
in 1988, only CCP members with two and four years’ college education (or more) at 
NSOS have significantly higher annual earnings (25.4% and 19.6% respectively) than 
CCP members in the base group.  
The growth of UCEs since 1979 has been the result of necessarily using limited local 
resources due to limited financial assistance from the central authorities. They are also 
under competitive pressure from booming job opportunities of other UPEs. Especially 
after Deng Xiaoping's 'southern tour' in 1992, more jobs started to shift toward UPEs, and 
UCEs’ employment declined gradually over the next few years. The proportion of UCEs 
in NSOS slightly declined to 83.4% in 1995. However, the dramatic shrinkage of UCEs 
in 1998 led to a third decline in total employment, shrinking to 44.5% in the 1999 CHIP 
sample. 
UCEs differ from both SOS and UPEs. They serve as a transitional form between the 
private and the State-owned the means of production. “UCE is theoretically an 
independent unit whose members have an equal right of ownership of the means of 
production and the products of labor” (Tang & Ma, 1983). They are not directly under the 
administrative or financial support of the state or provincial government. They are often 
sponsored and supervised by local governments (such as district/county government or 
residential offices) to obtain the assets.  
Since UCEs enjoy the least redistributive benefits and have much less access to 
official bank credit, they are encouraged to remain closer to market-oriented transactions. 
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As the market-oriented economy develops and matures over time, a higher education is 
gradually being recognized as an indicator of higher productivity and efficiency. 
Therefore, “level of education” starts to play an important role to NonCCP workers in 
1995 and 1999.  
The data in the present study show that almost all educational levels demonstrate 
significantly higher returns when compared to omitted educational level. But since there 
are far fewer CCP members at NSOS, we find that the impact of differing educational 
levels is not as large as expected. For CCP workers in NSOS, professional school 
education or senior high educational level led to significantly higher returns than omitted 
educational level in 1995, while only four-year college education does so in 1999. 
In the previous subsection, there is strong evidence that investments in human capital 
play a more and more important role in the earning structure for NonCCP workers at SOS 
over time, but are not nearly as quick for CCP members at SOS. In this section, the 
coefficients of each education level dummy at NSOS across three years will be compared 
to examine if NSOS presents a similar pattern.  
 
6.4.2.1 Vertical Analysis over Time 
Figure 6.5 does show a change on the impact of educational level on workers’ earning 
at NSOS during the three years examined in the present study. Table 6.15 and 6.16 
present the inference test over time for the CCP/NSOS and NonCCP/NSOS categories, 
respectively. All educational levels have significantly higher returns to NonCCP workers 
in 1999 than those in 1988. There are statistically significant increases in the rate of 
returns to NonCCP workers in NSOS with college education and professional school 
education from 1988 to 1995.  
For example, in 1988, NonCCP workers with four years of college education (or 
more) at NSOS receive a 14.4% lower return than those with junior high school 
education or less, but they made 50% more in 1995. Compared to returns of junior high 
school education or less in NSOS, only differences in returns for NonCCP workers with 
senior high school education statistically increase from 8.3% in 1995 to 21.6% in 1999. 
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For CCP workers in the NSOS, only the difference in the returns to professional school 
education is statistically significantly increasing from 1988 to 1995. 
 
6.4.2.2 Horizontal Analysis across Categories 
Comparison across categories in the NSOS shows that the coefficients of all 
education dummies for CCP workers are greater than those for other workers in 1988, 
while the return for each educational level of CCP members is not as great when 
compared to other workers in 1995 and 1999 (See Figure 6.6).   
For example, in 1988, the return for CCP workers in NSOS with four-year college 
education (or more) is 27% higher than for those in omitted group, while NonCCP 
workers in NSOS with the same educational level earned 14% less during the same year. 
A similar pattern is shown for two-year college graduates in 1988.  The inference test 
conducted on the 1988 data indicates they are significantly different (please see Table 
6.17). Additionally, in previous subsection it is noted that higher education usually has 
higher returns for CCP/NSOS workers. These findings suggest that education and Party 
membership are complements at NSOS in the early stages of economic reform.  
Since 1995, higher education level has been associated with bigger coefficients. 
Although the coefficients of college education dummies for NonCCP workers have been 
numerically exceeded those for CCP workers in NSOS. The pair-wise coefficient 
differences at each educational level between CCP members and other workers in NSOS 
are not statistically significant. However, I find the returns for CCP members with two 
years of college education are 13.7% higher than for those in omitted group at NSOS, 
compared with 50% for NonCCP workers at NSOS in 1999. The inference test in Table 
6.17 shows that this differential is statistically significant at 5% significance level. 
Meanwhile, in 1999, the pair-wise coefficient differences between CCP members and 
other workers with a senior high school education at NSOS are also statistically 
significant.  
On the one hand, these results indicate that the different returns brought about by the 
different educational levels became more significant to NonCCP workers in NSOS over 
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time. On the other hand, the results indicate that political capital and human capital 
became neither complements nor substitutes in the NSOS in the late 1990s. 
 
6.4.3 Workers in State-owned Sector and Nonstate-owned Sector 
 Another concern is if the returns for different educational levels differ across different 
ownership sectors. Using “less than senior high school education attained” as the base 
group, the empirical evidence says no to this question in most comparisons. For example, 
in Table 6.18, the pair-wise comparisons of coefficients for each educational level that 
CCP members attained at SOS versus those attained at NSOS do not show statistically 
significant differences in either of the three years, except for those with professional 
school education in 199556
We find a similar pattern when comparing NonCCP workers at SOS and NSOS in 
Table 6.19 and Figure 6.8. Most differences appeared in 1988 only. In 1988, NonCCP 
workers with junior high school education (or less) have higher returns in the NSOS than 
median to high educated NonCCP workers. Comparing to junior high school education 
(or less), the returns for college education and professional school education in SOS are 
significantly higher than the returns in NSOS in 1988. The impact of human capital on 
NonCCP workers’ earnings does not change much across sectors in 1990s. There is no 
statistical evidence that the different rewards for NonCCP workers in the base group and 
those with other educational levels are different across the two sectors in 1995 and 1999, 
with the exception of 1999, which favors NSOS for those with senior high school 
education attained. 
. Figure 6.7 shows the coefficient of each educational level 
dummy for the CCP/NSOS and NonCCP/NSOS categories in three years, respectively. 
Comparing the rewards for those in the base group, the different rewards for CCP 
members with a professional school education are statistically lesser in the SOS than in 
the NSOS in 1995. These findings suggest that the impact of human capital on CCP 
workers’ earnings does not change much across sectors.  
57
                                                 
56 The returns to CCP members with professional school education at SOS is 7% more than those with 
junior high school education (or less), while the difference in returns to those at NSOS is 25.5% in 1995. 
  
57 NonCCP workers at SOS with senior high school degree have 11.6% higher rate of returns than those 
with junior high school education (or less) in 1999, compared with 21.6% difference at NSOS. And this 
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In previous subsections, the results on the earnings equation show a larger wage 
differential between females and males in the NSOS and larger return to educational 
attainment for NonCCP workers than that for CCP workers. It is possible that the 
restrictions on migration in the urban labor market make it less competitive so that the 
wage adjustment is not fully driven by market forces. Before the economic reform, the 
state controlled labor placement by labor bureaus at all levels. The unified labor 
placement process ‘began with the central and local government’s annual plan for labor 
quotas. Then, these quotas were distributed to relevant industrial bureaus, which allocated 
them to enterprises under their jurisdiction… enterprises were not allowed to hire new 
workers without allocated labor quotas’ (Ding and Warner 2001). Under the central-
planning system, mobility among urban workers was negligible. A series of reforms on 
the employment system in the SOEs directed at gradually moving towards a market-
oriented system by replacing the state job assignment by limited labor contracts for new 
employees and finally by a comprehensive labor contract system with a market-oriented 
system. Although workers were granted more rights to move from one employer to 
another, voluntary mobility continued to be impeded by institutional barriers such as the 
household registration system (hukou) and the employer-specific provision of social 
welfare services. The household registration system (hukou) prohibits individuals from 
moving from one city to another, and from rural to urban areas. The SOEs and 
administrative institutions in the SOS usually tied social welfare services such as 
pensions, medical care, and housing to the employment which were gradually being 
privatized. In the meantime, the speed of implementation of the reform policies varies by 
regions and by industries. By the end of 1990s, mobility from NSOS to SOS was still low 
although some SOEs started to externally recruit experts with special skills such as those 
who are proficient in the computer science. The employees in a SOE were usually 
hesitated to voluntarily quit a job and move to another city because it was almost 
impossible for them to be recruited by another SOE if their hukou could not be resolved. 
It was hard to have an official document approved by the corresponding local bureau 
                                                                                                                                                 
pair-wise comparison of two coefficients shows a statistically significant difference at 10% significance 
level. 
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which would guarantee a move without losing associated labor quota and relevant non-
market facilities in the SOS. Under this circumstance, the private costs on quitting are 
significant for the workers in the SOS. However, the rapid development of NSOS created 
opportunities and pressures to encourage migration from the interior to the coast, not only 
including rural-urban migration but also urban-urban migration. In meanwhile, it 
provided incentives for officials not to enforce regulations on such a migration. Although 
an individual is technically required to live in the area designated on his/her permit under 
Hukou system, in practice the system has gradually broken down. It became possible for 
some to unofficially migrate and get a job without a valid permit. But it usually happens 
for those who move to work in the NSOS. Knight and Yueh (2004) find that the mobility 
rate of urban workers is much lower than that of rural-urban migrants by using 1999 
CHIP data with additional migrant households. In their data, the majority of urban 
workers in their sample have had only one employer and the job turnover might mostly 
occur internally. Wage adjustment may have been impeded by the restrictions on 
migration, but probably less so for the later period and for the NSOS. 
 
6.5 Robustness 
6.5.1 Five Common Provinces vs. All Provinces during the Three Years  
The geographic provinces and cities covered in three CHIP sample data are not 
exactly the same. There are only five common provinces over the three years, which are 
Beijing, Gansu, Henan, Jiangsu and Liaoning.58
 
 In Chapter 6, the two-stage estimation 
results are reported with all the provinces included. This approach has also been applied 
to each specification with only five common provinces as robust tests. Basically, the 
coefficients are robust in each year. Since it is believed that the larger sample size 
provide more precise estimates, all the provinces are included in the present study.  
6.5.2 Economic Sectors across Sectors 
In the first stage, the sectors (SOS, NSOS) in dependent variable are ownership 
sectors. It is determined by responders’ choices to the question, “Ownership of primary 
                                                 
58 More information is provided on Table A.1 in Appendix A. 
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workplace”. In both the first stage and the second stage, independent variables include 
economic sector dummies. The economic sectors are determined by responders’ choices 
to the question, “Economic sector codes for the primary work unit”. There was a concern 
of endogeneity of economic sector dummies if not all economic sectors existed in two 
ownership sectors.  
The data show that all economic sectors exist in both ownership sectors.59
 
 For 
example, a firm in the health sector could be a state-owned firm or a Non-state owned 
firm. But percentages of each economic sector in the two ownership sectors vary widely. 
Further, a robust test was conducted by excluding economic sectors dummies from the 
two stage estimation, and was checked for important changes in the economic 
interpretation of the coefficients. It was found that exclusion of economic sectors did not 
significantly change the economic significance of the coefficients.  
6.5.3 Bootstrap Standard Errors in Two-stage Estimation  
Two-stage estimation allows us to examine the earning functions given 
polychotomous choices. The general standard errors in the second stage are not consistent 
due to the heteroskedastic disturbance term and inclusion of parameter estimates from the 
first stage in this disturbance term. To correct for these standard errors, the bootstrap 
techniques were used in the two-stage estimation. It was found that most standard errors 
are biased downward with bootstrap, although the magnitudes were not terribly different.  
 
6.5.4 Specifications in the two-stage estimation 
In the earning equations, the individual characteristics include the years of experience 
and the four education level dummies. The other three specifications were also tried with 
“age and years of schooling”, “age and education levels”, “years of experience”, and 
“years of schooling”, respectively. Although the significance of the mill’s ratios is the 
same in most specifications, education level dummies were used to capture the nonlinear 
education effects in the earning equation.   
 
                                                 
59 Distribution of Economic sectors by ownership sectors is shown on Table D.1 in Appendix D. 
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6.5.5 Robustness Test on Instrument Variables 
       Identification frequently is an issue for selection problems. The description of 
identification variable is in Chapter 5. I have conducted robustness test on the instruments 
by comparing results with only functional form identification to those with exclusion 
restrictions for the year 1995 and 1999. Given multiple candidates of identification 
variables in 1999, I tried other combinations including parental Party membership 
affiliation and parental years of schooling or the nature of recruitment only. The 
coefficients of inverse mill’s ratio from different specification are quite similar.  It 
indicates that the identification variables considered in the paper are robust.60
 
   
6.6 Decomposition of Earning Differential 
In the following subsection, selection-corrected estimates were used to decompose 
the earning differentials between CCP worker and other worker in both sectors.  
 
6.6.1 Decomposition of Earning Differential in State-owned sector 
To sort out the impact of selectivity bias on earning differentials, the percentage of 
the total earning differential were calculated due to differences in coefficients (including 
constant terms), mean endowments and selectivity bias (coefficient and mean effects 
were lumped together). The selectivity bias indicates, for this sample of workers, the 
impact of unobserved traits – those that impact individuals' political membership 
affiliation, their ownership sector choices and also their earnings – on the earning 
differences between two groups of workers.  
Since the inverse of Mill's ratio in the earning equation of NonCCP workers at SOS is 
statistically significant, the analysis focused on the decomposition result in column, 
"Two-stage with selection effects" in each panel of Table 6.20. Figure 6.9 illustrates the 
components of earnings differential and the proportion of each component in three years. 
Panel a in Table 6.20 shows that the total earning gap between CCP and NonCCP 
workers at SOS is 24.72% in 1988, which means the average worker who self-selects to 
be a CCP member at SOS earns 24.72% more than the average worker who self-selects to 
                                                 
60 Additional information is shown in Appendix H. 
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remain as a NonCCP worker. Column "Two-stage with selection effects" in Panel b and 
Panel c shows the total differential rises to 30% in 1995 and 1999.  
The 1988 result indicates that the positive CCP-NonCCP earning differential favoring 
CCP members in the SOS is mainly due to the coefficient differential, which is the result 
of higher returns to the characteristics of CCP workers in the SOS. It accounts for 69% of 
total earning gap in 1988, which is over one and one-half times as much as the earning 
gap explained by differences in the endowments (36% of total earning gap). This implies 
that the differential evaluation of characteristics of CCP and other workers by their 
employers is a bigger contributor to the earning gap than are differences in the mean 
measured characteristics of the different group of workers in 1988. It is interesting to note 
that the “standard” procedure for investigating CCP-NonCCP earning differentials at 
SOS implicitly constrains the coefficients to be equal across two categories. Yet, I can 
find that differential attributes of CCP and other workers in the SOS contribute less to the 
earning gap than the differential evaluation of these attributes by employers based upon 
their political membership affiliation. Hence, the practice of simply introducing CCP 
membership dummies obscures an important source of observed earning differentials, 
regardless of whether CCP membership affiliation is treated as endogenous.  
However, a Party premium in favor of CCP members due to the varying returns to 
observables for CCP and other workers in the SOS decreases from 1988 to 1999 (See 
Figure 6.9). The coefficient differentials contribute much less (19.4%) to the total earning 
differential in 1995, and became negative in favor of other workers in 1999. Meanwhile, 
the differences in the characteristics of both groups of workers became more important to 
the total earning differentials at SOS over time. The contribution of the endowments 
differential increases significantly to 57% in 1995, and to 66% in 1999.  
Positive selection differential explains 24% of the total earnings differential in 1995, 
and 54% in 1999. Comparing the total earning gap in the column labeled "Two-stage net 
of selection effects" to the total earning gap reported in the column "Two-stage with 
selection effects", we find that the selection correction slightly increases the earning gap 
in 1988, while it substantially decreases the earning gap in each of the comparisons in 
1995 and 1999. The selection effects in CCP/SOS workers’ earning equation are all 
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negative in 1988 and 1995. This means that, in 1988, the predicted earning for CCP/SOS 
workers is greater if their membership and ownership form of work unit are not known 
than if their choice is known. The opposite is true for CCP workers in the SOS in 1999, 
since they have positive selection. Knowing the worker would choose the CCP/SOS 
category actually increases the predicted earning in 1999. For other workers in SOS, the 
selection effect remained negative for each of the three years being studied. The 
combined effect is that the earning gap and net of selectivity were larger than the 
observed earning gap in 1988, but smaller in 1995 and 1999. In this dissertation, the sum 
of coefficient differential and selection differential is called ‘unexplained differential’. 
Figure 6.10 shows that the unexplained Differential decreases in the SOS from 1988 to 
1999. 
The education level dummies are usually used to capture the skill differentials 
between CCP members and other workers. At SOS, it is expected that the returns of 
higher education are greater for CCP workers than those of other workers since they are 
more likely to have stronger educational backgrounds and will be recruited into the Party. 
Total earning differentials favor CCP workers in SOS during the three years examined, 
while sum of endowment and coefficients differentials (for all educational levels) 
indicate the total educational effect is smaller for CCP workers when compared to other 
workers.  
Meanwhile, Table 6.21 shows that 9.3%, 12%, and 26% (respectively) of the total 
earning gap is due to endowment differentials of all education dummies when they are 
evaluated via returns to a CCP/SOS worker during the aforementioned three years. The 
percentage of total earning gap due to endowment differential at each educational level 
rises with each respective educational level. Take the numbers in 1988 for example; 6% 
of the total earning differential is due to the endowment differential at the four-year 
college level, 3.7% is due to the endowment differential at the two-year college level, and 
only 1.1% at professional school level.  
However, the idea that higher education increases returns to CCP workers (as 
opposed to other workers) is refuted by the negative contribution of the coefficients, and 
by the lack of a tier pattern in the coefficient contributions. This implies that NonCCP 
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workers at SOS have a greater educational impact than CCP workers do in terms of 
varying returns to observables. 
The other two earning-gap measures may also be of interest because they provide a 
good prediction of the earning gap given that we know that the individual has chosen one 
of the alternatives. Both are called “coefficient differentials”, and are reported in the 
columns labeled, “Two-stage without selectivity” and “Two-stage with selectivity” on 
Table 6.22 and Table 6.23, respectively. Figure 6.11 illustrates these numbers. The 
implied log earning gap for an individual who has sorted into NonCCP/SOS category is 
given by: 
)|(ln)|(ln  SOSat  NonCCP |SOSat  Gap Earning //// SOSNonCCPSOSNonCCPSOSNonCCPSOSCCP XWEXWE −=
)ˆ'()ˆ'( //////// SOSNonCCPSOSNonCCPSOSNonCCPSOSNonCCPSOSNonCCPSOSCCPSOSNonCCPSOSCCP XX λδβλδβ +−+=  
where we take the mean characteristics of NonCCP workers at SOS as the reference. 
This earning gap with selectivity is called “coefficient differentials”, and is reported in 
the column labeled, “Two-stage with selectivity”.  
Similarly, the implied log earning gap for an individual who has sorted into CCP/SOS 
category is given by: 
)|(ln)|(ln  SOSat  CCP |SOSat  Gap Earning //// SOSCCPSOSNonCCPSOSCCPSOSCCP XWEXWE −=  
)ˆ'()ˆ'( //////// SOSCCPSOSNonCCPSOSCCPSOSNonCCPSOSCCPSOSCCPSOSCCPSOSCCP XX λδβλδβ +−+=  
where we take the mean characteristics of CCP workers at SOS as the reference.  
Net of selectivity effects, these earning gaps become 
)''( //// SOSNonCCPSOSNonCCPSOSNonCCPSOSCCP XX ββ −  and )''( //// SOSCCPSOSNonCCPSOSCCPSOSCCP XX ββ − , 
and are reported in the column labeled, “Two–stage without selectivity”. 
I find that, without the selectivity effects included, an average NonCCP worker at 
SOS would expect to earn 17% (5%) more if the marginal return is the same as that for a 
CCP member at SOS  than what the average NonCCP worker would experience at SOS 
in 1988 (1995). Taking selectivity into account, the coefficient differential rises slightly 
to 17.4% in 1988, but increases significantly to 15% in 1995. However, he/she would 
expect to earn less in 1999 with exclusion of selectivity, but would earn more with 
selectivity.  
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Similarly, in 1988 without selectivity, an average CCP worker at SOS would 
experience an earning gain of 6% over what the worker would expect to earn if rewarded 
as a NonCCP worker, with the differential increasing to 6.7% when selectivity effects are 
included. Although in 1995 and 1999, the coefficient differential net of selectivity 
indicates that an average CCP worker at SOS would have lesser earnings than what 
would be expected if the worker was rewarded as a NonCCP worker at SOS, the 
coefficient differential with selectivity rises to positive numbers during both years. These 
calculations show that selectivity considerations act to increase the earning differential 
between CCP and NonCCP workers at SOS because of the different returns to their 
attributes.  
 
6.6.2 Decomposition of Earning Differential in Nonstate-owned Sector 
Table 6.24 shows earning decompositions by using the coefficients of CCP members 
at NSOS as reference points. Figure 6.12 illustrates the components of CCP-NonCCP 
earnings differential in the NSOS and the proportion of each component by years. A 
decreasing earning advantage for CCP members at NSOS was found over time. The total 
earning differential between CCP members and other workers at NSOS is 34% in 1988, 
and then it decreases to 27.5% and 24.8% in 1995 and 1999, respectively. The positive 
coefficient differentials from a two-stage selection correction estimation in 1988 and 
1995 indicate that the average NonCCP worker at NSOS earns less than what s/he would 
earn if s/he is rewarded as a CCP member, and this differential accounts for the largest 
portion of the total earning gap. However, it decreases from 1998 to 1995, and becomes 
negative in 1999. Therefore, NonCCP workers would earn less if they are rewarded as 
CCP workers than what they earn now.  This further indicates that CCP is less better off 
than NonCCP in NSOS from 1988 to 1995 and becomes no better off as NSOS becomes 
further adapted to the market economy in 1999, which includes a shrinking of UCEs and 
a booming of UPEs within one decade. In this dissertation, the sum of coefficient 
differential and selection differential is called ‘unexplained differential’. Figure 6.13 
shows that the unexplained Differential decreases in the NSOS from 1988 to 1999. 
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The analysis of decomposition of educational effects is shown on Table 6.25. Column 
(4) in Table 6.25 shows that the contribution of endowment differentials of all 
educational levels toward the positive CCP-NonCCP earning differential in SOS rises 
over the three years examined. 6%, 12% and 36% of the total earning gap is explained by 
the different mean proportions of CCP-NonCCP workers with the same educational 
levels when they are evaluated by returns to CCP/NSOS during each of the three years, 
respectively.  
The percentage of earning gap caused by the endowment effect for each educational 
level usually rises as people gain more education. The numbers in 1999 for example, 
when evaluated by returns to educational levels in CCP/NSOS category, indicate that 25% 
of the total earning differential is due to the difference in four-year college graduates, 9% 
is due to the difference in two-year college graduates, and only 1.5% is from professional 
school graduates.  
At NSOS, it is expected that returns to human capital of CCP workers were better 
than for other workers in 1988 and the contribution of coefficient differentials to the total 
earning gap will be similar across both groups of workers in 1995 and 1999.  It was found 
that 7.5% of total earning differential could be explained by coefficient differentials for 
all education dummies, and favored CCP workers in 1988, while it decreased to 3.06% in 
1995 and becomes negative in 1999. Specifically, the coefficient differentials for college 
education dummies have turned out negative since 1995, which is due to better returns 
for two-year and four-year college education in the NonCCP/NSOS group.  
Regarding other educational levels in 1995, returns to CCP are better than for 
NonCCP at NSOS. Since negative CCP-NonCCP coefficient differentials for college 
educations are dominated by positive ones for other educational levels, aggregated 
coefficient differentials for all educational levels still favor CCP workers in NSOS.  
However, CCP workers at each educational level have smaller returns than other workers 
in NSOS in 1999. The total coefficient differentials of all educational levels become 
negative (-0.131) as well. The results in all three panels of Table 6.25 help to analyze 
how education contributes to a positive CCP-NonCCP earning differential at NSOS. 
Obviously, the contribution of the coefficient differential (across all educational levels) to 
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the total earning differential decreased from 1988 to 1995, and completely favored 
NonCCP workers in 1999.  
Given that we know that the individual has chosen one of the alternatives, another 
two types of “coefficient differentials” are reported in the columns labeled, “Two-stage 
without selectivity” and “Two-stage with selectivity” in Table 6.26 and Table 6.27, 
respectively. Figure 6.14 shows these numbers for an average CCP worker and an 
average NonCCP worker in the NSOS, respectively. The implied log earning gap for an 
individual who has sorted into the NonCCP/NSOS category is given by: 
)|(ln)|(ln  NSOSat  NonCCP |NSOSat  Gap Earning //// NSOSNonCCPNSOSNonCCPNSOSNonCCPNSOSCCP XWEXWE −=
)ˆ'()ˆ'( //////// NSOSNonCCPNSOSNonCCPNSOSNonCCPNSOSNonCCPNSOSNonCCPNSOSCCPNSOSNonCCPNSOSCCP XX λδβλδβ +−+=
Where we take the mean characteristics of NonCCP workers at NSOS as the reference. 
This earning gap with selectivity is called “coefficient differentials”, and is reported in 
the column labeled, “Two-stage with selectivity”.  
Similarly, the implied log earning gap for an individual who has sorted into 
CCP/NSOS category is given by: 
)|(ln)|(ln  NSOSat  CCP |NSOSat  Gap Earning //// NSOSCCPNSOSNonCCPNSOSCCPNSOSCCP XWEXWE −=  
)ˆ'()ˆ'( //////// NSOSCCPNSOSNonCCPNSOSCCPNSOSNonCCPNSOSCCPNSOSCCPNSOSCCPNSOSCCP XX λδβλδβ +−+=  
where we take the mean characteristics of CCP workers at SOS as the reference.  
Net of selectivity effects, these earning gaps become: 
)''( //// NSOSNonCCPNSOSNonCCPNSOSNonCCPNSOSCCP XX ββ −  and )''( //// NSOSCCPNSOSNonCCPNSOSCCPSOSCCP XX ββ − , 
and are reported in the column labeled, “Two –stage without selectivity”. 
It was found that, without selectivity effects included, an average NonCCP worker at 
NSOS would expect to earn 63% (23%) more if he or she is rewarded as a CCP member 
at NSOS than what the average NonCCP worker would experience in 1988 (1995). 
Taking selectivity into account, this coefficient differential dramatically decreases to 19% 
in 1988, and to 18% in 1995. However, an average NonCCP worker would expect to earn 
less in 1999 with exclusion of selectivity, but would expect to earn more with selectivity.  
Similarly, without selectivity, an average CCP worker at NSOS would experience an 
earnings gain of 75% (24%) over what the worker would expect to earn if rewarded as a 
NonCCP worker in 1988 (1995). This differential decreases to 6.7% (12%) when 
 
89 
 
selectivity effects are included. Although in 1999, this coefficient differential net of 
selectivity indicates that an average CCP worker at NSOS would have smaller earnings 
than what the worker would expect if rewarded as a NonCCP worker, The coefficient 
differential with selectivity rises to positive numbers. These calculations show that 
selectivity considerations act to increase the earning differential between CCP and 
NonCCP workers at NSOS due to the different returns to their attributes in 1999.  
CCP-NonCCP earning differential decompositions within each sector show some 
important differences between CCP members and other workers. First, the total earning 
differential at SOS increases dramatically in the early reform period from 1988 to 1995 
(24.7% to 30%), and then it levels out (remains at 30%) in 1999 (See Figure 6.15). 
Second, the CCP-NonCCP earning differential in the NSOS decreases over time from 34% 
in 1988 to 25% in 1999. Third, the proportion of earning gap in the two sectors, which is 
explained by endowment differences, is increasing over time; while the unexplained 
proportion is actually decreasing61. Fourth, endowment differentials in SOS 
consecutively rose during the three years examined in this dissertation paper, while the 
unexplained differentials62
Fifth, endowment differentials in NSOS slightly fluctuated during the three years
 went down. But the increase in endowment differentials in 
SOS was bigger than the decrease in unexplained differentials from 1988 to 1995, while 
they were tied from 1995 to 1999.  
63
Sixth, coefficient differentials favoring CCP workers went down from 1988 to 1995 
in both sectors, while they become negative in favor of other workers in 1999. This 
indicates that, for an average NonCCP worker in each category, the economic reform at 
, 
while the unexplained differentials kept declining over time. But the falling endowment 
differentials and the unexplained differentials both led the total earning differential to 
lessen from 1988 to 1995, while a slight rebound for endowment differentials cannot 
fully set off the falling unexplained differentials from 1995 to 1999. 
                                                 
61 Unexplained proportion stands for the proportion of total earning differential which is due to coefficients 
differentials on observable characteristics and selection differentials. 
62 Unexplained differential is sum of coefficient differential on observable characteristics and selection 
effects differential. If it is assumed that selection differentials are all due to varying returns to unobserved 
characteristics, then the unexplained differentials stands for a total coefficient differential on observed and 
unobserved characteristics.   
63 The coefficients of CCP/NSOS workers are taken as reference coefficients. 
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SOS and privatization at NSOS made the Party premium disappear due to varying returns 
to observable characteristics of CCP members and other workers64
Seventh, it was observed that the proportion of total earning differential which could 
be explained by coefficient differentials on observables is declining from 1988 to 1999 in 
both sectors. Coefficient differentials in NSOS explained a large portion of the total CCP-
NonCCP earning gap in the early reform era (from 1988 to 1995).  
.  
Eighth, comparing NSOS to SOS, NSOS has a larger log earning gap than SOS in 
1988. A greater proportion of the gap in NSOS is attributed to unexplained differential in 
1988. Unexplained differential accounts for about 64% of the total earnings gap at NSOS 
in 1988, while it accounts for 46% in SOS. However, unexplained differential makes 
slightly more contribution to the total earning gap in SOS than it does in NSOS in 1995 
and 1999.  The unexplained differential is further broken down into two components: 
coefficient differential due to varying returns to observable characteristics and selection 
differential due to different selection effects. A greater proportion of the gap in NSOS 
can be explained by the coefficient differentials on observables in 1988. The coefficient 
differential accounts for about 182% of the total log earning gaps at NSOS, whereas it 
accounts for 69% at SOS in 1988. However, due to further economic reforms in SOS and 
the booming of NSOS, the contribution of coefficient differentials goes down in both 
sectors in 1995. The contribution of coefficient differentials becomes much less than that 
of endowment differentials in SOS, although SOS has a larger log earning gap than 
NSOS does.  
 It was found that, in 1995, the greatest proportion of the earning gap at SOS is due to 
endowment differential, while that in NSOS can be attributed to coefficient differentials. 
For example, 19% of the total log earning gap at SOS can be explained by differences in 
varying returns to average observable characteristics of CCP members in 1995, whereas 
the counterpart at NSOS is 82% of the total log earning gaps. The continued reforms at 
SOS and the privatization in NSOS tend to minimize favorable returns to CCP members 
                                                 
64 Earning decomposition is also performed by taking coefficient of NonCCP workers in each sector as 
reference coefficients. The results show that the coefficient differential in SOS was positive, but it became 
negative in 1995 and 1999. The coefficient differential in NSOS was positive in 1988 and 1995, but 
became negative in 1999. 
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in 1999. Still, SOS has a bigger log earning gap that favors CCP members over NSOS in 
1999, but coefficient differential does not contribute to this gap.  
 Finally, assuming that workers in four categories to be different, the Party premium 
in the SOS is calculated for an average CCP/SOS worker and an average NonCCP/SOS 
worker, respectively; and the Party premium in the NSOS is calculated for an average 
CCP/NSOS worker and an average NonCCP/NSOS worker, respectively. It is found that 
for an average worker in each group, coefficient differential on observable characteristics 
of average worker is declining over time. Given that we know the alternative that a 
worker has chosen, the coefficient differential on unobservable characteristics of average 
worker is calculated as well. By doing so, the total coefficient differential with selectivity 
reflects the Party premiums due to varying returns to both observable and unobservable 
characteristics of an average worker in each group. Figure 6.11 and Figure 6.14 show that 
the coefficient differential with selectivity falls over time for either an average 
NonCCP/SOS worker or an average NonCCP/NSOS worker. 
 
6.7 Predicted Earning Differential 
6.7.1  Introduction 
 A simple way to predict earning differential is an OLS regression including 
categorical variables representing the four sectors. It constrains the coefficients on other 
variables to be the same across the four alternatives.  
Additionally, ‘conditional’ and ‘unconditional’ earning differential is calculated via 
two stage M-Logit OLS procedure. To better understand the distinctions between 
‘conditional’ and ‘unconditional’ earning differential as defined by Gyourko and Tracy 
(1988), Party premium in SOS will be used as an example. Suppose we randomly select 
an individual, who has observable characteristics of an average SOS worker, from the 
population. Without observing his/her choice of Party membership, the Party premium 
reflects the differences in returns to his/her observed traits embodied in the “typical SOS 
worker”. Gyourko and Tracey (1988) define such a differential as ‘Unconditional’ 
differential. The present study uses )( //
'
SOSNonCCPSOSCCPSOSX ββ −  to represent this concept. 
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However, if each individual’s choice of Party membership is known, Conditional 
Differential controls not only for varying returns to observed characteristics, but also for 
differentials due to unobserved characteristics - which can be inferred from their choice 
of Party membership. Given an individual’s choice of Party membership, two persons 
with the same observable characteristics as an average SOS worker could be randomly 
selected, one from CCP/SOS and the other from NonCCP/SOS. The earning differential 
between them reflects not only the varying returns to their observed characteristics, but 
also varying returns to unobserved characteristics or varying levels of their unobserved 
characteristics. The present study uses 
)ˆˆ()( //////
'
SOSNonCCPSOSNonCCPSOSCCPSOSCCPSOSNonCCPSOSCCPSOSX λδλδββ −+− to represent this concept. 
In decomposition of the mean earning in the labor market status j and k:  
)ˆ()ˆ(lnln
''
kkkkjjjjkj XXWW λδβλδβ +−+=−  
                      )ˆˆ()(
''
kkjjkkjj XX λδλδββ −+−=  
                  )ˆˆ()()( '
''
kkjjkjkjkj XXX λδλδβββ −+−+−=  
where the estimated β s are two-stage selection corrected estimates. 
The second component, )(
'
kjkX ββ − , is generally called “coefficient differential”, and 
indicates varying returns to common observable characteristics.  The third term, 
kkjj λδλδ ˆˆ − , is the difference in mean selection effects across two labor market statuses. 
In the absence of selection effects, the third term is zero and the second term is identical 
to the unconditional differential as defined above. In this circumstance, individuals are 
selected from the population at random and each individual’s choice is not observed. 
Unconditional differential only controls for the differences in returns across status to a 
given set of observable traits of an average worker. 
If a self-selection bias exists, the third term is not zero. It indicates for our sample of 
workers, the impact of unobserved traits – those that impact individuals’ political 
membership affiliation, their ownership sector choices, and their earnings – on the 
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earning differences between workers in labor market status j and k. The selection-effects 
differential could arise from differences in returns to some common unobserved 
productivity of the workers across two statuses, and also to differences in the levels of 
unobserved traits of the workers in each status as well.  
Conceptually, if the desired earning differential is meant to reflect varying returns to 
both observed and unobserved characteristics conditional on the selection process, only 
the coefficient differential and the part of selection-effects differential that represents a 
differential return to common unobserved characteristics should be included in the 
calculation. However, it is not feasible to decompose the selection-effects differential as 
having been done for observable characteristics. Calculating the correct differential is 
problematic without any assumptions. In this dissertation, both unconditional and 
conditional differentials with corresponding assumptions are presented. Under an 
assumption that the selection effects differential represent solely varying levels of 
unobserved characteristics, the unconditional differential could be appropriately 
interpreted. In contrast, the conditional differential is interpretable by assuming that the 
selection-effects differential arises only because of varying returns to unobservable 
productivity.  
 
6.7.2 Predicted Party Premium in State-owned Sector and Other Sectors 
One simple OLS regression is presented in Table 6.28.  Given the same parameters of 
other variables, the difference in the coefficients of alternative dummy variables 
CCP/SOS and NonCCP/SOS gives the Party premium in the SOS.  
Table 6.29 and Table 6.30 predict the ‘conditional’ and ‘unconditional’ earning 
differential between what an average worker would earn if his/her return is the same as 
CCP worker’s in one sector, and what s/he would earn if s/he is rewarded as a NonCCP 
worker in the same sector during the three years examined. The Party differentials are 
calculated using the mean characteristics for current workers within the specific category 
being considered (such as mean characteristics of an average worker in the full sample, 
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those of an average male in the full sample and so on). The results in the ‘OLS’65
For an average worker in the full sample, the conditional Party premium via Two 
Stage M-Logit OLS procedure presents a similar pattern in each sector as the simple OLS 
results (See Figure 6.16). For example, the Party premium in the NSOS decreases from 
1988 to 1999, while it rises in the SOS during the same time period. However, with 
controlling for selectivity and allowing different parameters for each alternative, Two 
Stage M-Logit OLS procedure generates higher Party premium in each sector. In the 
following analysis, I look into conditional earning differential in each sector.  
 and 
‘Two-stage conditional’ columns are very close, so the focus will remain on the Two-
stage conditional and unconditional earning differentials.   
Figure 6.17 illustrates the ‘conditional’ and ‘unconditional’ earning differential in 
each sector. Table 6.31 shows the selection effects of an average worker in each category. 
When the total selection-effect differential is interpreted as representing varying returns 
to the unobserved characteristics, the conditional earning differential in SOS remains at a 
stable level, reaching 11% in 1998 and 1995, and then rising slightly to 12% in 1999. In 
contrast, the unconditional differential in SOS presents a decreasing trend over time. It 
was 15% in 1988, decreasing to 5% in 1995, and then to -7% in 1999. If an average 
worker would self-select to be a CCP/SOS worker, s/he has a negative average selection 
effect (-0.09 in 1988). Too, s/he would have a slightly larger average negative selection 
effect (-0.04) if s/he self-selected to be a NonCCP/SOS worker.  
When calculating the conditional earning differential in 1988, the expected Party 
earning is reduced more than the expected earning of other workers in SOS by the 
average selection effect differential, thus lowering the reported Party earning differential 
at SOS. When calculating the unconditional differential at SOS, the expected earning 
differential is not reduced by the average selection effect differential because it is 
assumed that the selection effect differential solely represents varying unobserved 
characteristics. This is why the unconditional differential estimates in SOS exceed the 
conditional differential estimates in 1988. An average worker had a negative selection 
effect (-0.07) in 1995, and a positive selection effect (0.07) in 1999 if he/she self-selected 
                                                 
65 The column ‘OLS’ shows the predicted party premium via OLS regression in each alternative, rather 
than one simply OLS regression including alternative dummies. 
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to be a CCP/NSOS. However, s/he had a significant negative selection effect (-0.13) 
during both years if self-selected to be in NonCCP/SOS. When calculating the 
conditional earning differential of both years, the expected earning differentials are 
increased by the positive average selection-effect differential, thus raising the reported 
Party earning differential at SOS. 
For an average CCP-NonCCP worker, the conditional CCP-NonCCP earning 
differential at SOS shows a small increasing trend over time, while it shows a decreasing 
trend at NSOS, from 20% in 1988 to 3% in 1999. The NSOS Party premium is bigger 
than SOS Party premium in 1988, and roughly same in 1995. But it was much less than 
SOS Party premium in 1999.  
The change in the composition of NSOS over time provides some explanation of this 
point. During the first ten years of the economic reform, urban collective enterprises 
(UCEs) were the major component of NSOS. UCEs accounted for 92.5% of NSOS in 
1988. 95.5% of CCP members in NSOS are from UCEs. The 1988 results indicate that 
Party membership was an important reward-factor in UCEs at that time. Firms in NSOS 
started to explore a market-oriented operation in 1980s, and to large extent, the 
administration of UCEs still mimicked the SOS's. Without knowing exactly how to better 
define and measure individual productivity, Party membership might screen for certain 
ability (at least political ability) in the rewards system. Additionally, only 8.8% of the 
workers in NSOS were CCP members in 1988, and 9.1% of the workers in UCEs were 
CCP members. This is much smaller than the 28% in SOS, making the Party membership 
scarcer, and therefore better rewarded.  
After Deng Xiaoping's 'southern tour' in 1992, more jobs started to shift toward UPEs, 
and UCEs' employment declined gradually over the next few years. The proportion of 
UCEs in NSOS went down to 83.4% in 1995, and shrank to 44.5% in 1999. The 
percentage of CCP workers in both sectors increased in 1995 and 1999. In NSOS, it went 
up to 11% in 1995 and 17% in 1999.  Specifically, 9%, 12% and 17% of workers in 
UCEs were CCP workers during these three years. Too, the percentage of CCP workers 
in other NSOS entities rose as well, from 5.3% in 1988, to 7.2% in 1995, to 16.8% in 
1999. Still, in 1995, 89% of CCP members in NSOS were from UCEs. This number fell 
 
96 
 
to 44% in 1999. The 1999 results show that NSOS generated only a quarter of the 
conditional earning premium for Party membership as SOS did, indicating that the 
political capital became less important in the payment scheme in UCEs, and that it was 
not accounted as a key factor of productivity in other enterprises at NSOS.  
By assuming that the selection-effect differential solely represents varying levels of 
unobservable characteristics, the unconditional differential in NSOS gives us a slightly 
different picture. The unconditional differentials at NSOS show that NSOS generated a 
relatively larger earning premium for the Party members in 1988 (0.84) and 1995 (0.24), 
but for the other workers in 1999 (-0.24).  
Considering the NSOS Party differentials in 1988 and 1995, if an average worker 
would self-select to be a CCP/NSOS worker, s/he has a negative average selection effect 
(-0.07 in 1988 and -0.13 in 1995). On the other hand, the worker would have a large 
positive selection effect (0.57) in 1988, and an almost zero selection effect (-0.01) in 
1995 (on average) if s/he self-selected to be a NonCCP/NSOS worker.  
When calculating conditional earning differential in 1988 and 1995, the expected 
Party earning is reduced by the average selection effect of Party workers, while the 
expected earning of others workers in NSOS rises by the average selection effect, thus 
lowering the reported Party earning differential at NSOS. When calculating the 
unconditional differential in NSOS, the expected earning differential is not reduced by 
the average selection-effect differential because it is assumed that the selection effect 
solely represents varying unobserved characteristics. This is why the unconditional 
differential estimates exceeded the conditional differential estimates in 1988 and 1995. 
An average worker had a positive selection effect (0.21) if s/he self-selected to be a 
CCP/NSOS in 1999. However, s/he had a small negative selection effect (-0.06) if in 
NonCCP/NSOS.  
When calculating the conditional earning differential in 1999, the expected Party 
earning is increased by the positive average selection effect of Party workers, while the 
expected earning of other workers decreased, thus raising the reported Party earning 
differential at NSOS. In a word, by assuming selection effect solely represents varying 
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levels of unobservable characteristics, the unconditional differential in favor of CCP 
workers decreased from 1988 to 1995 and became negative in 1999 in both sectors. 
Table 6.29 and Table 6.30 also show Party differentials disaggregated by age, gender 
and education level in both sectors. Figure 6.18 presents Party differentials by gender. 
The conditional earning differential in SOS shows that the male and female Party 
premiums slightly increased over time. On average, the females' Party premium was 
always greater than that for the males'. In the NSOS, the male and female Party premium 
fell during three years being studied, and female Party premium disappeared in 1999. For 
either females or males, on average, the conditional Party premium was higher in the 
NSOS than that in the SOS during 1988 and 1995, but it was reversed in 1999. It might 
because the SOS had more equalized wage payment system in the early reform era. 
Further, the Party premium of young age cohort increased over time (See Figure 6.19). 
The old age cohort in SOS had bigger Party premium than the young age cohort in 1988 
and 1995, but became reversed in 1999. In the NSOS, the old age cohort always had 
bigger Party premium than the young age cohort, while the Party premium in two age 
cohorts fell during three years. For either age cohort, their Party premium is higher in the 
NSOS than in the SOS in 1988 and 1995. 
The Party premium for two age cohorts with college education is illustrated on Figure 
6.20, while that with senior high school education or professional school education is 
shown on Figure 6.21. For those with the same education level, the predicted earning in 
the young age cohort is different from that in old age cohort in the SOS, but there is no 
consistent pattern over time.   
Workers in either age cohort of NSOS with median education (only a senior high or 
professional school education) had Party premium during each year. The comparison 
between age-cohorts in NSOS shows that the old age cohort at this educational level is 
predicted to have a higher Party premium than does the comparable young age cohort. 
Meanwhile, only those CCP workers in the young age cohort with a college education in 
NSOS had the Party premium in 1988, while those with a college education in the old age 
cohort had the Party premium in 1988 and 1995. Both age cohorts did not have positive 
Party premium in 1999. This indicates that the Party card in NSOS is not associated with 
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higher predicted earnings to the young age cohort with a college degree in the recent 
economic era, while the Party premium for the comparable old age cohort disappeared 
later.  
For either age cohort, their Party premium was higher in the NSOS during the early 
reform era, but became reversed in 1999. For the young age cohort with a college 
education, the Party premium in the NSOS was bigger than that in the SOS in 1988 only. 
They still had Party premium in the SOS in later years, but not in the NSOS. Meanwhile, 
for the old age cohort with a college education, the Party premium in the NSOS was 
higher than that in the SOS in 1988 and 1995. They still had Party premium in the SOS in 
1999, but not in the NSOS. It indicates that the Party card does not play an important role 
in the returns to the young workers who have a college education in the NSOS in the 
1990s, while it still works for the old workers in the early 1990s. For either age cohort 
with median education, the Party premium was bigger in the NSOS than that in the SOS 
in 1988 and 1995. The young age cohort with median education had much smaller Party 
premium in the NSOS than that in the SOS in 1999, while the Party premium was tied in 
two sectors for the old age cohort with median education in 1999. The findings imply that 
the Party card works for the young age cohort with median education in either sector 
during three years being studied. It fell and approached to minimum in the NSOS in 1999 
but increased in the SOS over time. 
Figure 6.22 shows that Party membership generates a larger earning premium in the 
SOS for less educated workers in the same age cohort. For example, the workers with 
only a senior high or professional school education have higher Party premiums than 
those with a college education. This implies that the Party card plays a more important 
role for those who had less education.  
 
6.8 Conclusion 
This chapter presents the Multinomial Logit – OLS two stage regression results for 
three specific years, and for the four groups of workers in the labor market in urban 
China. The chapter began with multinomial logit regression results, which provided the 
relative probability of workers being in one of four categories; and then selection 
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correction terms were adopted in an earning equation regression.  The selection effect 
remained negative and significant with regard to the earning equation of NonCCP/SOS 
workers during the three years.  
It was found that increased work experience, increased educational attainment, and 
being male are the statistically significant variables which pull workers from the NonCCP 
category in either sector, and move them to the CCP/SOS category. Comparing to SOS, 
the NSOS has a larger wage differential between females and males in three years. The 
evidence in the SOS further shows that the investments of human capital did play an 
increasingly important role in the earning structure for NonCCP workers in SOS 
throughout three stages of economic reforms, and that the impact increased more quickly 
and strongly over time than it did on CCP workers. The contribution of higher education 
to CCP workers’ earnings was not as much as it is for other workers’ in the SOS. The 
results at NSOS indicate that, over time, different returns brought about by different 
educational levels increased significantly to NonCCP workers in NSOS. It was observed 
that the total earning advantage of CCP workers at SOS increased dramatically during the 
early reform period from 1988 to 1995, and then leveled out in 1999. However, it 
decreased in NSOS from 1988 to 1999.  
In addition, it was also found that (1) the proportion of earning gap in two sectors, 
which is explained by endowment differences is increasing over time, while the 
unexplained proportion is decreasing; (2) coefficient differentials favoring CCP workers 
went down from 1988 to 1995, and they become negative in favor of other workers in 
1999. Such a pattern indicates that the economic reform in the SOS, and the privatization 
in the NSOS, made the earnings differential which is due to varying returns to observable 
characteristics of CCP workers and other workers disappear in the late 1990s. (3) In the 
early reform year, varying returns to observable characteristics favoring CCP workers 
explained the greatest portion of the total earning gap in both sectors, especially in the 
NSOS. However, due to further economic reforms in the SOS and the booming of NSOS, 
the contribution of coefficient differentials went down in both sectors in 1995. The 
continued reforms at SOS and privatization in NSOS minimized favorable returns to CCP 
members in 1999; (4) The contribution of higher education to CCP workers’ earnings 
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was not as much as it is for other workers’ in the SOS. The investments on human capital 
did play an increasingly important role in the earning structure of NonCCP workers in the 
SOS throughout three stages of the economic reforms, and it did so more quickly and 
strongly than it did for CCP workers in the SOS; (5) The results from the NSOS imply 
that different returns brought about because of different educational levels became more 
significant to NonCCP workers in the NSOS over time. The results also suggest that 
human capital and political capital were complements in the NSOS in 1988, whereas they 
became neither complements nor substitutes in the 1990s; (6) Given that we know that 
the individual has chosen in one of the alternatives, selectivity considerations act to 
increase the earning differential between CCP and NonCCP workers in the SOS due to 
the different returns to their attributes; (7) By assuming that the selection effect solely 
represents the varying returns to unobservable characteristics, an average worker would 
earn 11-12% more if s/he is a CCP worker in SOS as opposed to being a NonCCP worker 
during the three years examined, while the Party premium showed a decreasing trend at 
NSOS - from 20% in 1988 to 3% in 1999; (8) The females’ Party premium in SOS was 
always greater than the males’ during three years being studies; (9) For either females or 
males, the Party premium slightly rose over time in SOS, whereas both fell down in 
NSOS during three years; (10) in the SOS, the Party premium of young age cohort 
increased within three years. It was smaller than that of old age cohort in 1988 and 1995; 
(11) in the NSOS, the Party premium of either age cohort decreased and the old age 
cohort had bigger Party premium than the young age cohort within three years; (12) in 
the SOS, the Party card played a more important role to those who had less education 
when compared to workers with a higher education in the same age cohort, whereas the 
Party premium was  higher for more educated workers in the NSOS in 1988 and became 
reversed later; (13) in the NSOS, the old age cohort with a high school education is 
predicted to have a higher Party premium than for the comparable young age cohort; (14) 
CCP workers with a college education in the young age cohort in the NSOS did not have 
Party premium during the radical economic reform era, while the part premium for the 
comparable old age cohort disappeared in late 1990s; (15) For either age cohort, NSOS 
had a higher Party premium than SOS did in 1988. This pattern continued for old age 
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cohort in 1995, but they were tied for the young age cohort in the same year. Then the 
Party premium became higher in SOS for both age cohorts in 1999; and (16) at different 
education level, the same pattern was found for both age cohorts in 1988.  This pattern 
continued in 1995 except that the Party premium for the young age cohort with a college 
degree disappeared in 1995. In contrast, the Party premium became higher in SOS for 
either age cohort with different education level in 1999. Specifically, the Party premium 
for either age cohort with a college degree did not exist in 1999.  
There is a paradox that the Party premium decreases in the NSOS and it almost 
remains constant in the SOS while the total number of members appears to have risen 
during economic transition. The findings in this paper indicate that the Party gives the 
people less incentive desire for membership on the financial side. However, we observe a 
remarkable increase in membership from having 3.8% of China’s population in 1978 to 
5.2% in 2002 when it reached 66.4 million strong (Song and Appleton, 2006). There are 
some speculative reasons behind this phenomenon. First, with a fear of less demand for 
membership, the Party modified the selection criteria in order to secure recruitment of 
members. For example, the Party might more proactively admit new members. For those 
who are observed and considered to have potential to meet the standards of the Party 
members, the Party might proactively approach them and encourage them to submit an 
application. The selection criteria might become not as strict as before. For example, in 
college, the grades usually become a dominant criterion to recruit new members. Second, 
the economic reforms also create the opportunities for the people to translate political 
power into higher incomes. There still exist potential monetary benefits, or so-called gray 
income for the people in prominent positions and the Party members are more likely to be 
promoted to these position in the SOS. Given the difficulties in fully measuring the 
degree of general corruption in terms of wages or earnings, this dissertation is not able to 
examine it. Third, the Party has not established an effective system to prevent grey 
income, it is likely because the government needs the CCP members’ corporation.  
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Table 6.1 Marginal Effect in 1988 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
1988 CCP/SOS NonCCP/SOS CCP/NSOS NonCCP/NSOS 
experience 0.0098 -0.0075 0.0011 -0.0033 
 (0.0002)*** (0.0004)*** (0.0001)*** (0.0003)*** 
     
male 0.157 -0.069 0.005 -0.092 
 (0.006)*** (0.008)*** (0.002)*** (0.005)*** 
     
minority 0.007 -0.055 -0.008 0.056 
 (0.015) (0.020)*** (0.004)** (0.017)*** 
     
fourcollege 0.350 -0.197 0.002 -0.155 
 (0.021)*** (0.021)*** (0.005) (0.005)*** 
     
twocollege 0.374 -0.251 0.008 -0.132 
 (0.020)*** (0.020)*** (0.005) (0.005)*** 
     
professional_sc
hool 
0.193 -0.064 -0.005 -0.124 
 (0.014)*** (0.015)*** (0.003)* (0.006)*** 
     
senior_high 0.099 -0.039 0.005 -0.065 
 (0.010)*** (0.010)*** (0.003)* (0.005)*** 
     
industry -0.059 -0.048 0.026 0.081 
 (0.009)*** (0.014)*** (0.007)*** (0.011)*** 
     
construction -0.047 -0.104 0.023 0.128 
 (0.013)*** (0.026)*** (0.016) (0.025)*** 
     
transportation -0.012 0.015 0.024 -0.027 
 (0.012) (0.019) (0.014)* (0.013)** 
     
commerce -0.018 -0.105 0.038 0.085 
 (0.011) (0.019)*** (0.015)*** (0.015)*** 
     
real_estate -0.037 -0.131 0.020 0.148 
 (0.017)** (0.030)*** (0.017) (0.028)*** 
     
health -0.008 0.003 0.031 -0.026 
 (0.014) (0.023) (0.017)* (0.016) 
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Table 6.1 (Continued) Marginal Effect Result in 1988 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
1988 CCP/SOS NonCCP/SOS CCP/NSOS NonCCP/NSOS 
     
arts -0.015 0.119 -0.002 -0.102 
 (0.012) (0.016)*** (0.007) (0.010)*** 
     
organization 0.309 -0.198 0.009 -0.120 
 (0.022)*** (0.022)*** (0.010) (0.009)*** 
     
LN 0.032 -0.159 0.011 0.116 
 (0.017)* (0.023)*** (0.008) (0.022)*** 
     
JS -0.052 -0.092 0.002 0.143 
 (0.012)*** (0.022)*** (0.005) (0.022)*** 
     
HN 0.015 -0.011 -0.005 0.001 
 (0.015) (0.020) (0.004) (0.015) 
     
GS 0.025 -0.014 0.005 -0.015 
 (0.018) (0.022) (0.007) (0.016) 
     
AH -0.017 -0.097 0.010 0.104 
 (0.014) (0.022)*** (0.008) (0.022)*** 
     
HB 0.022 -0.034 -0.001 0.013 
 (0.016) (0.020)* (0.005) (0.016) 
     
GD -0.039 -0.061 0.004 0.096 
 (0.012)*** (0.021)*** (0.006) (0.021)*** 
     
YN 0.026 0.027 -0.003 -0.050 
 (0.016) (0.019) (0.005) (0.012)*** 
     
SX -0.011 0.011 -0.008 0.008 
 (0.014) (0.019) (0.004)** (0.016) 
N 17320    
pseudo R2 0.202    
Note: Marginal effect of ‘years of experience’ is calculated by Stata program ‘margins’. 
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Table 6.2 Marginal Effects in 1995 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
1995 CCP/SOS NonCCP/SOS CCP/NSOS NonCCP/NSOS 
assigned 0.091 0.006 -0.005 -0.091 
 (0.009)*** (0.011) (0.003) (0.009)*** 
     
experience 0.0108 -0.0078 0.0011 -0.0040 
 (0.0004)*** (0.0005)*** (0.0002)*** (0.0004)*** 
     
male 0.123 -0.072 -0.002 -0.049 
 (0.008)*** (0.009)*** (0.002) (0.006)*** 
     
minority -0.016 0.012 0.004 -0.000 
 (0.018) (0.022) (0.007) (0.015) 
     
fourcollege 0.281 -0.176 -0.002 -0.103 
 (0.024)*** (0.024)*** (0.005) (0.006)*** 
     
twocollege 0.253 -0.158 0.004 -0.099 
 (0.018)*** (0.018)*** (0.004) (0.006)*** 
     
professional_sc
hool 
0.137 -0.042 -0.002 -0.093 
 (0.015)*** (0.016)*** (0.003) (0.006)*** 
     
senior_high 0.076 -0.022 0.000 -0.053 
 (0.013)*** (0.013)* (0.003) (0.005)*** 
     
industry -0.069 -0.026 0.020 0.075 
 (0.013)*** (0.019) (0.008)** (0.015)*** 
     
construction -0.051 -0.013 -0.000 0.065 
 (0.019)*** (0.032) (0.011) (0.029)** 
     
transportation -0.034 -0.002 0.027 0.009 
 (0.017)* (0.027) (0.018) (0.020) 
     
commerce -0.037 -0.079 0.024 0.092 
 (0.014)*** (0.024)*** (0.014)* (0.021)*** 
     
real_estate -0.032 -0.106 0.046 0.092 
 (0.020) (0.034)*** (0.026)* (0.028)*** 
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Table 6.2 (Continued) Marginal Effects in 1995 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
1995 CCP/SOS NonCCP/SOS CCP/NSOS NonCCP/NSOS 
     
health -0.016 0.038 -0.010 -0.012 
 (0.019) (0.025) (0.006) (0.020) 
     
arts -0.023 0.097 -0.014 -0.060 
 (0.016) (0.020)*** (0.004)*** (0.013)*** 
     
organization 0.168 -0.099 0.004 -0.073 
 (0.022)*** (0.024)*** (0.009) (0.011)*** 
     
LN -0.064 0.007 -0.007 0.064 
 (0.013)*** (0.023) (0.005) (0.022)*** 
     
JS -0.071 -0.115 0.017 0.169 
 (0.013)*** (0.028)*** (0.010) (0.029)*** 
     
HN -0.010 -0.028 0.020 0.018 
 (0.017) (0.024) (0.012)* (0.019) 
     
GS -0.008 -0.002 -0.002 0.012 
 (0.020) (0.027) (0.008) (0.022) 
     
SC -0.029 -0.032 0.010 0.052 
 (0.015)* (0.023) (0.008) (0.021)** 
     
AH -0.047 -0.092 0.012 0.128 
 (0.016)*** (0.029)*** (0.010) (0.029)*** 
     
GD -0.018 -0.149 0.020 0.147 
 (0.017) (0.029)*** (0.012)* (0.029)*** 
     
HB -0.017 -0.005 0.006 0.017 
 (0.016) (0.023) (0.008) (0.019) 
     
YN -0.009 -0.021 0.005 0.025 
 (0.017) (0.024) (0.008) (0.020) 
     
SX -0.009 0.030 -0.001 -0.020 
 (0.017) (0.022) (0.007) (0.015) 
N 10580    
pseudo R2 0.193    
Note: Marginal effect of ‘years of experience’ is calculated by Stata program ‘margins’. 
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Table 6.3 Marginal Effects in 1999 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
1999 CCP/SOS NonCCP/SOS CCP/NSOS NonCCP/NSOS 
assigned 0.088 0.000 -0.002 -0.086 
 (0.015)*** (0.018) (0.005) (0.013)*** 
     
fmparty 0.055 -0.013 0.011 -0.052 
 (0.015)*** (0.017) (0.005)** (0.010)*** 
     
fschooling -0.002 -0.002 -0.000 0.004 
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.001) (0.002)** 
     
mschooling -0.006 0.009 -0.001 -0.003 
 (0.003)** (0.003)*** (0.001) (0.002) 
     
experience 0.0125 -0.0083 0.0015 -0.0057 
 (0.0007)*** (0.0009)*** (0.0003)*** (0.0007)*** 
     
male 0.109 -0.085 0.007 -0.030 
 (0.014)*** (0.016)*** (0.004) (0.010)*** 
     
minority -0.013 0.048 -0.013 -0.022 
 (0.035) (0.038) (0.008) (0.022) 
     
fourcollege 0.467 -0.404 0.055 -0.118 
 (0.034)*** (0.028)*** (0.020)*** (0.009)*** 
     
twocollege 0.376 -0.296 0.028 -0.108 
 (0.027)*** (0.026)*** (0.010)*** (0.010)*** 
     
professional_sc
hool 
0.265 -0.193 0.014 -0.086 
 (0.032)*** (0.030)*** (0.010) (0.010)*** 
     
senior_high 0.124 -0.070 0.006 -0.060 
 (0.026)*** (0.025)*** (0.008) (0.010)*** 
     
industry -0.078 0.055 0.011 0.012 
 (0.020)*** (0.023)** (0.008) (0.014) 
     
construction -0.059 0.111 0.005 -0.057 
 (0.030)** (0.035)*** (0.012) (0.017)*** 
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Table 6.3 (Continued) Marginal Effects in 1999 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
1999 CCP/SOS NonCCP/SOS CCP/NSOS NonCCP/NSOS 
     
transportation 0.071 0.010 -0.015 -0.066 
 (0.030)** (0.031) (0.006)** (0.013)*** 
     
commerce -0.038 -0.077 0.038 0.077 
 (0.029) (0.034)** (0.017)** (0.022)*** 
     
real_estate -0.037 0.098 -0.002 -0.059 
 (0.029) (0.032)*** (0.009) (0.015)*** 
     
health -0.034 0.115 -0.006 -0.076 
 (0.030) (0.033)*** (0.008) (0.015)*** 
     
arts -0.061 0.199 -0.031 -0.106 
 (0.023)*** (0.026)*** (0.004)*** (0.012)*** 
     
organization 0.127 0.030 -0.017 -0.140 
 (0.033)*** (0.034) (0.006)*** (0.009)*** 
     
LN -0.001 -0.082 0.033 0.051 
 (0.024) (0.029)*** (0.015)** (0.020)** 
     
JS -0.022 0.044 -0.001 -0.021 
 (0.023) (0.026)* (0.009) (0.015) 
     
HN 0.036 -0.004 0.010 -0.042 
 (0.025) (0.027) (0.011) (0.014)*** 
     
GS 0.012 0.006 0.016 -0.033 
 (0.026) (0.029) (0.013) (0.016)** 
     
SC 0.020 -0.068 0.033 0.014 
 (0.024) (0.027)** (0.014)** (0.017) 
N 4456    
pseudo R2 0.183    
Note: Marginal effect of ‘years of experience’ is calculated by Stata program ‘margins’. 
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Table 6.4 Earnings Equations in 1988 
 
Year1988 
(1) 
CCP/SOS 
(2) 
CCP/SOS 
(3) 
NonCCP/ 
SOS 
(4)  
NonCCP/   
SOS 
(5)  
CCP/NSOS 
(6)  
CCP/NSOS 
(7) 
NonCCP/ 
NSOS 
(8) 
NonCCP/ 
NSOS 
 OLS Two-Stage OLS Two-Stage OLS Two-Stage OLS Two-Stage 
Mill_ratio  0.054  0.060  0.028  -0.350 
  (0.054)  (0.021)***  (0.332)  (0.212)* 
         
experience 0.031 0.027 0.055 0.055 0.050 0.049 0.053 0.044 
 (0.002)*** (0.005)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.010)*** (0.017)*** (0.003)*** (0.007)*** 
         
experience2 -0.000 -0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
         
male 0.053 0.027 0.092 0.097 0.150 0.147 0.151 0.041 
 (0.011)*** (0.028) (0.007)*** (0.007)*** (0.041)*** (0.060)** (0.016)*** (0.071) 
         
minority 0.019 0.018 -0.006 0.001 0.060 0.068 0.025 0.084 
 (0.022) (0.024) (0.019) (0.017) (0.142) (0.144) (0.039) (0.046)* 
         
fourcollege 0.203 0.167 0.283 0.293 0.271 0.270 0.274 -0.144 
 (0.016)*** (0.039)*** (0.017)*** (0.017)*** (0.095)*** (0.098)*** (0.127)** (0.263) 
         
twocollege 0.151 0.113 0.190 0.198 0.234 0.229 0.234 -0.039 
 (0.016)*** (0.042)*** (0.016)*** (0.016)*** (0.085)*** (0.100)** (0.060)*** (0.172) 
         
professional_
school 
0.076 0.051 0.127 0.126 0.094 0.097 0.157 -0.074 
 (0.014)*** (0.027)* (0.012)*** (0.010)*** (0.079) (0.079) (0.043)*** (0.144) 
         
senior_high 0.059 0.045 0.065 0.066 0.109 0.107 0.130 0.048 
 (0.013)*** (0.020)** (0.009)*** (0.009)*** (0.050)** (0.074) (0.019)*** (0.057) 
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Table 6.4 (Continued) Earning Equations in 1988 
 
Year1988 
(1) 
CCP/SOS 
(2) 
CCP/SOS 
(3) 
NonCCP/ 
SOS 
(4)  
NonCCP/   
SOS 
(5)  
CCP/NSOS 
(6)  
CCP/NSOS 
(7) 
NonCCP/ 
NSOS 
(8) 
NonCCP/ 
NSOS 
 OLS Two-Stage OLS Two-Stage OLS Two-Stage OLS Two-Stage 
industry 0.014 0.025 -0.027 -0.022 -0.246 -0.260 0.132 0.228 
 (0.017) (0.020) (0.012)** (0.012)* (0.115)** (0.270) (0.033)*** (0.073)*** 
         
construction 0.063 0.071 -0.008 -0.001 -0.220 -0.229 0.157 0.282 
 (0.030)** (0.027)*** (0.022) (0.021) (0.149) (0.273) (0.047)*** (0.091)*** 
         
transportation 0.030 0.032 0.016 0.014 -0.423 -0.432 0.154 0.118 
 (0.022) (0.026) (0.016) (0.017) (0.135)*** (0.261)* (0.048)*** (0.064)* 
         
commerce -0.007 -0.004 -0.017 -0.008 -0.352 -0.366 0.168 0.262 
 (0.020) (0.021) (0.014) (0.015) (0.119)*** (0.270) (0.035)*** (0.074)*** 
         
real_estate -0.004 0.004 -0.088 -0.077 -0.448 -0.457 0.082 0.225 
 (0.038) (0.052) (0.025)*** (0.028)*** (0.165)*** (0.273)* (0.049)* (0.106)** 
         
health -0.004 -0.003 -0.028 -0.030 -0.241 -0.252 0.147 0.113 
 (0.024) (0.023) (0.019) (0.017)* (0.145)* (0.275) (0.063)** (0.060)* 
         
arts -0.024 -0.021 -0.039 -0.046 -0.267 -0.266 0.098 -0.089 
 (0.020) (0.019) (0.016)** (0.015)*** (0.167) (0.291) (0.082) (0.133) 
         
organization -0.073 -0.102 -0.036 -0.017 -0.088 -0.092 0.091 -0.120 
 (0.017)*** (0.033)*** (0.018)** (0.019) (0.154) (0.266) (0.088) (0.162) 
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Table 6.4 (Continued) Earning Equations in 1988 
 
Year1988 
(1) 
CCP/SOS 
(2) 
CCP/SOS 
(3) 
NonCCP/ 
SOS 
(4)  
NonCCP/   
SOS 
(5)  
CCP/NSOS 
(6)  
CCP/NSOS 
(7) 
NonCCP/ 
NSOS 
(8) 
NonCCP/ 
NSOS 
 OLS Two-Stage OLS Two-Stage OLS Two-Stage OLS Two-Stage 
         
LN -0.065 -0.071 -0.088 -0.072 0.056 0.051 0.003 0.123 
 (0.024)*** (0.023)*** (0.019)*** (0.018)*** (0.104) (0.108) (0.047) (0.081) 
         
JS -0.005 0.002 -0.020 -0.010 0.164 0.162 -0.004 0.133 
 (0.024) (0.024) (0.018) (0.017) (0.106) (0.096)* (0.046) (0.090) 
         
HN -0.195 -0.198 -0.271 -0.269 -0.058 -0.055 -0.348 -0.347 
 (0.023)*** (0.023)*** (0.018)*** (0.018)*** (0.117) (0.118) (0.049)*** (0.044)*** 
         
GS -0.010 -0.014 -0.118 -0.115 0.208 0.205 -0.309 -0.329 
 (0.025) (0.028) (0.020)*** (0.021)*** (0.120)* (0.152) (0.056)*** (0.060)*** 
         
SX -0.162 -0.161 -0.241 -0.241 -0.131 -0.125 -0.291 -0.285 
 (0.024)*** (0.024)*** (0.018)*** (0.019)*** (0.126) (0.148) (0.050)*** (0.050)*** 
         
AH -0.086 -0.084 -0.120 -0.110 -0.007 -0.012 -0.228 -0.124 
 (0.025)*** (0.025)*** (0.019)*** (0.020)*** (0.107) (0.115) (0.047)*** (0.074)* 
         
HB -0.155 -0.159 -0.159 -0.155 -0.021 -0.020 -0.097 -0.082 
 (0.023)*** (0.024)*** (0.018)*** (0.017)*** (0.112) (0.093) (0.049)** (0.043)* 
         
GD 0.285 0.291 0.229 0.236 0.602 0.599 0.290 0.388 
 (0.024)*** (0.028)*** (0.018)*** (0.020)*** (0.108)*** (0.106)*** (0.047)*** (0.077)*** 
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Table 6.4 (Continued) Earning Equations in 1988 
 
Year1988 
(1) 
CCP/SOS 
(2) 
CCP/SOS 
(3) 
NonCCP/ 
SOS 
(4)  
NonCCP/   
SOS 
(5)  
CCP/NSOS 
(6)  
CCP/NSOS 
(7) 
NonCCP/ 
NSOS 
(8) 
NonCCP/ 
NSOS 
 OLS Two-Stage OLS Two-Stage OLS Two-Stage OLS Two-Stage 
 
YN -0.016 -0.021 -0.031 -0.033 0.227 0.229 -0.148 -0.222 
 (0.024) (0.023) (0.018)* (0.018)* (0.116)* (0.100)** (0.053)*** (0.066)*** 
         
_cons 7.912 8.083 7.593 7.601 7.651 7.753 7.291 6.922 
 (0.042)*** (0.176)*** (0.023)*** (0.025)*** (0.197)*** (1.143)*** (0.059)*** (0.224)*** 
N 3805 3805 9732 9732 333 333 3450 3450 
R2 0.294 0.294 0.390 0.390 0.445 0.445 0.317 0.318 
   Standard errors in parentheses 
   * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01 
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Table 6.5 Earnings Equations in 1995 
Year 1995 (1) 
CCP/SOS 
(2) 
CCP/SOS 
(3) 
NonCCP/S
OS 
(4) 
NonCCP/ 
SOS 
(5)  
CCP/NSOS 
(6)  
CCP/NSOS 
(7) 
NonCCP/ 
NSOS 
(8) 
NonCCP/ 
NSOS 
 OLS Two-Stage OLS Two-Stage OLS Two-Stage OLS Two-Stage 
Mill_ratio  0.044  0.190  0.050  0.008 
  (0.087)  (0.057)***  (0.516)  (0.088) 
         
experience 0.045 0.042 0.064 0.067 0.068 0.067 0.065 0.065 
 (0.005)*** (0.010)*** (0.003)*** (0.004)*** (0.016)*** (0.036)* (0.006)*** (0.008)*** 
         
experience2 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.001)** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
         
male 0.066 0.050 0.124 0.140 0.119 0.122 0.153 0.154 
 (0.020)*** (0.044) (0.014)*** (0.014)*** (0.066)* (0.074)* (0.029)*** (0.034)*** 
         
minority 0.011 0.014 -0.112 -0.116 -0.116 -0.121 -0.085 -0.085 
 (0.046) (0.039) (0.034)*** (0.040)*** (0.155) (0.164) (0.076) (0.080) 
         
fourcollege 0.245 0.219 0.363 0.383 0.284 0.285 0.493 0.499 
 (0.031)*** (0.064)*** (0.030)*** (0.028)*** (0.172) (0.188) (0.124)*** (0.149)*** 
         
twocollege 0.164 0.138 0.233 0.247 0.179 0.174 0.331 0.335 
 (0.027)*** (0.061)** (0.023)*** (0.022)*** (0.102)* (0.118) (0.065)*** (0.091)*** 
         
professional_s
chool 
0.086 0.070 0.209 0.198 0.253 0.255 0.248 0.253 
 (0.027)*** (0.046) (0.021)*** (0.022)*** (0.100)** (0.091)*** (0.056)*** (0.079)*** 
         
senior_high 0.039 0.030 0.077 0.072 0.155 0.154 0.081 0.083 
 (0.029) (0.041) (0.018)*** (0.019)*** (0.081)* (0.090)* (0.033)** (0.040)** 
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Table 6.5 (Continued) Earning Equations in 1995 
Year 1995 (1) 
CCP/SOS 
(2) 
CCP/SOS 
(3) 
NonCCP/S
OS 
(4) 
NonCCP/ 
SOS 
(5)  
CCP/NSOS 
(6)  
CCP/NSOS 
(7) 
NonCCP/ 
NSOS 
(8) 
NonCCP/ 
NSOS 
 OLS Two-Stage OLS Two-Stage OLS Two-Stage OLS Two-Stage 
         
industry -0.123 -0.114 -0.084 -0.076 0.107 0.091 -0.206 -0.208 
 (0.032)*** (0.036)*** (0.026)*** (0.029)*** (0.190) (0.319) (0.073)*** (0.084)** 
         
construction -0.080 -0.072 -0.082 -0.082 0.594 0.597 -0.043 -0.045 
 (0.062) (0.057) (0.046)* (0.045)* (0.322)* (0.469) (0.105) (0.100) 
         
transportation 0.028 0.032 0.016 0.013 0.157 0.144 -0.134 -0.134 
 (0.049) (0.047) (0.038) (0.041) (0.223) (0.316) (0.099) (0.125) 
         
commerce -0.212 -0.206 -0.144 -0.123 0.213 0.199 -0.161 -0.164 
 (0.039)*** (0.043)*** (0.030)*** (0.033)*** (0.203) (0.323) (0.076)** (0.087)* 
         
real_estate -0.119 -0.114 -0.050 -0.026 -0.244 -0.266 -0.348 -0.350 
 (0.058)** (0.068)* (0.043) (0.043) (0.224) (0.389) (0.090)*** (0.105)*** 
         
health -0.101 -0.099 0.034 0.023 0.140 0.157 -0.088 -0.087 
 (0.047)** (0.041)** (0.038) (0.038) (0.373) (0.416) (0.123) (0.115) 
         
arts -0.106 -0.103 0.018 -0.002 0.501 0.533 -0.290 -0.288 
 (0.039)*** (0.042)** (0.034) (0.031) (0.376) (0.464) (0.138)** (0.119)** 
         
organization -0.112 -0.127 -0.055 -0.017 0.153 0.153 -0.164 -0.161 
 (0.032)*** (0.042)*** (0.033)* (0.039) (0.232) (0.346) (0.127) (0.164) 
         
LN -0.376 -0.368 -0.373 -0.376 -0.622 -0.615 -0.392 -0.394 
 (0.041)*** (0.047)*** (0.033)*** (0.032)*** (0.196)*** (0.198)*** (0.087)*** (0.093)*** 
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Table 6.5 (Continued) Earning Equations in 1995 
Year 1995 (1) 
CCP/SOS 
(2) 
CCP/SOS 
(3) 
NonCCP/S
OS 
(4) 
NonCCP/ 
SOS 
(5)  
CCP/NSOS 
(6)  
CCP/NSOS 
(7) 
NonCCP/ 
NSOS 
(8) 
NonCCP/ 
NSOS 
 OLS Two-Stage OLS Two-Stage OLS Two-Stage OLS Two-Stage 
         
JS -0.096 -0.088 -0.124 -0.090 -0.413 -0.429 -0.140 -0.144 
 (0.041)** (0.044)** (0.034)*** (0.036)** (0.165)** (0.251)* (0.083)* (0.092) 
         
HN -0.452 -0.451 -0.538 -0.529 -0.787 -0.804 -0.611 -0.612 
 (0.041)*** (0.051)*** (0.035)*** (0.036)*** (0.173)*** (0.267)*** (0.092)*** (0.095)*** 
         
GS -0.464 -0.464 -0.571 -0.572 -1.174 -1.176 -0.756 -0.755 
 (0.046)*** (0.042)*** (0.039)*** (0.040)*** (0.254)*** (0.426)*** (0.108)*** (0.115)*** 
         
SX -0.469 -0.467 -0.458 -0.468 -0.987 -0.988 -0.619 -0.618 
 (0.041)*** (0.047)*** (0.033)*** (0.032)*** (0.202)*** (0.238)*** (0.096)*** (0.102)*** 
         
AH -0.404 -0.400 -0.430 -0.400 -0.811 -0.822 -0.513 -0.516 
 (0.045)*** (0.048)*** (0.037)*** (0.038)*** (0.186)*** (0.252)*** (0.087)*** (0.091)*** 
         
HB -0.264 -0.263 -0.338 -0.338 -0.753 -0.761 -0.389 -0.389 
 (0.039)*** (0.043)*** (0.033)*** (0.031)*** (0.180)*** (0.217)*** (0.093)*** (0.092)*** 
         
GD 0.365 0.367 0.194 0.236 0.028 0.010 0.454 0.450 
 (0.041)*** (0.047)*** (0.036)*** (0.045)*** (0.172) (0.281) (0.084)*** (0.095)*** 
         
YN -0.348 -0.348 -0.314 -0.307 -0.622 -0.628 -0.290 -0.290 
 (0.039)*** (0.041)*** (0.034)*** (0.033)*** (0.186)*** (0.210)*** (0.096)*** (0.095)*** 
         
SC -0.314 -0.311 -0.289 -0.280 -0.753 -0.764 -0.485 -0.487 
 (0.039)*** (0.040)*** (0.033)*** (0.032)*** (0.170)*** (0.222)*** (0.087)*** (0.093)*** 
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Table 6.5 (Continued) Earning Equations in 1995 
Year 1995 (1) 
CCP/SOS 
(2) 
CCP/SOS 
(3) 
NonCCP/S
OS 
(4) 
NonCCP/ 
SOS 
(5)  
CCP/NSOS 
(6)  
CCP/NSOS 
(7) 
NonCCP/ 
NSOS 
(8) 
NonCCP/ 
NSOS 
 OLS Two-Stage OLS Two-Stage OLS Two-Stage OLS Two-Stage 
_cons 8.407 8.532 8.068 8.110 8.083 8.251 8.081 8.090 
 (0.074)*** (0.272)*** (0.045)*** (0.053)*** (0.269)*** (1.854)*** (0.110)*** (0.151)*** 
N 2464 2464 6188 6188 217 217 1711 1711 
R2 0.317 0.317 0.278 0.280 0.513 0.513 0.353 0.353 
    Standard errors in parentheses 
    * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01 
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Table 6.6 Earnings Equations in 1999 
Year 1999 (1) 
CCP/SOS 
(2) 
CCP/SOS 
(3) 
NonCCP/ 
SOS 
(4)  
NonCCP/ 
SOS 
(5)  
CCP/NSOS 
(6)  
CCP/NSOS 
(7) 
NonCCP/N
SOS 
(8) 
NonCCP/N
SOS 
 OLS Two-Stage OLS Two-Stage OLS Two-Stage OLS Two-Stage 
Mill_ratio  -0.049  0.164  -0.087  0.036 
  (0.129)  (0.071)**  (0.354)  (0.137) 
         
experience 0.030 0.033 0.044 0.044 -0.009 -0.005 0.036 0.038 
 (0.007)*** (0.011)*** (0.004)*** (0.005)*** (0.021) (0.021) (0.008)*** (0.012)*** 
         
experience2 -0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 0.000 0.000 -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.000)*** (0.000)** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
         
male 0.051 0.064 0.069 0.086 0.361 0.369 0.248 0.251 
 (0.029)* (0.043) (0.021)*** (0.023)*** (0.085)*** (0.098)*** (0.044)*** (0.047)*** 
         
minority 0.133 0.132 -0.022 -0.037 0.051 0.020 0.178 0.181 
 (0.069)* (0.049)*** (0.051) (0.060) (0.307) (0.214) (0.114) (0.141) 
         
fourcollege 0.314 0.355 0.558 0.616 0.443 0.501 0.668 0.688 
 (0.050)*** (0.128)*** (0.042)*** (0.048)*** (0.144)*** (0.269)* (0.115)*** (0.138)*** 
         
twocollege 0.242 0.277 0.344 0.385 0.099 0.137 0.481 0.497 
 (0.043)*** (0.105)*** (0.032)*** (0.037)*** (0.135) (0.206) (0.070)*** (0.091)*** 
         
professional_sc
hool 
0.105 0.130 0.172 0.193 0.151 0.178 0.253 0.267 
 (0.050)** (0.084) (0.034)*** (0.036)*** (0.140) (0.165) (0.072)*** (0.088)*** 
         
senior_high 0.007 0.019 0.111 0.116 -0.015 -0.005 0.207 0.216 
 (0.049) (0.062) (0.028)*** (0.028)*** (0.135) (0.136) (0.053)*** (0.066)*** 
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Table 6.6 (Continued) Earning Equations in 1999 
Year 1999 (1) 
CCP/SOS 
(2) 
CCP/SOS 
(3) 
NonCCP/ 
SOS 
(4)  
NonCCP/ 
SOS 
(5)  
CCP/NSOS 
(6)  
CCP/NSOS 
(7) 
NonCCP/N
SOS 
(8) 
NonCCP/N
SOS 
 OLS Two-Stage OLS Two-Stage OLS Two-Stage OLS Two-Stage 
         
industry -0.159 -0.169 -0.144 -0.156 -0.281 -0.263 -0.008 -0.006 
 (0.045)*** (0.054)*** (0.032)*** (0.034)*** (0.126)** (0.140)* (0.062) (0.059) 
         
construction -0.027 -0.035 -0.005 -0.040 -0.223 -0.216 0.015 0.027 
 (0.077) (0.084) (0.052) (0.052) (0.204) (0.189) (0.130) (0.146) 
         
transportation 0.194 0.203 0.149 0.137 -0.196 -0.222 0.277 0.291 
 (0.049)*** (0.052)*** (0.041)*** (0.044)*** (0.231) (0.307) (0.098)*** (0.122)** 
         
commerce -0.023 -0.031 -0.102 -0.070 -0.269 -0.235 0.003 -0.006 
 (0.067) (0.067) (0.046)** (0.049) (0.141)* (0.202) (0.065) (0.072) 
         
real_estate 0.270 0.266 0.313 0.281 0.559 0.556 0.512 0.524 
 (0.065)*** (0.068)*** (0.046)*** (0.051)*** (0.200)*** (0.219)** (0.118)*** (0.126)*** 
         
health 0.204 0.202 0.174 0.138 -0.214 -0.223 0.036 0.053 
 (0.063)*** (0.052)*** (0.049)*** (0.042)*** (0.200) (0.310) (0.149) (0.141) 
         
arts 0.121 0.117 0.087 0.030 -0.578 -0.665 0.000 0.025 
 (0.053)** (0.052)** (0.042)** (0.044) (0.511) (0.443) (0.160) (0.182) 
         
organization 0.153 0.166 0.114 0.096 -0.139 -0.170 0.245 0.284 
 (0.045)*** (0.055)*** (0.044)*** (0.042)** (0.219) (0.263) (0.250) (0.248) 
         
LN -0.395 -0.396 -0.439 -0.417 -0.372 -0.342 -0.648 -0.653 
 (0.048)*** (0.058)*** (0.037)*** (0.039)*** (0.169)** (0.228) (0.073)*** (0.080)*** 
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Table 6.6 (Continued) Earning Equations in 1999 
Year 1999 (1) 
CCP/SOS 
(2) 
CCP/SOS 
(3) 
NonCCP/ 
SOS 
(4)  
NonCCP/ 
SOS 
(5)  
CCP/NSOS 
(6)  
CCP/NSOS 
(7) 
NonCCP/N
SOS 
(8) 
NonCCP/N
SOS 
 OLS Two-Stage OLS Two-Stage OLS Two-Stage OLS Two-Stage 
         
JS -0.020 -0.022 -0.157 -0.165 -0.266 -0.265 -0.366 -0.362 
 (0.047) (0.055) (0.035)*** (0.033)*** (0.200) (0.186) (0.079)*** (0.074)*** 
         
HN -0.344 -0.339 -0.521 -0.520 -0.072 -0.066 -0.790 -0.784 
 (0.044)*** (0.046)*** (0.034)*** (0.035)*** (0.178) (0.216) (0.082)*** (0.112)*** 
         
GS -0.439 -0.437 -0.480 -0.480 -0.389 -0.372 -0.696 -0.690 
 (0.049)*** (0.053)*** (0.037)*** (0.036)*** (0.192)** (0.206)* (0.086)*** (0.088)*** 
         
SC -0.277 -0.277 -0.403 -0.382 -0.351 -0.322 -0.592 -0.595 
 (0.043)*** (0.049)*** (0.035)*** (0.036)*** (0.157)** (0.226) (0.073)*** (0.079)*** 
         
_cons 8.685 8.549 8.414 8.482 8.984 8.693 8.455 8.468 
 (0.098)*** (0.365)*** (0.054)*** (0.067)*** (0.315)*** (1.221)*** (0.094)*** (0.104)*** 
N 1210 1210 2321 2321 154 154 771 771 
R2 0.266 0.266 0.313 0.314 0.413 0.413 0.299 0.299 
    Standard errors in parentheses 
    * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01 
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Table 6.7 Average Returns to One Additional Year of Work Experience Given 15 
Years of Experience 
Year CCP/SOS NonCCP/SOS CCP/NSOS NonCCP/NSOS 
1988 0.3 0.6 0.6 0.5 
1995 0.5 0.7 0.7 0.7 
1999 0.4 0.5 0.0 0.4 
Note: It is assumed that intercept term and all other Xs are zero. 
 
Table 6.8 Coefficients of the Variable ‘Male’ in Earnings Equations 
Year CCP/SOS NonCCP/SOS CCP/NSOS NonCCP/NSOS 
1988 0.027 0.097 0.147 0.041 
  (0.030) (0.007)*** (0.058)** (0.065) 
1995 0.050 0.140 0.122 0.154 
 (0.037) (0.015)*** (0.069)* (0.035)*** 
1999 0.064 0.086 0.369 0.251 
 (0.041) (0.022)*** (0.092)*** (0.046)*** 
Note: Bootstrap standard errors are in the parenthesis; *p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01 
 
Table 6.9 Inference Test – Gender Effects over Time 
CCP/NSOS 1988-1995 1995-1999 1988-1999 
CCP/SOS - - - 
NonCCP/SOS *** ** - 
CCP/NSOS - ** ** 
NonCCP/NSOS * ** *** 
Note: ‘-’means differences of coefficients are not statistically significant at any conventional level; ‘*’ 
means p<.10, ‘**’ means p<.05, and ‘***’ means p<.01 
 
Table 6.10 Inference Test – Gender Effects across Cateogries 
Male 1988 1995 1999 
CCP/SOS v.s. NonCCP/SOS *** ** - 
CCP/NSOS v.s. NonCCP/NSOS - - - 
CCP/SOS v.s. CCP/NSOS ** - *** 
NonCCP/SOS v.s. NonCCP/NSOS - - *** 
Note: ‘-’means differences of coefficients are not statistically significant at any conventional level; ‘*’ 
means p<.10, ‘**’ means p<.05, and ‘***’ means p<.01 
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Table 6.11 Coefficients of Education Level Dummies 
Panel a. Coefficient of the Variable 'Four-year College Education'  
Year CCP/SOS NonCCP/SOS CCP/NSOS NonCCP/NSOS  
1988 0.167 0.293 0.270 -0.144  
  (0.041)*** (0.017)*** (0.097)*** (0.272)  
1995 0.219 0.383 0.285 0.499  
 (0.059)*** (0.031)*** (0.173) (0.143)***  
1999 0.355 0.616 0.501 0.688  
 (0.106)*** (0.050)*** (0.276)* (0.135)***  
      
Panel b. Coefficient of the Variable 'Two-year College Education'  
Year CCP/SOS NonCCP/SOS CCP/NSOS NonCCP/NSOS  
1988 0.113 0.198 0.229 -0.039  
  (0.044)*** (0.016)*** (0.112)** (0.168)  
1995 0.138 0.247 0.174 0.335  
 (0.055)** (0.023)*** (0.112) (0.086)***  
1999 0.277 0.385 0.137 0.497  
 (0.090)*** (0.037)*** (0.207) (0.091)***  
      
Panel c. Coefficient of the Variable 'Professional School Education'  
Year CCP/SOS NonCCP/SOS CCP/NSOS NonCCP/NSOS  
1988 0.051 0.126 0.097 -0.074  
  (0.029)* (0.012)*** (0.089) (0.140)  
1995 0.070 0.198 0.255 0.253  
 (0.041)* (0.021)*** (0.102)** (0.077)***  
1999 0.130 0.193 0.178 0.267  
 (0.077)* (0.035)*** (0.178) (0.087)***  
      
Panel d. Coefficient of the Variable 'Senior High School Education'  
Year CCP/SOS NonCCP/SOS CCP/NSOS NonCCP/NSOS  
1988 0.045 0.066 0.107 0.048  
  (0.020)** (0.009)*** (0.060)* (0.051)  
1995 0.030 0.072 0.154 0.083  
 (0.033) (0.018)*** (0.082)* (0.041)**  
1999 0.019 0.116 -0.005 0.216  
 (0.056) (0.028)*** (0.142) (0.063)***  
Note: Bootstrap standard errors are in the parenthesis; *p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01 
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Table 6.12 Inference Test – CCP/SOS v.s. NonCCP/SOS 
CCP/SOS v.s. 
NonCCP/SOS 1988 1995 1999 
Four-year College *** *** ** 
Two-year College ** ** - 
Professional School *** *** - 
Senior High - - * 
Note: ‘-’means differences of coefficients are not statistically significant at any conventional level; ‘*’ 
means p<.10, ‘**’ means p<.05, and ‘***’ means p<.01 
 
Table 6.13 Inference Test over Time – CCP/SOS Category 
CCP/SOS 1988-1995 1995-1999 1988-1999 
Four-year College - - * 
Two-year College - - * 
Professional School - - - 
Senior High - - - 
Note: ‘-’means differences of coefficients are not statistically significant at any conventional level; ‘*’ 
means p<.10, ‘**’ means p<.05, and ‘***’ means p<.01 
 
Table 6.14 Inference Test over Time – NonCCP/SOS Category 
NonCCP/SOS 1988-1995 1995-1999 1988-1999 
Four-year College *** *** *** 
Two-year College ** *** *** 
Professional School *** - ** 
Senior High - * ** 
Note: ‘-’means differences of coefficients are not statistically significant at any conventional level; ‘*’ 
means p<.10, ‘**’ means p<.05, and ‘***’ means p<.01 
 
Table 6.15 Inference Test over Time – CCP/NSOS Category 
CCP/NSOS 1988-1995 1995-1999 1988-1999 
Four-year College - - - 
Two-year College - - - 
Professional School * - - 
Senior High - - - 
Note: ‘-’means differences of coefficients are not statistically significant at any conventional level; ‘*’ 
means p<.10, ‘**’ means p<.05, and ‘***’ means p<.01 
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Table 6.16 Inference Test over Time – NonCCP/NSOS Category 
NonCCP/NSOS 1988-1995 1995-1999 1988-1999    
Four-year College ** - ***    
Two-year College ** - ***    
Professional School ** - **    
Senior High - ** **    
Note: ‘-’means differences of coefficients are not statistically significant at any conventional level; ‘*’ 
means p<.10, ‘**’ means p<.05, and ‘***’ means p<.01 
 
Table 6.17 Inference Test – CCP/NSOS v.s. NonCCP/NSOS 
CCP/NSOS v.s. NonCCP/NSOS 1988 1995 1999    
Four-year College * - -    
Two-year College * - *    
Professional School - - -    
Senior High - - *    
Note: ‘-’means differences of coefficients are not statistically significant at any conventional level; ‘*’ 
means p<.10, ‘**’ means p<.05, and ‘***’ means p<.01 
 
Table 6.18 Inference Test – CCP/SOS v.s. CCP/NSOS 
CCP/SOS v.s. 
NonCCP/SOS 1988 1995 1999 
Four-year College - - - 
Two-year College - - - 
Professional School - ** - 
Senior High - - - 
Note: ‘-’means differences of coefficients are not statistically significant at any conventional level; ‘*’ 
means p<.10, ‘**’ means p<.05, and ‘***’ means p<.01 
 
Table 6.19  Inference Test – NonCCP/SOS v.s. NonCCP/NSOS 
CCP/NSOS v.s. 
NonCCP/NSOS 1988 1995 1999 
Four-year College ** - - 
Two-year College * - - 
Professional School * - - 
Senior High - - * 
Note: ‘-’means differences of coefficients are not statistically significant at any conventional level; ‘*’ 
means p<.10, ‘**’ means p<.05, and ‘***’ means p<.01 
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Table 6.20 Decomposition of CCP-NonCCP Earnings Differential in SOS 
Panel a. 1998 CHIP sample (Without instrument in Two-stage estimation ) 
 OLS 
Two-stage net 
of selection 
effects 
Two-stage with 
selection 
effects Proportion  
OLS 
Proportion 
Endowments 
differentials  
a c f f/(f+g+e) a/(a+b) 
0.1284 0.0902 0.0902 36.48% 51.94% 
  (0.0081) (0.039) (0.039)     
Coefficients 
differentials 
b d g g/(f+g+e) b/(a+b) 
0.1188 0.1699 0.1699 68.75% 48.06% 
  (0.0092) (0.091) (0.091)     
Selection-
effect 
Differential 
  e e/(f+g+e)  
    -0.0129 -5.23%  
Earning 
differential 
a+b c+d f+g+e   
0.2472 0.2601 0.2472    
      
Panel b. 1995 CHIP sample (With nature of recruitment as an instrument in Two-stage 
estimation) 
 OLS 
Two-stage net 
of selection 
effects 
Two-stage with 
selection 
effects Proportion  
OLS 
Proportion 
Endowments 
differentials  
a c f f/(f+g+e) a/(a+b) 
0.1978 0.1723 0.1723 56.86% 65.30% 
  (0.0140) (0.053) (0.053)     
Coefficients 
differentials 
b d g g/(f+g+e) b/(a+b) 
0.1051 0.0589 0.0589 19.43% 34.70% 
  (0.0164) (0.144) (0.144)     
Selection-
effect 
Differential 
  e e/(f+g+e)  
    0.0718 23.71%  
Earning 
differential 
a+b c+d f+g+e   
0.3030 0.2311 0.3030    
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Table 6.20 (Continued) Decomposition of CCP-NonCCP Earnings Differential in SOS 
Panel c. 1999 CHIP sample (With nature of recruitment and parental information as an 
instruments in Two-stage estimation) 
 OLS 
Two-stage net 
of selection 
effects 
Two-stage with 
selection 
effects Proportion  
OLS 
Proportion 
Endowments 
differentials  
a c f f/(f+g+e) a/(a+b) 
0.1709 0.1953 0.1953 65.60% 57.40% 
  (0.0182) (0.063) (0.063)     
Coefficients 
differentials 
b d g g/(f+g+e) b/(a+b) 
0.1268 -0.0570 -0.0570 -19.15% 42.60% 
  (0.0226) (0.182) (0.182)     
Selection-
effect 
Differential 
  e e/(f+g+e)  
    0.1594 53.55%  
Earning 
differential 
a+b c+d f+g+e   
0.2977 0.1383 0.2977    
      
Panel d. Selection Effects in SOS    
Selection 
Effects CCP/SOS NonCCP/SOS 
Selection 
Effects 
Difference   
1988 -0.0511 -0.0382 -0.0129   
1995 -0.0435 -0.1153 0.0718   
1999 0.0464 -0.1130 0.1594   
Note: Weight =1 (Coefficients in CCP/SOS category as reference coefficients) 
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Table 6.21 Decomposition of CCP-NonCCP Earning Differential in SOS for Selected Characteristics 
1988 
Due to 
Endowments 
Due to 
Coefficients 
Endowments 
+ 
Coefficients 
Percentage of 
Endowment 
Differential 
out of Total 
Earning 
Differential 
Percentage of 
Coefficient 
Differential 
out of Total 
Earning 
Differential 
Percentage 
of Total 
Earning 
Differential 
Experience 0.199 -0.585 -0.386 80.57% -236.57% -156.00% 
Experience Squared -0.107 0.270 0.163 -43.15% 109.23% 66.09% 
Experience Total 0.093 -0.315 -0.222 37.43% -127.33% -89.91% 
          
Four years' College 0.015 -0.007 0.008 6.04% -2.63% 3.41% 
Two years' College 0.009 -0.005 0.004 3.69% -2.01% 1.67% 
Professional School 0.003 -0.009 -0.006 1.10% -3.57% -2.47% 
Senior high school -0.004 -0.006 -0.009 -1.49% -2.34% -3.83% 
Education Level 
Total 0.023 -0.026 -0.003 9.34% -10.56% -1.22% 
       
Total Earning 
differential     0.2472       
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Table 6.21 (Continued) Decomposition of CCP-NonCCP Earning Differential in SOS for Selected Characteristics 
1995 
Due to 
Endowments 
Due to 
Coefficients 
Endowments 
+ 
Coefficients 
Percentage of 
Endowment 
Differential 
out of Total 
Earning 
Differential 
Percentage of 
Coefficient 
Differential 
out of Total 
Earning 
Differential 
Percentage 
of Total 
Earning 
Differential 
Experience 0.284 -0.454 -0.170 93.71% -149.80% -56.09% 
Experience Squared -0.182 0.221 0.039 -60.14% 73.03% 12.89% 
Experience Total 0.102 -0.233 -0.131 33.57% -76.77% -43.20% 
          
Four years' College 0.019 -0.011 0.007 6.15% -3.70% 2.45% 
Two years' College 0.018 -0.015 0.003 5.96% -4.97% 0.98% 
Professional School 0.001 -0.024 -0.023 0.40% -7.85% -7.45% 
Senior high school -0.003 -0.011 -0.014 -0.95% -3.64% -4.59% 
Education Level 
Total 0.035 -0.061 -0.026 11.56% -20.16% -8.60% 
       
Total Earning 
differential     0.3030       
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Table 6.21 (Continued) Decomposition of CCP-NonCCP Earning Differential in SOS for Selected Characteristics 
1999 
Due to 
Endowments 
Due to 
Coefficients 
Endowments 
+ 
Coefficients 
Percentage of 
Endowment 
Differential 
out of Total 
Earning 
Differential 
Percentage of 
Coefficient 
Differential 
out of Total 
Earning 
Differential 
Percentage 
of Total 
Earning 
Differential 
Experience 0.193 -0.194 -0.001 64.82% -65.30% -0.48% 
Experience Squared -0.123 0.045 -0.079 -41.44% 15.01% -26.43% 
Experience Total 0.070 -0.150 -0.080 23.38% -50.29% -26.91% 
          
Four years' College 0.039 -0.023 0.016 13.06% -7.85% 5.21% 
Two years' College 0.041 -0.022 0.019 13.83% -7.29% 6.54% 
Professional School 0.000 -0.009 -0.009 -0.07% -3.12% -3.19% 
Senior high school -0.002 -0.028 -0.030 -0.73% -9.26% -9.99% 
Education Level 
Total 0.078 -0.082 -0.004 26.10% -27.52% -1.42% 
       
Total Earning 
differential     0.2977       
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Table 6.22 Coefficient Differential for an Average Worker in NonCCP/SOS 
Category 
Panel a. 1998 CHIP sample (Without instrument in Two-
stage estimation ) 
 
Two-stage 
without 
selectivity Selectivity 
Two-stage with 
selectivity 
Coefficients 
differentials 
g e2 g+e2 
0.1699 0.0040 0.1740 
  (0.0911)   (0.0555) 
    
Panel b. 1995 CHIP sample (With nature of recruitment as an 
instrument in Two-stage estimation) 
 
Two-stage 
without 
selectivity Selectivity 
Two-stage with 
selectivity 
Coefficients 
differentials 
g e2 g+e2 
0.0589 0.0885 0.1474 
  (0.1440)   (0.0868) 
    
Panel c. 1999 CHIP sample (With nature of recruitment and 
parental information as an instruments in Two-stage 
estimation) 
 
Two-stage 
without 
selectivity Selectivity 
Two-stage with 
selectivity 
Coefficients 
differentials 
g e2 g+e2 
-0.0570 0.1467 0.0897 
  (0.1820)   (0.0928) 
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Table 6.23 Coefficient Differential for an Average Worker in CCP/SOS Category 
Panel a. 1998 CHIP sample (Without instrument in Two-
stage estimation ) 
 
Two-stage 
without 
selectivity Selectivity 
Two-stage 
with selectivity 
Coefficients 
differentials 
g e2 g+e2 
0.0613 0.0060 0.0674 
  (0.0555)   (0.0072) 
    
Panel b. 1995 CHIP sample (With nature of recruitment as an 
instrument in Two-stage estimation) 
 
Two-stage 
without 
selectivity Selectivity 
Two-stage 
with selectivity 
Coefficients 
differentials 
g e2 g+e2 
-0.0247 0.1434 0.1187 
  (0.1002)   (0.0204) 
    
Panel c. 1999 CHIP sample (With nature of recruitment and 
parental information as an instruments in Two-stage 
estimation) 
 
Two-stage 
without 
selectivity Selectivity 
Two-stage 
with selectivity 
Coefficients 
differentials 
g e2 g+e2 
-0.1201 0.2019 0.0818 
  (0.1329)   (0.0200) 
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Table 6.24 Decomposition of CCP-NonCCP Earnings Differential in NSOS 
Panel a. 1988 CHIP sample (Without instrument in Two-Stage estimation) 
 OLS 
Two-stage net 
of selection 
effects 
Two-stage 
with 
selection 
effects Proportion 
OLS 
Proportion 
Endowments 
differentials  
a c f f/(f+g+e) a/(a+b) 
0.1922 0.1857 0.1857 53.92% 55.82% 
  (0.0332) (0.084) (0.084)     
Coefficients 
differentials 
b d g g/(f+g+e) b/(a+b) 
0.1521 0.6298 0.6298 182.91% 44.18% 
  (0.0346) (0.852) (0.852)     
Selection 
effects 
   e e/(f+g+e)  
    -0.4711 -136.83%  
Earning 
differential 
a+b c+d f+g+e   
0.3443 0.8155 0.3443   
      
Panel b.1995 CHIP sample (With nature of recruitment as an instrument in Two-stage 
estimation)  
 OLS 
Two-stage net 
of selection 
effects 
Two-stage 
with 
selection 
effects Proportion 
OLS 
Proportion 
Endowments 
differentials  
a c f f/(f+g+e) a/(a+b) 
0.1613 0.1519 0.1519 55.10% 58.51% 
  (0.0514) (0.116) (0.116)     
Coefficients 
differentials 
b d g g/(f+g+e) b/(a+b) 
0.1144 0.2264 0.2264 82.11% 41.49% 
  (0.0519) (1.220) (1.220)     
Selection 
effects 
   e e/(f+g+e)  
    -0.1026 -37.20%  
Earning 
differential 
a+b c+d f+g+e   
0.2757 0.3783 0.2757   
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Table 6.24 (Continued) Decomposition of CCP-NonCCP Earnings Differential in NSOS 
Panel c. 1999 CHIP smaple (with nature of recruitment and parental information as 
instruments in Two-stage estimation)  
 OLS 
Two-stage net 
of selection 
effects 
Two-stage 
with 
selection 
effects Proportion 
OLS 
Proportion 
Endowments 
differentials  
a c f f/(f+g+e) a/(a+b) 
0.1312 0.1608 0.1608 64.73% 52.80% 
  (0.0696) (0.133) (0.133)     
Coefficients 
differentials 
b d g g/(f+g+e) b/(a+b) 
0.1173 -0.1318 -0.1318 -53.04% 47.20% 
  (0.0752) (0.817) (0.817)     
Selection 
effects 
   e e/(f+g+e)  
    0.2194 88.30%  
Earning 
differential 
a+b c+d f+g+e   
0.2484 0.0291 0.2484   
      
Panel d. Selection Effects in NSOS    
Selection 
Effects 
CCP/NSO
S 
NonCCP/NSO
S 
Selection 
Effects 
Difference   
1988 -0.0633 0.4079 -0.4711   
1995 -0.1120 -0.0094 -0.1026   
1999 0.1755 -0.0439 0.2194   
Note: Weight =1 (Coefficients in CCP/NSOS category as reference coefficients) 
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Table 6.25 Decomposition of CCP-NonCCP Earning Differential in NSOS for Selected Characteristics 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
1988 
Due to 
Endowments 
Due to 
Coefficients 
Endowments 
+ 
Coefficients 
Percentage of 
Endowment 
Differential 
out of Total 
Earning 
Differential 
Percentage of 
Coefficient 
Differential 
out of Total 
Earning 
Differential 
Percentage 
of Total 
Earning 
Differential 
Experience 0.382 0.090 0.472 110.82% 26.16% 136.99% 
Experience Squared -0.259 0.004 -0.255 -75.24% 1.20% -74.04% 
Experience Total 0.123 0.094 0.217 35.58% 27.37% 62.95% 
          
Four years' College 0.010 0.001 0.012 3.02% 0.42% 3.44% 
Two years' College 0.010 0.004 0.015 3.02% 1.26% 4.28% 
Professional School 0.003 0.006 0.009 0.86% 1.61% 2.47% 
Senior high school -0.003 0.015 0.011 -0.95% 4.22% 3.27% 
Education Level Total 0.021 0.026 0.046 5.96% 7.51% 13.47% 
       
Total Earning 
differential     0.3443       
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Table 6.25 (Continued) Decomposition of CCP-NonCCP Earning Differential in NSOS for Selected Characteristics 
1995 
Due to 
Endowments 
Due to 
Coefficients 
Endowments 
+ 
Coefficients 
Percentage of 
Endowment 
Differential 
out of Total 
Earning 
Differential 
Percentage of 
Coefficient 
Differential 
out of Total 
Earning 
Differential 
Percentage 
of Total 
Earning 
Differential 
Experience 0.464 0.019 0.483 168.25% 6.86% 175.11% 
Experience Squared -0.346 0.052 -0.295 -125.55% 18.70% -106.85% 
Experience Total 0.118 0.070 0.188 42.70% 25.56% 68.26% 
          
Four years' College 0.008 -0.003 0.005 2.90% -1.04% 1.86% 
Two years' College 0.015 -0.009 0.006 5.36% -3.12% 2.25% 
Professional School 0.016 0.000 0.016 5.71% 0.06% 5.77% 
Senior high school -0.006 0.020 0.014 -2.02% 7.16% 5.14% 
Education Level Total 0.033 0.008 0.041 11.95% 3.06% 15.01% 
       
Total Earning 
differential     0.2757       
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Table 6.25 (Continued) Decomposition of CCP-NonCCP Earning Differential in NSOS for Selected Characteristics 
1999 
Due to 
Endowments 
Due to 
Coefficients 
Endowments 
+ 
Coefficients 
Percentage of 
Endowment 
Differential 
out of Total 
Earning 
Differential 
Percentage of 
Coefficient 
Differential 
out of Total 
Earning 
Differential 
Percentage 
of Total 
Earning 
Differential 
Experience -0.034 -0.696 -0.730 -13.74% -280.19% -293.93% 
Experience Squared 0.053 0.354 0.407 21.31% 142.47% 163.78% 
Experience Total 0.019 -0.342 -0.323 7.57% -137.73% -130.16% 
          
Four years' College 0.063 -0.008 0.055 25.41% -3.22% 22.19% 
Two years' College 0.023 -0.050 -0.028 9.10% -20.31% -11.21% 
Professional School 0.004 -0.011 -0.007 1.50% -4.38% -2.88% 
Senior high school 0.000 -0.061 -0.061 0.17% -24.68% -24.51% 
Education Level Total 0.090 -0.131 -0.041 36.18% -52.59% -16.41% 
       
Total Earning 
differential     0.2484       
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Table 6.26 Coefficient Differential for an Average Worker in NonCCP/NSOS 
Category 
Panel a. 1988 CHIP sample (Without instrument in Two-
Stage estimation) 
 
Two-stage 
without 
selectivity Selectivity 
Two-stage 
with 
selectivity 
Coefficients 
differentials 
g e2 g+e2 
0.6298 -0.4405 0.1893 
  (0.852)   (0.4320) 
    
Panel b. 1995 CHIP sample (With nature of recruitment as 
an instrument in Two-stage estimation) 
 
Two-stage 
without 
selectivity Selectivity 
Two-stage 
with 
selectivity 
Coefficients 
differentials 
g e2 g+e2 
0.2264 -0.0514 0.1750 
  (1.220)   (0.6121) 
    
Panel c. 1999 CHIP sample (With nature of recruitment and 
parental information as an instruments in Two-stage 
estimation) 
 
Two-stage 
without 
selectivity Selectivity 
Two-stage 
with 
selectivity 
Coefficients 
differentials 
g e2 g+e2 
-0.1318 0.1487 0.0170 
  (0.817)   (0.3992) 
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Table 6.27 Coefficient Differential for an Average Worker in CCP/NSOS Category 
Panel a. 1998 CHIP sample (Without instrument in Two-
stage estimation ) 
 
Two-stage 
without 
selectivity Selectivity 
Two-stage 
with 
selectivity 
Coefficients 
differentials 
g e2 g+e2 
0.7534 -0.8557 -0.1023 
  (0.806)   (0.1647) 
    
Panel b. 1995 CHIP sample (With nature of recruitment 
as an instrument in Two-stage estimation) 
 
Two-stage 
without 
selectivity Selectivity 
Two-stage 
with 
selectivity 
Coefficients 
differentials 
g e2 g+e2 
0.2396 -0.0947 0.1450 
  (1.125)   (0.0790) 
    
Panel c. 1999 CHIP sample (With nature of recruitment 
and parental information as an instruments in Two-stage 
estimation) 
 
Two-stage 
without 
selectivity Selectivity 
Two-stage 
with 
selectivity 
Coefficients 
differentials 
g e2 g+e2 
-0.2000 0.2490 0.0489 
  (0.722)   (0.0832) 
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Table 6.28 OLS Regression on Log Earnings Equations without Constant Term 
Year (1)1988 (2) 1995 (3) 1999 
experience 0.051 0.056 0.035 
 (0.001)*** (0.002)*** (0.003)*** 
experience2 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
male 0.105 0.118 0.113 
 (0.006)*** (0.011)*** (0.016)*** 
minority 0.000 -0.083 0.049 
 (0.014) (0.026)*** (0.041) 
fourcollege 0.242 0.368 0.569 
 (0.012)*** (0.021)*** (0.030)*** 
twocollege 0.169 0.255 0.392 
 (0.012)*** (0.016)*** (0.024)*** 
professional_school 0.113 0.212 0.224 
 (0.009)*** (0.016)*** (0.026)*** 
senior_high 0.077 0.088 0.125 
 (0.007)*** (0.014)*** (0.022)*** 
CCP_SOS 7.654 8.145 8.591 
 (0.019)*** (0.033)*** (0.046)*** 
NonCCP_SOS 7.592 8.064 8.488 
 (0.017)*** (0.029)*** (0.040)*** 
CCP_NSOS 7.604 7.978 8.419 
 (0.026)*** (0.046)*** (0.060)*** 
NonCCP_NSOS 7.434 7.884 8.376 
 (0.017)*** (0.030)*** (0.040)*** 
LN -0.052 -0.379 -0.464 
 (0.015)*** (0.025)*** (0.028)*** 
JS -0.008 -0.134 -0.178 
 (0.014) (0.025)*** (0.027)*** 
HN -0.265 -0.536 -0.512 
 (0.014)*** (0.026)*** (0.026)*** 
GS -0.114 -0.570 -0.496 
 (0.016)*** (0.030)*** (0.029)*** 
SX -0.233 -0.488  
 (0.015)*** (0.026)***  
AH -0.142 -0.451  
 (0.015)*** (0.027)***  
HB -0.149 -0.336  
 (0.015)*** (0.025)***  
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Table 6.28 (Continued) OLS Regression on Earnings Equations without Constant Term 
Year (1)1988 (2) 1995 (3) 1999 
GD 0.265 0.309  
 (0.014)*** (0.026)***  
YN -0.038 -0.327  
 (0.015)** (0.026)***  
SC  -0.336 -0.400 
  (0.025)*** (0.026)*** 
Observations 17320 10580 4456 
R-squared 0.9982 0.9963 0.9966 
Standard errors in parentheses    
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** 
significant at 1% 
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Table 6.29 Predicted Party Premium in SOS 
  1988  
  Two Stage Two Stage 
Average Worker OLS Conditional  Unconditional 
Aggregate  0.11 0.11 0.15 
    
By gender:    
Male  0.09 0.09 0.11 
Female 0.13 0.13 0.20 
    
By Age:    
29-38 Years old 0.08 0.08 0.13 
49-58 Years old 0.11 0.12 0.10 
    
By Age and Education level:    
who ages from 29 to 38 and 
get a college degree 0.05 0.05 0.06 
who ages 29 to 38 and get a 
senior high school degree 0.09 0.08 0.14 
    
Who ages from 49 to 58 and 
get a college degree 0.00 0.02 -0.03 
who ages from 49 to 58 and 
get a senior high school 
degree 0.08 0.09 0.06 
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Table 6.29 (continued) Predicted Party Premium in SOS 
  1995  
  Two Stage Two Stage 
Average Worker OLS Conditional  Unconditional 
Aggregate  0.11 0.11 0.05 
    
By gender:    
Male  0.09 0.09 0.02 
Female 0.13 0.13 0.10 
    
By Age:    
29-38 Years old 0.08 0.08 0.04 
49-58 Years old 0.13 0.14 0.01 
    
By Age and Education level:    
who ages from 29 to 38 and get a 
college degree 
0.03 0.03 -0.04 
who ages 29 to 38 and get a 
senior high school degree 
0.07 0.07 0.04 
    
Who ages from 49 to 58 and get 
a college degree 
0.06 0.11 -0.08 
who ages from 49 to 58 and get a 
senior high school degree 
0.10 0.11 -0.01 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
141 
 
Table 6.29 (continued) Predicted Party Premium in SOS 
  1999  
  Two Stage Two Stage 
Average Worker OLS Conditional  Unconditional 
Aggregate  0.12 0.12 -0.07 
    
By gender:    
Male  0.10 0.11 -0.09 
Female 0.14 0.14 -0.05 
    
By Age:    
29-38 Years old 0.13 0.13 -0.06 
49-58 Years old 0.09 0.09 -0.12 
    
By Age and Education level:    
who ages from 29 to 38 and get a 
college degree 
0.09 0.09 -0.10 
who ages 29 to 38 and get a 
senior high school degree 
0.12 0.13 -0.06 
    
Who ages from 49 to 58 and get 
a college degree 
0.01 0.06 -0.20 
who ages from 49 to 58 and get a 
senior high school degree 
0.07 0.08 -0.12 
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Table 6.30 Predicted Party Premium in NSOS 
  
1988 
 
  
Two Stage Two Stage 
Average Worker OLS Conditional  Unconditional 
Aggregate  0.20 0.19 0.84 
    By gender: 
   Male  0.22 0.20 0.93 
Female 0.18 0.18 0.73 
    By Age: 
   29-38 Years old 0.16 0.17 0.77 
49-58 Years old 0.29 0.25 1.04 
    By Age and Education 
level: 
   who ages from 29 to 38 
and get a college degree 0.21 0.22 1.15 
who ages 29 to 38 and get 
a senior high school 
degree 0.15 0.16 0.82 
    Who ages from 49 to 58 
and get a college degree 0.28 0.24 1.35 
who ages from 49 to 58 
and get a senior high 
school degree 0.25 0.20 1.07 
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Table 6.30 (Continued) Predicted Party Premium in NSOS 
  
1995 
 
  
Two Stage Two Stage 
Average Worker OLS Conditional  Unconditional 
Aggregate  0.12 0.12 0.24 
    By gender: 
   Male  0.11 0.11 0.22 
Female 0.14 0.14 0.26 
    By Age: 
   29-38 Years old 0.08 0.08 0.20 
49-58 Years old 0.24 0.24 0.34 
    By Age and Education 
level: 
   who ages from 29 to 38 
and get a college degree -0.08 -0.07 0.04 
who ages 29 to 38 and get 
a senior high school 
degree 0.14 0.14 0.26 
    Who ages from 49 to 58 
and get a college degree 0.13 0.12 0.23 
who ages from 49 to 58 
and get a senior high 
school degree 0.35 0.34 0.45 
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Table 6.30 (Continued) Predicted Party Premium in NSOS 
  1999  
  Two Stage Two Stage 
Average Worker OLS Conditional  Unconditional 
Aggregate  0.03 0.03 -0.24 
    
By gender:    
Male  0.07 0.08 -0.19 
Female -0.03 -0.03 -0.30 
    
By Age:    
29-38 Years old 0.00 0.01 -0.26 
49-58 Years old 0.04 0.05 -0.23 
    
By Age and Education level:    
who ages from 29 to 38 and 
get a college degree 
-0.11 -0.11 -0.38 
who ages 29 to 38 and get a 
senior high school degree 
0.01 0.02 -0.25 
    
Who ages from 49 to 58 and 
get a college degree 
-0.18 -0.16 -0.44 
who ages from 49 to 58 and 
get a senior high school 
degree 
0.07 0.08 -0.20 
 
Table 6.31 Selection Effects of an Average Worker 
Year CCP/SOS NonCCP/SOS CCP/NSOS NonCCP/NSOS 
1988 -0.09 -0.04 -0.07 0.57 
1995 -0.07 -0.13 -0.13 -0.01 
1999 0.07 -0.13 0.21 -0.06 
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Figure 6.1 Returns to Years of Work Experience in Three Years 
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Figure 6.2 Gender Effects by Categories in Three Years 
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Figure 6.3 Comparison of Coefficient of Each Education Dummy between CCP/SOS 
and NonCCP/SOS 
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Figure 6.4 Comparison of Coefficients of Education Dummies Over Time in 
CCP/SOS and NonCCP/SOS 
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Figure 6.5 Comparison of Coefficients of Education Dummies Over Time in 
CCP/SOS and NonCCP/SOS 
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Figure 6.6 Comparison of Coefficient of Each Education Dummy between 
CCP/NSOS and NonCCP/NSOS 
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Figure 6.7 Comparison of Coefficient of Each Education Dummy between CCP/SOS 
and CCP/NSOS 
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Figure 6.8 Comparison of Coefficient of Each Education Dummy between 
NonCCP/SOS and NonCCP/NSOS 
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Figure 6.9 Components of Total CCP-NonCCP Earnings Differential in SOS 
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Figure 6.10 Unexplained Differential v.s. Endowment Differential in SOS 
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Figure 6.11 Two Types of Coefficient Differentials in SOS 
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Figure 6.12 Components of Total CCP-NonCCP Earnings Differential in NSOS   
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Figure 6.13 Unexplained Differential v.s. Endowment Differential in NSOS 
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Figure 6.14 Two Types of Coefficient Differential in NSOS 
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Figure 6.15 Total CCP-NonCCP Earnings Differential in Two Sectors 
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Figure 6.16 Party Premium from OLS Estimates v.s Party Premium from Two 
Stage Estimation Procedure 
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Figure 6.17 Conditional Party Premium v.s. Unconditional Party Premium from 
Two Stage Estimation Procedure 
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Figure 6.18 Conditional Party Premium by Gender in Two Sectors 
 
 
Figure 6.19 Conditional Party Premium by Age Cohorts in Two Sectors 
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Figure 6.20  Conditional Party Premium by Age Cohorts in Two Sectors for College 
Education 
 
 
Figure 6.21  Conditional Party Premium by Age Cohorts in Two Sectors for Median 
Education 
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Figure 6.22 Conditional Party Premium by Education Levels in Two Sectors for 
Each Age Cohort 
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Chapter 7  
Conclusion 
More than three decades of economic reform have brought remarkable benefits to 
most people in China. There has been a notable increase in the number of firms in NSOS.  
As the only Party in power, CCP also adapts to the changing environment to achieve its 
economic goal. The number of members has risen to 70 million in 2006. The economic 
impact on CCP members in the labor market has been the subject of numerous economic 
and sociological studies during the past three decades. This dissertation represents an 
examination of how the economic returns to CCP members and other workers were 
different over time, and in each sector of the labor markets in urban China. This paper has 
further attempted to gain better estimates of the components of the earning gap between 
CCP members and other workers by estimating a model that treats Party membership 
affiliation and ownership form at which a worker is employed as endogenous. Explicitly 
incorporating personal choices of Party membership and ownership of work unit into the 
estimation of earning functions allows us to analyze the contribution of selectivity and 
employee characteristics to the observed earning gap.  
This dissertation focuses on the labor market in the urban China. Since the CCP came 
to the power in 1949, the government has created segregation between rural and urban 
areas under the household registration system. The highly restrictive labor mobility 
policies excluded rural people from working in the cities66
                                                 
66 Although urban industrialization starting the beginning of the 1990s created a significant demand for 
rural labor in urban areas, the government still fears to abolish Hukou system. 
. Economic reform in rural 
China established its own labor market, which generally consists of an agriculture sector 
and a non-agriculture sector. The returns in the rural labor market are mainly determined 
by labor productivity. However, the labor market reform in urban China proceeded at a 
much slower pace and was not as successful as the product market reform (Meng 2000). 
Due to the segregation of rural and urban areas, the labor markets prove to be different in 
these two areas. The urban labor market is complicated in terms of invisible constraints 
placed on labor mobility across regions, multiple ownership structures of enterprises, and 
political sensitivity. The wage rates, for example, often deviated from the market rate due 
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to rigid wage systems and government interventions in the labor market. We would also 
expect a different Party premium in urban China from that in rural China.  
In Chapter 1, milestones of economic reform in urban China throughout a twenty year 
stretch were reviewed, as was the impact of economic development on individuals’ 
ideology and preference. This, in turn, influences an individual’s preference in labor 
market. The difficulties of an empirical analysis on the pure economic effect of Party 
membership, which were caused by endogeneity of Party membership affiliation and 
ownership forms choice, were discussed, as was extensive government regulation, and 
the lack of a complete market system.  
Although a large number of studies have investigated the relationship between Party 
membership affiliation and earnings in different ownership sectors, the majority of these 
studies ignore the selection effect of Party membership affiliation and ownership sector 
choice on the earning equation in China. Most of these studies are subject to the criticism 
that the returns to Party membership and ownership sector are poorly measured because 
some unobservable characteristics could potentially influence personal choices of 
political investment and ownership form of their work units, which, in turn, affect their 
earnings.  
The effects of workers’ choices of Party membership and ownership forms on their 
earnings were discussed in this dissertation paper, relying on an empirical model 
developed by Lee (1983), which is not subject to this criticism. At the end of the chapter, 
four questions were presented to be addressed in this paper: (1) How did total earning gap 
between CCP members and other workers, in the SOS and NSOS, change from 1988 to 
1999, respectively? (2) How did contribution of human capital to earnings vary by 
political status of workers in each sector? (3) How did selectivity effect influence the 
predicted earning in each sector? (4) How did the Party premium change in the SOS and 
the NSOS during the early reform period from 1988 to 1995, and during the radical 
reform period from 1995 to 1999? By comparing CCP members to other workers in each 
sector, it was found that the total earning differential in the SOS increases dramatically in 
the early reform period from 1988 to 1995, and then it levels out in 1999, while the 
earning gap in the NSOS decreases from 1988 to 1999. The contribution of different 
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treatments to employee characteristics to the total earning gap decreases in the early stage 
of economic reform, until coefficient differential became negative in favor of other 
workers in 1999. Such a pattern indicates that the economic reform in the SOS, and the 
privatization in the NSOS, made the Party premium disappear in the late 1990s. There is 
evidence that education played a more important role on the earning structure of other 
workers compared with CCP members in the SOS, while there was no such difference in 
the NSOS particularly before 1999; the investment on human capital did play an 
increasingly important role in the earning structure of NonCCP workers in two sectors 
throughout three stages of the economic reforms.  Furthermore, the two-stage selection 
correction estimation showed that nonrandom assignment of workers acted to increase 
the earning gap between CCP members and other workers in SOS during 1995 and 1999, 
while it decreased the earning gap in NSOS during 1988 and 1995. With an assumption 
of the selection effect differential solely representing varying returns to unobservable 
characteristics, the Party premium at SOS remained 11% to 12% during these three years. 
Further, it showed a decreasing trend at NSOS, from 20% in 1988 to 3% in 1999.  
Chapter 2 reviewed current empirical studies of economic impact of political capital 
in China. It mainly focused on personal investments on political capital and human 
capital in urban China. The studies were grouped into five categories, and their findings 
were discussed. The studies in the first category examined the returns to political capital 
and human capital. The second category analyzed if rent seeking exists if CCP 
membership is used as a device to collect benefits to favored groups. The third category 
examined whether membership is primarily determined by an individual’s demand or by 
the CCP's screening. The fourth category investigated whether the returns to Party 
membership decline over time. And finally, the fifth category analyzed how existing 
literatures address endogeneity of Party membership in earning equation in China. 
Chapter 3 began with a brief discussion of selection process for Party membership in 
China. The criteria for membership have changed over time along with the Party’s main 
goals. After changing the key task to economic modernization in 1978, CCP started to 
recruit those who were, “more revolutionary, younger, better educated and more 
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professionally competent”. The data showed an increasing educational level among CCP 
members after 1978.  
In Chapter 4, the theoretical model discussed in Liu (2003) was modified by adding 
an interaction term between people’s Party membership choice and ownership sector 
choice into the utility model. The sample was broken down into four groups based on 
their choices: CCP/SOS, NonCCP/SOS, CCP/NSOS and NonCCP/NSOS. Given four 
choices, the empirical model closely followed Lee (1983) to correct for selectivity bias. A 
very important issue in studying earning determination in the labor market is how to 
obtain unbiased estimates. By controlling for endogeneity of membership affiliation and 
ownership sector, selectivity bias was accounted for.  
Chapter 5 presented the final estimating earning equation for the workers who are 
falling into one of four categories based upon their choices. Then the dependent variable 
and independent variables were defined, and the effects of the control variables on the 
dependent variable were also discussed. Data were utilized from the 1988, 1995 and 1999 
Chinese Household Income Project (CHIP). The pros and cons of comparing CHIP data 
to NBS data was discussed, as was how the individuals were selected into the sample. A 
total of 5135 workers (out of 6579) were left for analysis after applying the selection 
criteria in 1999. Finally, the components of annual earning defined in this dissertation 
were examined, and detailed summary statistics were provided. 
The results from the two-stage selection correction model were presented in Chapter 
6. A Multinomial Logit model was applied as the first stage estimation. Workers were 
grouped into four categories based upon their choices of Party membership affiliation and 
ownership sectors. Then, the two-stage selection correction estimates in earning equation 
of each category were analyzed. The robustness of the results were checked by 
comparing the results of five common provinces for each year to those of all provinces 
for each year.  Finally, the earning differentials of CCP – NonCCP workers were 
decomposed in each sector, and predicted Party premium in each sector.  
In summary, this dissertation examines the effects of personal choices of political 
capital investment and ownership form of work unit on individuals’ earnings, relying on 
the empirical model developed by Lee (1983). Using CHIP data provided by CASS, 
 
169 
 
evidence was found to support that the contribution of higher education to CCP workers’ 
earnings is not as much as it is to other workers’ at SOS. The investments on the human 
capital did play an increasingly important role in the earning structure to NonCCP 
workers at SOS throughout three stages of economic reforms, and certainly more quickly 
and strongly than it did for CCP workers at SOS. The results at NSOS indicate that 
different returns brought by different educational levels became more significant to 
NonCCP workers than it did to CCP workers over time.  
Interestingly, the total CCP-NonCCP earning differential favoring CCP workers at 
SOS increased dramatically during the early reform period from 1988 to 1995 (24.7% to 
30%), then it leveled out (remaining at 30%) in 1999. It has decreased over time in NSOS, 
from 34% in 1988 to 25% in 1999. However, the unexplained proportion in both sectors 
decreased during these same three years. One of its components, the coefficient 
differential decreased over time and became negative in 1999. This indicates that Party 
premium which is due to varying returns to observables tended to disappear during the 
market liberalization in late 1990s.  
The findings also suggest that selectivity considerations act to increase the earning 
differential which is due to the different returns to the attributes between CCP and other 
workers at SOS, given that we know that individuals have chosen one of two alternatives 
in the SOS.  In the subsection of predicted Party premium, it was found that, with an 
assumption of selection effect differential solely representing varying returns to 
unobservable characteristics, the conditional Party premium at SOS remained 11% to 12% 
during these three years. Further, it showed a decreasing trend at NSOS, from 20% in 
1988 to 3% in 1999. The comparison of conditional Party premium between NSOS and 
SOS indicates that political capital played a less important role in the payment scheme in 
NSOS over time. During these three years, Party membership generated a larger earning 
premium in SOS among less educated workers in the same age cohort. However, in the 
late 1990s, it was not associated with higher predicted earnings in NSOS for the workers 
in either age cohort with a college degree.  
GDP in China had been growing at double digit rates from the 1970s to the early 
1990s (White, 2004). The growth rate surged again after 1997, which was partly due to 
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the extensive privatization in the late 1990s, in that NSOS could now gain more 
bargaining power over prices than before.  The evidence presented in this dissertation 
indicates that the Party premium in NSOS existed continuously but decreased during 
these three years. In contrast, the Party premium in SOS remained flat during the same 
period. Comparing to SOS, the Party premium in NSOS was higher in 1988 and then it 
was tied in 1995, but it became much smaller in 1999. There is no doubt that the Party 
card screens political skills. With an assumption that the NSOS is tied to the market and 
the returns are determined by productivity, the positive Party premium in the NSOS 
would indicate that the Party membership is a proxy for both political and productive 
skills. A flat Party premium in the SOS and a decreasing Party premium in the NSOS 
suggest that the Party card played a similar role (even more important role) in the 
payment scheme in the SOS during three years, whereas NSOS valued the political 
capital less and less over time. 
Economic reforms have potential impacts on income distribution. But, CCP 
membership is losing its earning power at least in the NSOS. As was found in this 
dissertation, the CCP would tend to alleviate the earning advantage of Party members that 
is due to unequal treatment to Party membership. Therefore, the challenge of public 
policy, as stated by Morduch and Sicular (2000), is if CCP should allow the labor market 
to be completely market-oriented so that other workers could totally and fairly compete 
with CCP members, or if CCP should permit the economic advantages of CCP members 
to secure the recruitment. The findings in this dissertation disclose that CCP sacrificed its 
benefits in order to achieve its economic goal. 
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APPENDICES   
Appendix A  
Table A.1 Description of Raw CHIP Data in Urban China 
Year 1988 1995 1999 
# of households 9,009 6,931 3,255 
# of persons 3,1827 21,694 9,637 
Provinces 
Anhui, Beijing, Gansu, 
Guangdong, Henan, 
Hubei, Jiangsu, 
Liaoning, Shanxi, 
Yunan. Liaoning and 
Shanxi 
Anhui, Beijing, 
Gansu, Guangdong, 
Henan, Hubei, 
Jiangsu, Liaoning, 
Shanxi, Yunan, and 
Sichuan 
Beijing, Gansu, 
Henan, Jiangsu, 
Liaoning, and 
Sichuan 
 
Number of 
provinces 10 11, adding Sichuan 6 
5 common 
Provinces in  all 
three years Beijing, Gansu, Henan, Jiangsu, Liaoning, 
10 common 
Provinces in 1988 
and 1995 
Anhui, Beijing, Gansu, Guangdong, Henan, 
Hubei, Jiangsu, Liaoning, Shanxi, and 
Yunan.  
6 common  
provinces in 1995 
and 1999  
Beijing, Gansu, Henan, Jiangsu, 
Liaoning, and Sichuan.  
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Appendix B  
Additional Information on Table 5.1  
The CHIP sample in Table 1 includes only individuals in three survey years that are 
between 18 and 65 years of age and currently employed in urban area. CHIP survey in 
the urban area includes only households with urban registration (hukou). But it excludes 
most rural-urban migrant households. The exclusion of the floating population from the 
rural area might be one of reasons why percentage of SOS in CHIP is higher than that of 
NBS.  
All NBS data is from Chinese Statistical Year book 2000. NBS Data of SOS units 
come from Urban data in the Table ‘5-4 Number of Employed Persons at the Year-end by 
Residence in Urban and Rural Areas’. It includes the data by ownership in urban and 
rural areas, respectively.  
The following is how NBS defines employed persons: Employed Persons refer to the 
persons who are engaged in social working and receive remuneration payment or earn 
business income, including total staff and workers, re-employed retirees, employers of 
private enterprises, self-employed workers, employees in private enterprises and 
individual economy, employees in township enterprises(in rural area), employed persons 
in the rural areas, and other employed persons (including teachers in the schools run by 
the local people, people engaged in religious profession and the servicemen, etc.). This 
indicator reflects the actual utilization of total labor force during a certain period of time 
and is often used for the research on China’s economic situation and national power. 
From the same table, I take the provinces that are included in CHIP survey. Table B.1 
shows the distribution of ownership by regions and its subtotal. Comparing to % SOS 
including all provinces in the NBS (59% and 41%), %SOS in the provinces covered in 
CHIP survey is bigger (64% and 55%), but still smaller than %SOS in CHIP sample. One 
of reason would be that CHIP survey did not include floating population from the rural 
area. The floating population from the rural area usually works in the NSOS. 
NBS Data of Male come from the Table ‘4-1 Population and its Composition’, 
including population in both urban and rural area. But there is No gender information for 
urban and rural area separately. NBS data in 1988was adjusted on the basis of the 1982 
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and 1990 National Population census. Since 1990, NBS data have been estimated on the 
basis of the annual National Sample Surveys on population changes.  
China Statistical Year Book 2000 include Table ‘5-20 Average Wage of Staff and 
Workers and Related Indices’, Table ‘5-23 Average Wage of Staff and Workers in State-
owned Units by Sector’, Table ‘5-24 Average Wage of Staff and Workers in Urban 
Collective-owned Units by Sector’, Table ‘5-22 Average Wage of Staff and Workers in 
Units of Other Types of Ownership by Sector’. The information on Staff and Workers is 
more comparable to the CHIP sample of workers in urban China. Table 5.1 shows the 
average wage from NBS and CHIP. In the book, the ownerships in rural areas include 
township and village enterprises, private enterprises and self-employed individuals, while 
the ownerships in urban area include State-owned Units, urban collective-owned units 
and other ownerships such as limited liability cooperation. 
Here is the definition Staff and workers in each table by NBS: 
Staff and Workers in State-owned Economic Units refer to the persons who work in 
the state-owned economic units or their attached units and are listed in their payrolls.  
Staff and Workers of Collective Owned Units in Urban Areas refer to the persons 
who work in collective owned units in urban areas and their administration departments 
and receive payment there. 
Staff and Workers in Units of Other types of Ownership refer to those who work in 
(and receive payment there) enterprises and institutions of joint ownership, share holding, 
foreign ownership, and ownership by entrepreneurs from Hong Kong, Macao, and 
Taiwan. 
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Table B.1 Distribution of Ownership Forms – NBS v.s. CHIP 
 NBS  CHIP 
1995 
State-
owned 
Units 
Non-
State-
owned 
Units  
State-
owned 
Units 
Non-
State-
owned 
Units 
Beijing 4.3% 1.7%  6.2% 0.7% 
Liaoning 8.2% 5.5%  8.9% 1.9% 
Jiangsu 6.8% 4.8%  7.6% 3.3% 
Henan 7.5% 3.3%  7.3% 1.4% 
Gansu 2.6% 0.8%  4.6% 0.6% 
Sichuan 8.8% 4.8%  9.6% 2.2% 
Shanxi 4.5% 1.5%  8.6% 1.0% 
Anhui 4.4% 2.7%  5.3% 1.9% 
Hubei 6.8% 3.7%  8.8% 1.3% 
Guangdong 6.6% 6.7%  6.3% 2.6% 
Yunnan 3.2% 1.0%  8.6% 1.2% 
Subtotal 63.6% 36.3%   81.8% 18.2% 
 
 NBS  CHIP 
1999 
State-
owned 
Units 
Non-
State-
owned 
Units  
State-
owned 
Units 
Non-
State-
owned 
Units 
Beijing 7.1% 3.9%  13.0% 3.1% 
Liaoning 11.1% 10.1%  10.8% 4.7% 
Jiangsu 11.3% 10.6%  13.3% 3.1% 
Henan 11.8% 10.3%  15.9% 2.8% 
Gansu 4.2% 2.3%  11.3% 2.2% 
Sichuan 10.0% 6.9%  14.9% 4.9% 
Subtotal 55.4% 44.2%   79.2% 20.8% 
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Appendix C  
Additional Information from NBS 
Regarding NBS data on the education, I can only find the information at an overall 
level without separating urban area from rural area in 1999. In the same year, there is 
another table ‘5-28 Composition of Employed Persons by Educational Level and by 
Region’, including urban and rural area together. NBS does not have the categories 
‘professional school’ and ‘two-year College’. 
Regarding NBS data on age decomposition, I can only find the information for 1995 
and 1999 without separating urban data from rural data. In order to compare to NBS data, 
I use the full CHIP sample in urban area rather that current workers only (See Table C.1). 
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Table C.1 Distribution of Age Cohorts - NBS v.s. CHIP  
Age composition 
1995 1999   
NSB 
CHIP 
(URBAN) NSB 
CHIP 
(URBAN)   
Age 0 - 14 3,306,220 3,646 290,145 1,222   
 26.73% 16.80% 23.94% 12.68%   
Age 15 - 64 8,232,607 16,728 829,312 7,437   
 66.57% 77.09% 68.43% 77.17%   
Age 65 and over 828,127 1,317 92,507 972   
 6.70% 6.07% 7.63% 10.09%   
Total 12,366,954 21,698 1,211,965 9,637   
Note: The data in 1995 from NSB are from the sampling survey in Oct.1 1995. The sample proportion is 1.04%. 
The data in 1999 from NSB are from the sampling survey on population changes in 1999. The sample fraction is 
0.976‰. 
CHIP data in this table include all individuals in urban data rather than current workers only. 
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Appendix D  
Additional Information on Economic Sectors 
Based on the data and classification of ownership sectors, same economic sector could 
exist in both ownership sectors. For example, a firm in health sector could a State-owned 
firm or a Non-state owned firm. I did a robust test with a specification without economic 
sector dummies from first and second stage. It was found that exclusion of economic 
sectors did not significantly change the economic significance of the coefficients. The 
test results are available upon a request. 
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Table D.1 Distribution of Economic Sectors in CHIP 
Year 
Ownership 
Sectors 
Economic Sectors 
industry 
construc
tion 
transpo
rtation commerce 
real_es
tate health arts organization 
otherecose
ctor Total 
1988 
NSOS 2,161 172 164 769 145 82 40 39 211 3,783 
SOS 5,256 427 1,007 1,746 282 720 1,223 1,450 1,426 13,537 
Total 7,417 599 1,171 2,515 427 802 1,263 1,489 1,637 17,320 
1995 
NSOS 1,062 57 82 426 120 35 26 42 78 1,928 
SOS 3,324 251 459 1,110 293 453 755 1,236 771 8,652 
Total 4,386 308 541 1,536 413 488 781 1,278 849 10,580 
1999 
NSOS 348 33 56 184 41 27 16 13 207 925 
SOS 955 159 403 225 230 212 366 425 556 3,531 
Total 1,303 192 459 409 271 239 382 438 763 4,456 
Note: # of workers is shown in each cell                 
Year 
Ownership 
Sectors 
Economic Sectors 
industry 
construc
tion 
transpo
rtation commerce 
real_es
tate health arts organization 
otherecose
ctor Total 
1988 
NSOS 29% 29% 14% 31% 34% 10% 3% 3% 13% 22% 
SOS 71% 71% 86% 69% 66% 90% 97% 97% 87% 78% 
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
1995 
NSOS 24% 19% 15% 28% 29% 7% 3% 3% 9% 18% 
SOS 76% 81% 85% 72% 71% 93% 97% 97% 91% 82% 
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
1999 
NSOS 27% 17% 12% 45% 15% 11% 4% 3% 27% 21% 
SOS 73% 83% 88% 55% 85% 89% 96% 97% 73% 79% 
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
Note: % of Rows is shown in each cell                 
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Table D.1 (Continued): Distribution of Economic Sectors in CHIP 
Year 
Ownership 
Sectors 
Economic Sectors 
industr
y 
constru
ction 
transp
ortatio
n 
commerc
e 
real_e
state 
healt
h arts 
organizatio
n 
otherecos
ector Total 
1988 
NSOS 57% 5% 4% 20% 4% 2% 1% 1% 6% 100% 
SOS 39% 3% 7% 13% 2% 5% 9% 11% 11% 100% 
Total 43% 3% 7% 15% 2% 5% 7% 9% 9% 100% 
1995 
NSOS 55% 3% 4% 22% 6% 2% 1% 2% 4% 100% 
SOS 38% 3% 5% 13% 3% 5% 9% 14% 9% 100% 
Total 41% 3% 5% 15% 4% 5% 7% 12% 8% 100% 
1999 
NSOS 38% 4% 6% 20% 4% 3% 2% 1% 22% 100% 
SOS 27% 5% 11% 6% 7% 6% 10% 12% 16% 100% 
Total 29% 4% 10% 9% 6% 5% 9% 10% 17% 100% 
Note: % of Columns is shown in each cell                 
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Appendix E  
Suppose ijε and ijω are joint normally distributed (Heckman 1974) as the following: 
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where εσ  is the standard deviation of the error term ijε , ωερ  is the correlation 
coefficient between ijε and *ijω . 
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Appendix F  
Table F.1 Pairwise Comparision of Coefficients: CCP/SOS v.s. NonCCP/SOS 
 Coefficient S.E. Difference Test statistic  
1988 CCP/SOS NonCCP/SOS CCP/SOS NonCCP/SOS  
Absolute 
Value  
four years' college or more 0.167 0.293 0.039 0.017 -0.126 2.96 *** 
two or three years' college 0.113 0.198 0.042 0.016 -0.085 1.89 ** 
professional school 0.051 0.126 0.027 0.01 -0.075 2.60 *** 
senior high school  0.045 0.066 0.02 0.009 -0.021 0.96  
Male 0.027 0.097 0.028 0.007 -0.07 2.43 *** 
        
 Coefficient S.E. Difference Test statistic  
1995 CCP/SOS NonCCP/SOS CCP/SOS NonCCP/SOS  Difference  
four years' college or more 0.219 0.383 0.064 0.028 -0.164 2.35 *** 
two or three years' college 0.138 0.247 0.061 0.022 -0.109 1.68 ** 
professional school 0.07 0.198 0.046 0.022 -0.128 2.51 *** 
senior high school  0.03 0.072 0.041 0.019 -0.042 0.93  
Male 0.05 0.14 0.044 0.014 -0.09 1.95 ** 
 Coefficient S.E. Difference Wald statistic  
1999 CCP/SOS NonCCP/SOS CCP/SOS NonCCP/SOS  Difference  
four years' college or more 0.355 0.616 0.128 0.048 -0.261 1.91 ** 
two or three years' college 0.277 0.385 0.105 0.037 -0.108 0.97  
professional school 0.13 0.193 0.084 0.036 -0.063 0.69  
senior high school  0.019 0.116 0.062 0.028 -0.097 1.43 * 
Male 0.064 0.086 0.043 0.023 -0.022 0.45  
* p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01        
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Table F.2  Comparison of Coefficients in CCP/SOS across Time 
CCP/SOS 1988 1995 1988 1995    
 Coefficient S.E. Difference 
Test 
statistic  
four years' college or more 0.167 0.219 0.039 0.064 0.052 0.69  
two or three years' college 0.113 0.138 0.042 0.061 0.025 0.34  
professional school 0.051 0.07 0.027 0.046 0.019 0.36  
senior high school  0.045 0.03 0.02 0.041 -0.015 -0.33  
male 0.027 0.05 0.028 0.044 0.023 0.44  
        
CCP/SOS 1995 1999 1995 1999    
 Coefficient S.E. Difference 
Test 
statistic  
four years' college or more 0.219 0.355 0.064 0.128 0.136 0.95  
two or three years' college 0.138 0.277 0.061 0.105 0.139 1.14  
professional school 0.07 0.13 0.046 0.084 0.06 0.63  
senior high school  0.03 0.019 0.041 0.062 -0.011 -0.15  
male 0.05 0.064 0.044 0.043 0.014 0.23  
        
CCP/SOS 1988 1999 1988 1999    
 Coefficient S.E. Difference 
Test 
statistic  
four years' college or more 0.167 0.355 0.039 0.128 0.188 1.40 * 
two or three years' college 0.113 0.277 0.042 0.105 0.164 1.45 * 
professional school 0.051 0.13 0.027 0.084 0.079 0.90  
senior high school  0.045 0.019 0.02 0.062 -0.026 -0.40  
male 0.027 0.064 0.028 0.043 0.037 0.72  
* p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01 
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Table F.3  Comparison of Coefficients in NonCCP/SOS across Time 
NonCCP/SOS 1988 1995 1988 1995    
 Coefficient S.E. Difference 
Test 
statistic  
four years' college or more 0.293 0.383 0.017 0.028 0.09 2.75 *** 
two or three years' college 0.198 0.247 0.016 0.022 0.049 1.80 ** 
professional school 0.126 0.198 0.01 0.022 0.072 2.98 *** 
senior high school  0.066 0.072 0.009 0.019 0.006 0.29  
Male 0.097 0.14 0.007 0.014 0.043 2.75 *** 
        
NonCCP/SOS 1995 1999 1995 1999    
 Coefficient S.E. Difference 
Test 
statistic  
four years' college or more 0.383 0.616 0.028 0.048 0.233 4.19 *** 
two or three years' college 0.247 0.385 0.022 0.037 0.138 3.21 *** 
professional school 0.198 0.193 0.022 0.036 -0.005 -0.12  
senior high school  0.072 0.116 0.019 0.028 0.044 1.30 * 
Male 0.14 0.086 0.014 0.023 -0.054 -2.01 ** 
        
NonCCP/SOS 1988 1999 1988 1999    
 Coefficient S.E. Difference 
Test 
statistic  
four years' college or more 0.293 0.616 0.017 0.048 0.323 6.34 *** 
two or three years' college 0.198 0.385 0.016 0.037 0.187 4.64 *** 
professional school 0.126 0.193 0.01 0.036 0.067 1.79 ** 
senior high school  0.066 0.116 0.009 0.028 0.05 1.70 ** 
Male 0.097 0.086 0.007 0.023 -0.011 -0.46  
* p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01        
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Table F.4 Pairwise Comparision of Coefficients: CCP/NSOS v.s. NonCCP/NSOS 
 
 Coefficient S.E. Test statistic  
1988 CCP/NSOS NonCCP/NSOS CCP/NSOS NonCCP/NSOS Difference  
four years' college or more 0.27 -0.144 0.098 0.263 1.48 * 
two or three years' college 0.229 -0.039 0.1 0.172 1.35 * 
professional school 0.097 -0.074 0.079 0.144 1.04  
senior high school  0.107 0.048 0.074 0.057 0.63  
Male 0.147 0.041 0.06 0.071 1.14  
 
  
    
 Coefficient S.E. Test statistic  
1995 CCP/NSOS NonCCP/NSOS CCP/NSOS NonCCP/NSOS Difference  
four years' college or more 0.285 0.499 0.188 0.149 0.89  
two or three years' college 0.174 0.335 0.118 0.091 1.08  
professional school 0.255 0.253 0.091 0.079 -0.02  
senior high school  0.154 0.083 0.09 0.04 -0.72  
Male 0.122 0.154 0.074 0.034 -0.39  
       
 Coefficient S.E. Test statistic  
1999 CCP/NSOS NonCCP/NSOS CCP/NSOS NonCCP/NSOS Difference  
four years' college or more 0.501 0.688 0.269 0.138 0.62  
two or three years' college 0.137 0.497 0.206 0.091 1.60 * 
professional school 0.178 0.267 0.165 0.088 0.48  
senior high school  -0.005 0.216 0.136 0.066 1.46 * 
Male 0.369 0.251 0.098 0.047 1.09  
* p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01       
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Table F.5  Comparison of Coefficients in CCP/NSOS across Time 
CCP/NSOS 1988 1995 1988 1995    
 Coefficient S.E. Difference 
Test 
statistic  
four years' college or more 0.27 0.285 0.098 0.188 0.015 0.07  
two or three years' college 0.229 0.174 0.1 0.118 -0.055 -0.36  
professional school 0.097 0.255 0.079 0.091 0.158 1.31 * 
senior high school  0.107 0.154 0.074 0.09 0.047 0.40  
Male 0.147 0.122 0.06 0.074 -0.025 -0.26  
        
CCP/NSOS 1995 1999 1995 1999    
 Coefficient S.E. Difference 
Test 
statistic  
four years' college or more 0.285 0.501 0.188 0.269 0.216 0.66  
two or three years' college 0.174 0.137 0.118 0.206 -0.037 -0.16  
professional school 0.255 0.178 0.091 0.165 -0.077 -0.41  
senior high school  0.154 -0.005 0.09 0.136 -0.159 -0.97  
Male 0.122 0.369 0.074 0.098 0.247 2.01 ** 
        
CCP/NSOS 1988 1999 1988 1999    
 Coefficient S.E. Difference 
Test 
statistic  
four years' college or more 0.27 0.501 0.098 0.269 0.231 0.81  
two or three years' college 0.229 0.137 0.1 0.206 -0.092 -0.40  
professional school 0.097 0.178 0.079 0.165 0.081 0.44  
senior high school  0.107 -0.005 0.074 0.136 -0.112 -0.72  
Male 0.147 0.369 0.06 0.098 0.222 1.93 ** 
* p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01        
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Table F.6  Comparison of Coefficients in NonCCP/NSOS across Time 
NonCCP/NSOS 1988 1995 1988 1995    
 Coefficient S.E. Difference 
Test 
statistic  
four years' college or more -0.144 0.499 0.263 0.149 0.643 2.13 ** 
two or three years' college -0.039 0.335 0.172 0.091 0.374 1.92 ** 
professional school -0.074 0.253 0.144 0.079 0.327 1.99 ** 
senior high school  0.048 0.083 0.057 0.04 0.035 0.50  
Male 0.041 0.154 0.071 0.034 0.113 1.44 * 
        
NonCCP/NSOS 1995 1999 1995 1999    
 Coefficient S.E. Difference 
Test 
statistic  
four years' college or more 0.499 0.688 0.149 0.138 0.189 0.93  
two or three years' college 0.335 0.497 0.091 0.091 0.162 1.26  
professional school 0.253 0.267 0.079 0.088 0.014 0.12  
senior high school  0.083 0.216 0.04 0.066 0.133 1.72 ** 
Male 0.154 0.251 0.034 0.047 0.097 1.67 ** 
        
NonCCP/NSOS 1988 1999 1988 1999    
 Coefficient S.E. Difference 
Test 
statistic  
four years' college or more -0.144 0.688 0.263 0.138 0.832 2.80 *** 
two or three years' college -0.039 0.497 0.172 0.091 0.536 2.75 *** 
professional school -0.074 0.267 0.144 0.088 0.341 2.02 ** 
senior high school  0.048 0.216 0.057 0.066 0.168 1.93 ** 
Male 0.041 0.251 0.071 0.047 0.21 2.47 *** 
* p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01        
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Table F.7  Comparison of Coefficients in NonCCP/NSOS across Time 
 Coefficient S.E. Test statistic  1988 CCP/SOS CCP/NSOS CCP/SOS CCP/NSOS Difference 
 four years' college or more 0.167 0.27 0.039 0.098 0.98  
two or three years' college 0.113 0.229 0.042 0.1 1.07  
professional school 0.051 0.097 0.027 0.079 0.55  
senior high school  0.045 0.107 0.02 0.074 0.81  
Male 0.027 0.147 0.028 0.06 1.81 ** 
       
 Coefficient S.E. Test statistic  1995 CCP/SOS CCP/NSOS CCP/SOS CCP/NSOS Difference 
 four years' college or more 0.219 0.285 0.064 0.188 -0.33  
two or three years' college 0.138 0.174 0.061 0.118 -0.27  
professional school 0.07 0.255 0.046 0.091 -1.81 ** 
senior high school  0.03 0.154 0.041 0.09 -1.25  
Male 0.05 0.122 0.044 0.074 0.84  
       
 Coefficient S.E. Test statistic  1999 CCP/SOS CCP/NSOS CCP/SOS CCP/NSOS Difference 
 four years' college or more 0.355 0.501 0.128 0.269 -0.49  
two or three years' college 0.277 0.137 0.105 0.206 0.61  
professional school 0.13 0.178 0.084 0.165 -0.26  
senior high school  0.019 -0.005 0.062 0.136 0.16  
Male 0.064 0.369 0.043 0.098 2.85 *** 
* p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01        
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Table F.8 Pairwise Comparision of Coefficients: NonCCP/SOS v.s. NonCCP/NSOS 
 Coefficient S.E. Test statistic 
 1988 NCCP/SOS NonCCP/NSOS NCCP/SOS NonCCP/NSOS Difference 
 four years' college or more 0.293 -0.144 0.017 0.263 -1.66 ** 
two or three years' college 0.198 -0.039 0.016 0.172 -1.37 * 
professional school 0.126 -0.074 0.01 0.144 -1.39 * 
senior high school  0.066 0.048 0.009 0.057 -0.31  
Male 0.097 0.041 0.007 0.071 -0.78  
       
 Coefficient S.E. Test statistic  1995 NCCP/SOS NonCCP/NSOS NCCP/SOS NonCCP/NSOS Difference 
 four years' college or more 0.383 0.499 0.028 0.149 0.77  
two or three years' college 0.247 0.335 0.022 0.091 0.94  
professional school 0.198 0.253 0.022 0.079 0.67  
senior high school  0.072 0.083 0.019 0.04 0.25  
Male 0.14 0.154 0.014 0.034 0.38  
        Coefficient S.E. Test statistic  1999 NCCP/SOS NonCCP/NSOS NCCP/SOS NonCCP/NSOS wald statistic 
 four years' college or more 0.616 0.688 0.048 0.138 0.49  
two or three years' college 0.385 0.497 0.037 0.091 1.14  
professional school 0.193 0.267 0.036 0.088 0.78  
senior high school  0.116 0.216 0.028 0.066 1.39 * 
Male 0.086 0.251 0.023 0.047 3.15 *** 
* p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01 
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Appendix G 
Figure G.1 Component of Earning Differential in Two Sectors – Weight = 0 
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Figure G.2 Proportion of Components of Earnings Equations in Two Sectors – Weight = 0 
 
1988 1995 1999
Selection Differential -5.23% 23.71% 53.55%
Coefficient Differential on 
Observables 24.80% -8.16% -40.35%
Endowment Differential 80.43% 84.45% 86.80%
80.43% 84.45%
86.80%
24.80%
-8.16%
-40.35%
-5.23%
23.71%
53.55%
-40%
-20%
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
Proportion of Components of Earning Differentials in SOS
(Averge CCP/SOS Worker as Reference Attributes)
1988 1995 1999
Selection Differential -136.83% -37.20% 88.30%
Coefficient Differential on 
Observables 218.80% 86.91% -80.53%
Endowment Differential 18.03% 50.29% 92.22%
18.03%
50.29% 92.22%
218.80%
86.91%
-80.53%-136.83%
-37.20%
88.30%
-40%
-20%
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
Proportion of Components of Earning Differentials in 
NSOS
(Averge CCP/NSOS Worker as Reference Attributes)
 
 
191 
Figure G.3 Endowment and Unexplained Differential in Two Sectors – Weight = 0  
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Figure G.4 Proportion of Endowment and Unexplained Differentials in Two Sectors – Weight = 0 
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Appendix H  
Additional Robust Test on Instrument Variables 
Ideally, identification variables are expected to impact only people’s choice but not 
their earning level. The finding of significant coefficients of these variables in the 
multinomial model provides evidences to meet the first requirement. To test if they meet 
the second requirement, I conduct a test which is similar to an overidentification test. I 
obtain a residual from the regression of annual earnings of individuals on all exogenous 
variables for each alternative, and then I run a regression of the residual on these 
identification variables. It is found that the identification variable, ‘nature of recruitment’ 
is not statistically significant in the CCP/SOS, CCP/NSOS and NonCCP/NSOS 
categories in 1995. The ‘parental Party membership affiliation’ and ‘mother’s years of 
schooling’ do not have statistically significantly impact on the annual earnings in any 
category, while the coefficient of ‘nature of recruitment’ is not statistically significant in 
the CCP/SOS and NonCCP/NSOS categories and that of ‘father’s years of schooling’ is 
statistically significant in NonCCP/SOS category only. It further provides statistical 
evidence that the identification variables considered in the paper are valid. 
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